Mr. Wallis writes that, “theism is just as ill-equipped as nontheism to answer the epistemic problem of induction.” In this statement is an apparent acknowledgement that non-theism is unable or at any rate “ill-equipped” to “answer the epistemic problem of induction.” We will set aside this concession regarding the problem of induction in a non-theistic worldview and go directly to the objection to justifying induction in the context of the Christian worldview.
The problem Mr. Wallis has with attempting to justify induction in the Christian worldview does not concern the content of the answer Christian theology provides. Rather Mr. Wallis …
Mr. Wallis claims that, “we simply must use induction, because we have no other means of planning for action in the world.” An interesting claim to be sure, but it is not clear what Mr. Wallis means by this statement or how Mr. Wallis could know that it is true.He nevertheless concludes from this statement that, “no epistemic ‘problem’ of induction need cause us an abundance of concern.” Even more strange is that Wallis offers these statements as constituting an “objection” to the following argument that he quotes from me from our debate:
The so-called argument from design by well-meaning “Apologists” has, we believe, done much more harm than good, for it has attempted to bring down the great God to the level of finite comprehension, and thereby has lost sight of his solitary excellence.
Analogy has been drawn between a savage finding a watch upon the sands, and from a close examination of it he infers a watch-maker. So far so good. But attempt to go further: suppose that savage sits down on the sand and endeavors to form to himself a conception of this watch-maker, his personal affections and manners; his
Paul Manata has written another one of his excellent reviews. Though I have already read the book, I have been hoping that he would review Michael Sudduth’s The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology and Manata has not disappointed. The book is rather expensive and has much to say that many of those who object to Natural Theology are not going to want to hear. Thus I do not look forward to many people reading the work even though they should. In light of this the review is especially helpful. You may find it here.
Historically, when David Hume and Immanuel Kant exposed the invalidity of the theistic proofs, apologists generally balked at returning to revelation as the basis for their certainty of God’s existence. They elected, rather, to maintain status in the the blinded eyes of the “worldly wise” by attempting to prove Christianity’s credibility by means of arguments that hopefully pointed toward the probability of God’s existence and Scripture’s truth. They settled for a mere presumption (plus pragmatic assurance) in favor of a few salvaged items (i.e., “fundamentals”) from the Christian system. Refusing to presuppose the sovereign God revealed in the Bible
Recently the “Bahnsen Burner” Dawson Bethrick took a swing at Choosing Hats founder and administrator Brian Knapp’s contribution to The Portable Presuppositionalist as a part of his ongoing attempt to provide an answer to the Problem of Induction from within the confines of the Objectivist worldview. Mr. Bethrick quotes from page 124 of Knapp’s “Induction and the Unbeliever” in The Portable Presuppostionalist where Knapp asks, “Why do you believe nature is uniform, and how is that belief rationally justified?” Bethrick begins to provide an answer early in his post as follows:
The “Bahnsen Burner” Dawson Bethrick is busy writing a number of posts concerning the Problem of Induction that I discussed with him some time ago. In his most recent post Mr. Bethrick repeats where he thinks David Hume went wrong on induction thus allegedly setting himself up for a future post on how Objectivism rids itself of the so-called “problem” of induction. Setting aside a number of mistakes in his exegesis of Hume Mr. Bethrick shows that his last thread of hope in the area of induction will not hold the weight he wants to place on it.
Hume is similar to Nietzsche in that he attacks philosophical norms, but what is pertinent to this article is that he likewise attacks religion. Hume finds many philosophical worries with religion. One of these worries is with the inadequacies of supposed proofs such as arguments from experience and miracles, which are at the core of many religions.
Hume presents a proof for the existence of God from experience through the character Cleanthes. This is the popular argument from design, which contends that since there is in the universe design and order there must also be a designer. After …
Mitch LeBlanc continues to espouse his inconsistencies regarding induction in his most recent post found here – http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/further-thoughts-and-clarifications-on-induction-and-the-christian-god/
Mitch Admits His Problem
He writes, “…I simply mean to suggest that one should be as skeptical about the problem of induction as the problem is skeptical of inductive reasoning itself.” With this he begs the question. I pointed out that he did so in his previous post and he continues to do so now. The existence of debate regarding a given topic does not entail skepticism. If he is unsure of whether or not there is a Problem of Induction then …