The New Euthyphro

There are countless angles to take in approaching the somewhat difficult task of teaching covenantal/presuppositional apologetics. What follows may be one of them.

Socrates famously asked, “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” The so-called Euthyphro Dilemma has haunted and warmed the halls of the academy ever since.

The difficulty with answering that the good is willed by God because it is good is that the standard of good in this view exists quite apart from and in superiority to God. God appeals to a notion of moral good above and beyond Himself. God is neither an ultimate nor necessary standard of morality.

The difficulty with answering that the good is good because it is willed by God is that the standard of good in this view exists arbitrarily and in possible contradiction to moral facts. What is morally good is arbitrary, because it is wholly dependent upon the will of God.

Typically Christian apologists respond to this philosophical problem by identifying it as a false dilemma and splitting its ‘horns.’ It is simply not correct to speak of the standard of good apart from God, or according to His arbitrary will, for God is the very standard of good in question, and His will is in accord with His nature. God has might, yes, but He is also the right. The traditional answer to the Euthyphro Dilemma goes on from there.

But I would like to suggest that we reject God as the very standard, essence, enforcer, or whatever ‘of good’ for the sake of argument. Let’s twist the dilemma just a tad and reapply it to the haughty unbeliever. Is the good willed by the individual because it is good, or is it good because it is willed by the individual?

If the good is willed by the individual because it is good, then good exists quite apart from and superior to the individual. But it is difficult to imagine what on earth (pun intended) this would look like. Even if there were some external, objective, universal standard of good that exists outside of the individual, it is apparently not immediately knowable, and I can think of no reason to live by it. What does it mean for such a standard to exist superior to the individual? The individual has nothing to do with what is considered good, and should in the end find such an alleged standard rather irrelevant. Submission to some such standard rids one of the freedom of autonomy so often cherished in unbelieving circles. Positing ‘society’ as the standard in question is precluded by the very nature of this horn of the dilemma, for society consists of a group of individuals, and in this side of the dilemma good exists apart from the individual. There are many other worries, but none that time and space permit me to write about here.

If the good is good because it is willed by the individual, then moral good is rather arbitrary. What is good just becomes relative to the individual. But then there are as many moral standards as there are people to hold them. Even if two people were to agree completely on all of their moral ‘standards,’ it would not follow that they agreed on anything more than a merely formal level, for the alleged standards, values, facts, whatever are such solely in virtue of each individual. Ann thinks murder is wrong ultimately because Ann thinks it is wrong, whereas Barb ultimately believes murder is wrong because Barb thinks it is wrong. There can be no true agreement upon moral facts. A spin off of this view might be moral subjectivism. Disliking rape is a bit like disliking vanilla icecream. Perhaps it just isn’t exciting enough. Or maybe it’s icky. Horrible suggestions, I know, but if you have ever spent much time around, say, New Atheists, you know that they suggest much worse than that.

Of course I’m not going to pretend that unbelievers have not attempted to come up with a variety of complex responses to this metaethical mess that they have on their hands. But the very fact that such complex responses are so varied should tell us something. Left to themselves, unbelievers would not know how to be truly good if their lives depended upon it. And their lives do depend upon it. That is why we preach and pray that they might turn from their repeated offenses against the essentially good, almighty God and toward His Son the Lord Jesus Christ through faith.

Jesus Christ lived the truly good life and died in the place of those who never could live it. Redemption from our sins is ours’ in Jesus Christ through faith in Him. The very standard of moral good became incarnate, lived the perfect life, died for those who could not, and was raised again just as we shall be raised if only we trust in Him.


17 Comments

Patrick Mefford

I don’t think the Euthyphro dilemma as it is poised commonly by both atheists and Christians (and in this post) is really true to the text itself, nor what the real question Plato is raising. The question asked by Socrates “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods? is a trick question meant to stumble Euthyphro, it’s not even a real dilemma since one half of the disjunction is manifestly false.

