Category: Objections and Misconceptions
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The things you find while not looking for them…
“NB that choosing hats errantly supposes that by rational Bahnsen means deductive. But anyone with even a modicum of familiarity with Bahnsen and Van Til would know that both of them considered induction rational.” – Mark
Someone taking shots at me and my understanding of Bahnsen from afar as it were recently made the claim quoted above. I responded to his entire argument here.
Tonight as I was scanning Bahnsen for something completely unrelated I happened across the context of the passage from Bahnsen that was the focus of the discussion Mark was responding to.
…But we realize even
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“Silly” Arguments
The attempts of liberals to interpret Scripture according to their own would-be autonomous categories have always struck me as exercises in futility due to the admission that they have already rejected Scripture anyway. The lengths to which people will go in an attempt to justify sin in themselves and in others are rather incredible. One can know this by taking a look at how one attempts to justify one’s own sin. [Edit: Payton Alexander has expressed to me that he does not wish to be labeled a liberal. I cannot find any place where I have given him that label.]…
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Science Is Guesswork
A recent visitor to Choosing Hats who goes by the name “noen” made a few comments which imply that he does not believe the material on the site is up to his ‘standards’. For example in response to the post here he wrote, “Not really impressed” and “The argument is without merit”. Of course I doubt that the post was written with the intention of impressing noen, and he merely asserts that “the argument” (it is unclear what argument he is referring to) is “without merit” but never explains why he thinks this way.
He also commented here to ask, …
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Zao Thanatoo’s Final Response To Mitch LeBlanc On TAG
In a post with the title Zao Thanatoo’s Response To Mitch LeBlanc Regarding TAG I linked to an exchange between Zao Thanatoo and Mitch LeBlanc concerning an article written by LeBlanc on TAG.
Zao Thanatoo has written his second and final response which may be found here.…
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Zao Thanatoo’s Response To Mitch LeBlanc Regarding TAG
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Knapp’s “Induction and the Unbeliever”
Recently the “Bahnsen Burner” Dawson Bethrick took a swing at Choosing Hats founder and administrator Brian Knapp’s contribution to The Portable Presuppositionalist as a part of his ongoing attempt to provide an answer to the Problem of Induction from within the confines of the Objectivist worldview. Mr. Bethrick quotes from page 124 of Knapp’s “Induction and the Unbeliever” in The Portable Presuppostionalist where Knapp asks, “Why do you believe nature is uniform, and how is that belief rationally justified?” Bethrick begins to provide an answer early in his post as follows:
…[N]ature is uniform on its own, independent of
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David Hume Is Rolling In His Grave
The “Bahnsen Burner” Dawson Bethrick is busy writing a number of posts concerning the Problem of Induction that I discussed with him some time ago. In his most recent post Mr. Bethrick repeats where he thinks David Hume went wrong on induction thus allegedly setting himself up for a future post on how Objectivism rids itself of the so-called “problem” of induction. Setting aside a number of mistakes in his exegesis of Hume Mr. Bethrick shows that his last thread of hope in the area of induction will not hold the weight he wants to place on it.
Objectivists constantly …
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A Fristian Strikes Out Revisited: Response to “Theo Beza”
Not too long ago I posted regarding a Fristianity Style Counter (FSC) to TAG from “John Calvin”. You may find the post here (https://choosinghats.org/?p=876) but it is reposted below.
In that post the particular FSC that John Calvin had offered was in my view successfully refuted by appealing to an analogous argument offered by Paul Manata. An individual commenting on the post using the name “Theo Beza” offered a series of irrelevant and hence unsuccessful objections to my critique of the FSC. Here I will repost A Fristian Strikes Out in order to provide the context needed to …
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Science Is Not That Simple (Part 3)
Chalmers also challenges the idea that facts provide a firm and reliable foundation for scientific knowledge. This argument falls in line with the other arguments.
Further difficulties concerning the reliability of the observational basis of science arise from some of the ways in which judgments about the adequacy of observation statements draw on presupposed knowledge in a way that renders those judgments fallible.1
Chalmers uses the example of Aristotle’s idea that fire is a substance. Fire was observed, and it could be seen rising into the air so that it seemed accurate to say that fire …
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Science Is Not That Simple (Part 2)
(For the first part of Science Is Not That Simple click here.)
Chalmers argues against the common idea that facts precede and are separate from theory. Chalmers starts his argument out against this common idea by explaining the ambiguity of the term “fact”.
…It can refer to a statement that expresses the fact and it can also refer to the state of affairs referred to by such a statement. For example, it is a fact that there are mountains and craters on the moon. Here the fact can be taken as referring to the mountains or craters themselves. Alternatively,