All we have is the text Mr. Bolt, and you presuppositionalists are always so quick to tell us atheists we need to get back to the text of scripture when he try to expound on it, but I couldn’t drag Razorkiss to the text of Plato with a pair of stallions.

C.L. Bolt

Hm. Do you reckon I have been in Plato?

But let’s just assume that I haven’t, won’t go there, and have the interpretation of the text wrong. How does that change my argument at all?

Patrick Mefford

Chris, when you turn the argument around, it is still wrong:

(A) Is the good willed by the individual because it is good
V
(B) is it good because it is willed by the individual

(B) is shown by Plato via Socrates to be manifestly false, but because with this dialogue was written before Attic had no distinction between a verb and a noun, the proof given by Socrates to Euthyphro is difficult to parse in English, but “piety” or “the good” can’t be understood by a passion (verb in passive voice), and has nothing to do with something being arbitrary.

The intent behind this question (and others) characterizes what this and other Socratic dialogues are all about, trying to get a real understanding of a concept. (B) is false and (A) only gives a nominal definition and fails to provide was Socrates was asking for.

So, in light of what the text says, your argument isn’t really an argument but a request for a definition.

C.L. Bolt

This sheds just a little light on what you are trying to get at, but not much.

First, you did not answer my question, “Do you reckon I have been in Plato?” You were complaining about not being willing to go to the text. But I find that charge with respect to my willingness to go to Plato rather presumptuous.

Second, you are suggesting an interpretation of the difficulty surrounding the Euthyphro dilemma that is quite out of the way in terms of traditional understandings of the problem. A citation of the source from which you get your view would be helpful.

Third, your suggestion concerning Attic Greek is peculiar, but I may just be confused by an issue related to your qualification or correction given below in the comments. Reading the passage in Greek instead of English is not an issue, if that is the way you need to go.

Fourth, you did not answer my second question, which was, “How does that change my argument at all?” You say something about my turning the argument around, presumably to apply to humans, but that is not an answer to my question. Rather, I am saying, let’s grant for the sake of argument that you are right regarding my interpretation of Plato here (an interpretation which, again, was given to me by some very qualified individuals, in addition to my study of the text, but it has, to be fair, been a while), how does that affect my argument?

Fifth, I would just offer my own answer to my aforementioned question. A misreading of the text does not change my argument at all. Even if it is divorced from the text, and even if it is divorced from the traditional applications of that text to philosophy of religion and metaethical theory (which it clearly is not), pointing it out does not serve to address the argument I have made and “falsely” identified as or as derivative of the Euthyphro dilemma.

Hope this helps.

Patrick Mefford

~First, you did not answer my question, “Do you reckon I have been in Plato?”~

Sure, but not carefully.

~But I find that charge with respect to my willingness to go to Plato rather presumptuous.~

You’re a presuppositional apologist, you maintain the impossibility of things like Knowledge for unbelievers. I think this kind of position demands a high level of competence in a variety of topics, the same way it does for someone that claims that the Christian Theism is impossible and incoherent.

You’ve been trained to read the Bible, you know from your interactions with other Christians and Roman Catholics how easy it is to misunderstand and unintentionally distort ancient writings. I just don’t see how any discussion of the “Euthyphro dilemma” can be discussed so divorced from the text.

Would you let me get away from offering a paraphrased English rendition of John 3:16 as a launching point against substitutionary atonement? Not a chance, you’d bring me back to the text and its context, in light of Scripture as a whole.

If it is one thing I’ve taken away from James White, it is the need for consistency in method and argumentation.

~Second, you are suggesting an interpretation of the difficulty surrounding the Euthyphro dilemma that is quite out of the way in terms of traditional understandings of the problem.~

Actually, I would maintain that I would have the traditional understanding and that what is most commonly presented in Anglophone Philosophy is mistaken. Off the top of my head, I’d send anyone to John Burnet’s classic work on Greek Philosophy, A.E. Taylor, and Gregory Vlastos too. I’ve yet to come across a Philosopher who is trained in Ancient Greek Philosophy to really deviate from what I’ve written.

Now the majority of Philosophers I come across, both atheist and theist, present the “dilemma” as you have here. Crack open any treatment of DCT and this is probably the first addressed, but that is not simply how the text presents the issue. This situation should be familiar to you, how many arminian scholars mishandle the text of scripture without even realizing they are doing it?

~Third, your suggestion concerning Attic Greek is peculiar, but I may just be confused by an issue related to your qualification or correction given below in the comments.~

That is purely my fault. I think what I’m going to do is write a fuller exegesis of the passage and clearly demonstrate what I mean, but I don’t think I can do that in the confines of a combox.

~Fourth, you did not answer my second question, which was, “How does that change my argument at all?” ~

Because it isn’t an argument, it is a disjunction between one proposition that is trivially true, and another proposition that in syntactically (logic) false.

C.L. Bolt

Well, you are wrong to think that I have never read Plato carefully. It has been a little while, yes, but you are mistaken to act as if I am quite out of the way in my reading of him.

Plato is not the Bible. The Bible is a Christian’s authoritative text. I don’t know of anyone who takes Plato that way. Perhaps a handful of people in California. Your example of John 3:16 is disanalogous to what I am doing with the Euthyphro dilemma for that and other reasons. You didn’t give that one much thought.

I appreciate your concern for teaching Plato correctly. I do. But that’s not the point of this post at all. Far from it. If it makes you feel better, then omit the quote from Plato, title the post something else, and deal with it from there. You are “missing the forest for the trees” as they say.

“Because it isn’t an argument, it is a disjunction between one proposition that is trivially true, and another proposition that in syntactically (logic) false.”

Flesh that out, and maybe we can actually talk about the content of my post. I don’t know the referents you have in mind, or what you mean by “trivially true” or “in syntactically (logic) false.”

Patrick Mefford
Josh B.

“But the very fact that such complex responses are so varied should tell us something.”

This is always a difficult charge to level against the unbeliever because they can always turn right back around and accuse the Christian (who may belong to one of hundreds of denominations) of the same thing.

C.L. Bolt

It would only be a difficulty if the unbeliever’s objection that you mention actually worked, but it doesn’t, for at least two reasons.

First, that “you too” response does not solve the unbeliever’s problem, which is what is being discussed.

Second, Christians do belong to many different denominations, all of which (if they are Christian denominations) credit God as an objective source and/or standard of morality in some sense.

Josh B.

However, the denominations still disagree on a great many things, sometimes “majoring in the minors” according to some people while others say they “disregard the major stuff.” The non-Christian charge is that if the Holy Spirit guides Christians, why isn’t there more solidarity?

“But the very fact that such complex responses [i.e., apologetic arguments in defense of various denominational practices and beliefs] are so varied should tell us something…” namely, shouldn’t it tell us about the nature of the Holy Spirit somehow?

C.L. Bolt

But Josh, the post is not about disagreements between denominations, is it? I gave you two points in response to your comment, and you ignored them both. So please stay on topic, or find another outlet for your concerns. I would love to have the time to address every topic all the people commenting here want to talk about in lieu of the topic of the actual post, but I don’t. Try the chat channel.

Tyler Noble

I find your criticism of an objective moral standard “willed by the individual because it is good” to be equally applicable to God establishing the same moral standard.

As humans, we are limited by our own humanness. We are embodied individuals with a truncated understanding of reality. This limitation provides the boundaries of our understanding and anything outside of our horizon is meaningless. Even further, to posit something that is established outside of our own horizon, I would argue, cannot be done.

What then is available? Our limited horizon, if there even IS something outside of our understanding, looks no different than some objective standards outside of us. Humans are limited by human perspective.

The argument you provided can then just as easily be levied against God or an objective moral standard. What we can establish however, is a inter-subjective standard. Ontologically very different but functionally the same. We wouldn’t be able to tell the difference because of our embodiness.

“Even if there were some external, objective, universal standard of good that exists outside of the individual, it is apparently not immediately knowable, and I can think of no reason to live by it.” I completely agree.

C.L. Bolt

“This limitation provides the boundaries of our understanding and anything outside of our horizon is meaningless.”

That’s an exceedingly silly suggestion.

First, I would point out that there are many concepts that Tyler Noble does not understand, and because of his finitude, will never understand. Say, for example, that Tyler Noble does not know the cheapest, most effective way to clean the PVC valve on a factory V8 1984 Monte Carlo. Perhaps Tyler Noble does not even know what a PVC valve, V8, or Monte Carlo are, much less where the PVC valve is located or how to clean it. Suppose, further, that Tyler Noble will never learn such information. It is not something he finds worth learning about, and so he doesn’t even take the time to Google it, much less to study the topic and clean the PVC valve on his own. All of this information is well beyond Tyler Noble, if you will. While Tyler Noble may be a bit of a ‘know-it-all,’ he does not actually know everything. There is at least one thing he does not know, namely, how to clean a PVC valve. But I do know how to do that, and it is not meaningless. It is an absurd suggestion to say otherwise. Now, there are many more ready examples of things that Tyler Noble does not understand. It does not follow that such concepts are meaningless.

Second, even if you are speaking of, not the individual, for example, Tyler Noble, but the entire population of human beings, the observations of my first point still apply by way of analogy.

Third, and following the point above, there are plenty of examples of concepts which were once outside of the understanding and/or horizon of human beings as a whole, but are now understood well within the bounds of human understanding. It is not unreasonable to suggest that there will be even more examples in the future. But it would be unreasonable to suggest that such concepts are meaningless.

Fourth, it might be suggested in response to the point above that the concepts there are not what you meant by things that are beyond our understanding or horizon. Those concepts are just examples of concepts which are in our horizon. But then I fail to see what you are really trying to say, for the concept of God is well within our understanding and horizon in that sense, not to mention many other concepts that we may or may not currently grasp.

Fifth, if God exists, then He knows and understands things about Himself that we do not and never will. So your claim begs the question against the existence of God. More than that, there is no contradiction, nor difficulty with just supposing that God has a broader understanding and horizon than what we do whether on an individual basis or an entire race.

Sixth, this response seems irrelevant to the point at hand concerning morality, and even if it is relevant, it does not resolve the unbeliever’s difficulty. It is an ill-informed diversion.

“Even further, to posit something that is established outside of our own horizon, I would argue, cannot be done.”

Except that you don’t actually argue this in your comment, so I could care less. Opinions are like armpits, and the unbelieving locker room has the stinkiest ones. You’re not in the locker room anymore.

“What we can establish however, is a inter-subjective standard.”

No, you can’t establish that. In fact I rebutted it in my post when I wrote, “Positing ‘society’ as the standard in question is precluded by the very nature of this horn of the dilemma, for society consists of a group of individuals, and in this side of the dilemma good exists apart from the individual.” If you don’t understand what I’m saying there then review the post more carefully or ask me to clarify.

Patrick Mefford

I made a pretty bad error above, I didn’t mean to say “this dialogue was written before Attic had no distinction between a verb and a noun” I meant to say that Plato didn’t have the terminology to clearly point out a passive voice for a verb, so his explanation seems convoluted in English.

C.L. Bolt

Noted.

Tyler Noble

Your dismissal of my suggestion is facile at best. The argument I made, one I did in fact make, is the horizon of humanness limits our perspective and thus the claim of some established point “outside” that horizon is meaningless. This is an ontological project. That being said I will respond to your objections is the same order:

1. My argument in no way applies strictly to an individual but our limited capacity as an embodied consciousness. The fact that I may or may not know some particular thing is irrelevant to the argument. “All of this information is well beyond Tyler Noble, if you will.” I am sorry but it isn’t. Ignorance plays no role as I am fully capable of gaining this knowledge at my leisure or to ignore it entirely at whim. The point is that the nature of our ability to understand is limited by our being embodied.

2. My argument extends in 1 applies to your second criticism as well. It is not societies will towards knowledge or lack of knowledge but the limitations of our perception, place, singularity, etc.

3. Human understanding of the universe will undoubtably expand the purview of philosophy, science, etc. Yet that would not necessitate that expansion is infinite and forever expanding to encompass all things. You stated, “if God exists, then He knows and understands things about Himself that we do not and never will.” If this is true then our understanding does have a point to which it cannot exceed. How do we engage with this information? Could we identify these things? By your own admission we could not comprehend these concepts not because we were unwilling or ignorant but because fundamentally we are unable. By definition then, to us, those concepts mean nothing. You have just framed our horizon quite nicely.

4. While words like “God” are clearly within the horizon, the properties of God are based far away from our understanding. Timelessness, infinite, omniscience. These are words which we have no real means to interact with. SUre, we can create a definition of these terms and use them in arguments yet no one has ever experienced them. Even in abstraction these terms become almost impossible to comprehend or explain. I can say, “I am thinking of a round square” yet am I really envisioning that object. I can define it, use the word functionally, yet I am so far removed from the reality of that concept as I am with timelessness. We use these kinds of words to define God yet it is lip service. This is no way disproves the existence of God. I does, however, place the traditional concept of God out side of our possible understanding and renders it meaningless to us.

5.Like I said, this was never an argument against the existence of God therefore non-question begging. Merely the argument that the concept is outside our possible understanding and thus meaningless.

6. My argument was directed towards morality in your criticism of the Euthyphro Dilemma. What solves the unbeliever’s difficulty is the relation morality has to the horizon of our understanding. If there is reality outside of our understanding, it is inaccessible and therefore we are once again left with our perspectival view. This argument is directed to your presumed objective law when you have no means to understand how the law is established.

Taking this argument further into the moral sphere does not invoke society to frame what is moral. Instead of incorrectly framing what I have said, read the next two sentences. “What we can establish however, is a inter-subjective standard. Ontologically very different but functionally the same. We wouldn’t be able to tell the difference because of our embodiedness.” The inter-subjective standard is formed by our situatedness, to borrow a Heideggerain phrase, “in the world.”

Thank you for the response. I do quite enjoy the rebuke.

C.L. Bolt

“Your dismissal of my suggestion is facile at best.”
Right, right and your Mom is fat. I know. Also, I hardly dismissed anything. I responded to it, at length, in a comment, against my better judgment. Dismissal would have been one click on the “Spam” button. That button looks better and better every day.

“The argument I made, one I did in fact make, is the horizon of humanness limits our perspective and thus the claim of some established point ‘outside’ that horizon is meaningless.”
I have my doubts about how beneficial this conversation can be when you cannot follow your own reasoning. You wrote, “Even further, to posit something that is established outside of our own horizon, I would argue, cannot be done.” I noted that this was merely your opinion. An unargued assertion. You promised us Candy Mountain and all we have is one less kidney. You did not actually make the argument you claimed you could or would make, which was that it is impossible to posit something outside of our own “horizon.” Note that what you address in the sentence quoted above is “the horizon of humanness” (whatever that is) limiting our perspective such that claiming “some established point ‘outside’ that horizon is meaningless.” But that is a different claim from the one I noted you did not argue. The older claim pertains to the impossibility of establishing something outside of the horizon. The newer claim pertains to its meaninglessness. So retorting, “one I did in fact make” doesn’t address at all the claim that I shot down in my last response by noting that you did not ever actually argue it. Stick to the topic.

Now, you still haven’t defined what you mean by “horizon.” It sounds like you’re just saying that humans are finite beings and that this has some consequences for epistemology. But virtually everyone agrees with that. It is uninteresting.

Does it follow from the fact that humans are finite that some “established point ‘outside’” that horizon is meaningless? No, not at all. And I’ve not seen you make any argument for that claim. In fact, let me turn this around on you and say that you ascribe the following property to an “established point” outside of the human horizon, where X is anything outside of the “human horizon”:
P: X is meaningless.
But P is not meaningless. So your claim is self-frustrating.

“This is an ontological project.”
The claims you are making pertain to epistemology, not ontology.

“My argument in no way applies strictly to an individual but our limited capacity as an embodied consciousness.”
That’s fine, but I gave a response to that interpretation of your unclear remarks as well.

“The fact that I may or may not know some particular thing is irrelevant to the argument.”
Except that it’s not. See my comment again.

“Ignorance plays no role as I am fully capable of gaining this knowledge at my leisure or to ignore it entirely at whim.”
No you’re not; not in the hypothetical. Did you read the hypothetical? I would imagine so. I think it is likely that you are making the really amateur mistake that I’ve seen 100 times in the classroom of wanting to mess with the hypothetical. The only alternative to the argument I offered in virtue of the hypothetical is for you to claim that you know everything, or perhaps can come to know everything, but that’s obviously untrue.

“The point is that the nature of our ability to understand is limited by our being embodied.”
Again, this is uninteresting. See above.

“My argument extends in 1 applies to your second criticism as well.”
Not a coherent sentence.

“It is not societies will towards knowledge or lack of knowledge but the limitations of our perception, place, singularity, etc.”
Also not a coherent sentence, but it sounds like you’re just stating, again, that humans are finite. Boring.

“Human understanding of the universe will undoubtably expand the purview of philosophy, science, etc.”
Yup, depending on what you mean by “purview.”

“Yet that would not necessitate that expansion is infinite and forever expanding to encompass all things.”
Which goes against you in what I already mentioned. There are things you are ignorant of as an individual which you will not and cannot ever know due to your finitude. So also for the human race as a whole. Thanks for the concession, unwitting though it may be.

“You stated, ‘if God exists, then He knows and understands things about Himself that we do not and never will.’ If this is true then our understanding does have a point to which it cannot exceed.”
Yup. And again, it doesn’t follow that such things are meaningless. They are meaningful to God.

“How do we engage with this information?”
We don’t, if I understand what you mean by “engage.”

“Could we identify these things?”
Yes, they are the things that God knows that we do not.

“By your own admission we could not comprehend these concepts not because we were unwilling or ignorant but because fundamentally we are unable.”
Yes, but this is not much of an “admission.” I’m sorry that you’re ignorant of Christian theology; I’m not saying anything new.

“By definition then, to us, those concepts mean nothing.”
Ah, but you see you qualified your claim. This is why it is frustrating to interact with people like you, because as soon as I put a little heat on your statements, they melt into something else. Your original claim was that, “anything outside of our horizon is meaningless.” That claim is false, because God knows those things outside of our horizon, and they have meaning for God. Now you have changed your claim to, “to us, those concepts mean nothing.” You should have said that in the first place. But regardless, the claim is still false, mainly because of the example of P I provided above. Or maybe you would like to explain what you mean by “meaningless.”

“You have just framed our horizon quite nicely.”
And you still haven’t defined what you even mean by “horizon.”

“While words like ‘God’ are clearly within the horizon, the properties of God are based far away from our understanding.”
I see, so God exhibits the property of Y: “having properties that are based far away from our understanding.” But Y is well within our understanding. So you’ve refuted yourself again. Nice try, but you should have educated yourself with a small portion of the 2,000 years of Christian theology written on the very topic of God, His “properties,” and our understanding of Him. Note that you’ve made a claim without any backing for it, I reject that claim as false and misrepresentative of Christian theology, and I provide you with a counter. You’re not doing too well here.

“Timelessness, infinite, omniscience.”
These are all understandable concepts. They certainly are not meaningless!

“These are words which we have no real means to interact with.”
And yet, you’re talking about them.

“SUre, we can create a definition of these terms and use them in arguments yet no one has ever experienced them.”
God has experienced them. Your presuppositions are showing again.

“Even in abstraction these terms become almost impossible to comprehend or explain.”
They are apprehensible, if incomprehensible. You really need to brush up on your theology.

“I can say, ‘I am thinking of a round square’ yet am I really envisioning that object.”
A round square is a contradictory concept. Timelessness, infinity, and omniscience are not. Perhaps you think they are, but you haven’t provided an argument for anything like that. You’re long on assertion and short on argument.

“I can define it, use the word functionally, yet I am so far removed from the reality of that concept as I am with timelessness.”
No, because again, the former is a contradiction, whereas the latter is not.

“We use these kinds of words to define God yet it is lip service.”
Yawn.

“This is no way disproves the existence of God.”
You’re right, it doesn’t. It assumes He does not exist. But you’ve never made an argument for that.

“I does, however, place the traditional concept of God out side of our possible understanding and renders it meaningless to us.”
Seriously? That’s all you got? You’re not thinking very deeply here Tyler. I know that you think you are, but you’re not. Ask yourself a question, why does not knowing some things about God entail that we can know nothing about God? You won’t find an answer to that question. The reason you won’t is because not knowing some things about God does not entail that we cannot know anything about Him.

“Like I said, this was never an argument against the existence of God therefore non-question begging.”
I didn’t say it was an argument against the existence of God. (You’ve claimed that God is meaningless, but you haven’t made a good argument for that.) I did say that you’re begging the question against God. To put it another way, you assume, repeatedly, that God does not exist. Otherwise none of your claims hold any water. They couldn’t. Not with the opposite assumption in place that God not only exists, but knows things about Himself that we do not, and reveals much about Himself to us in a way that we understand it.

“Merely the argument that the concept is outside our possible understanding and thus meaningless.”
Right, but (must I continue to point this out?) that is not an argument. That is an assertion, and a faulty one at that. There are concepts outside of our experience that have meaning for God. I don’t even know what you mean now by “concept.” Are we talking about morality anymore?

“My argument was directed towards morality in your criticism of the Euthyphro Dilemma.”
Let’s do ourselves a favor and stop calling what you’ve written an “argument.”

“What solves the unbeliever’s difficulty is the relation morality has to the horizon of our understanding.”
Okay, there’s your claim. What’s the definition of “horizon,” and where is your argument?

“If there is reality outside of our understanding, it is inaccessible and therefore we are once again left with our perspectival view.”
Okay, but what does this have to do with anything? You’re really confused Tyler. People better than yourself have already thought through a lot of these topics. I think you should read them. Read some theology, and read some metaethics. The moral will of God is not outside of our understanding, nor is it inaccessible. So what’s your point?

“This argument is directed to your presumed objective law when you have no means to understand how the law is established.”
Oh, right, but see I do have that means. It’s the Word of God. You’re a bit behind!

“Taking this argument further into the moral sphere does not invoke society to frame what is moral.”
You’re not being clear at all. Are you talking about the non-theistic view here? What view of ethics?

“Instead of incorrectly framing what I have said, read the next two sentences. ‘What we can establish however, is a inter-subjective standard. Ontologically very different but functionally the same. We wouldn’t be able to tell the difference because of our embodiedness.’”
Uh, yeah, already addressed this in my post. I’m not incorrectly framing anything. You just missed the point.

“The inter-subjective standard is formed by our situatedness, to borrow a Heideggerain phrase, ‘in the world.’”
And again, how is this supposed to be a response to my post at all? Oh, and Heidegger? No wonder you’re so confused!

Try to keep any further responses succinct. For example:
“Chris, grounding objective morality in God is objectionable because God is outside of human experience and hence meaningless.”


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