[12:07] [BK] ok, the floor is yours, Algo
[12:07] [PL] Very Good.
[12:07] [PL] Welcome Gentlemen.
[12:08] [PL] Let us now begin our formal debate with an intro/bio.
[12:08] [PL] Introducing MusLm :
[12:08] [PL] Name: Yasser Ali
[12:08] [PL] Nick: MusLm
[12:08] [PL] Age: 34
[12:09] [PL] Country: Pakistan
[12:09] [PL] Education: Post-Graduate of Information Technology (Australia)
[12:09] [PL] Occupation / Designation: Da’ee (Da’ee is a Muslim who invites people towards God / Islam)
[12:09] [PL] Faith: Muslim based on Quran (100%) and Hadith (Authentic)
[12:09] [PL] I have …
Recently the “Bahnsen Burner” Dawson Bethrick took a swing at Choosing Hats founder and administrator Brian Knapp’s contribution to The Portable Presuppositionalist as a part of his ongoing attempt to provide an answer to the Problem of Induction from within the confines of the Objectivist worldview. Mr. Bethrick quotes from page 124 of Knapp’s “Induction and the Unbeliever” in The Portable Presuppostionalist where Knapp asks, “Why do you believe nature is uniform, and how is that belief rationally justified?” Bethrick begins to provide an answer early in his post as follows:
The “Bahnsen Burner” Dawson Bethrick is busy writing a number of posts concerning the Problem of Induction that I discussed with him some time ago. In his most recent post Mr. Bethrick repeats where he thinks David Hume went wrong on induction thus allegedly setting himself up for a future post on how Objectivism rids itself of the so-called “problem” of induction. Setting aside a number of mistakes in his exegesis of Hume Mr. Bethrick shows that his last thread of hope in the area of induction will not hold the weight he wants to place on it.
Chalmers also challenges the idea that facts provide a firm and reliable foundation for scientific knowledge. This argument falls in line with the other arguments.
Further difficulties concerning the reliability of the observational basis of science arise from some of the ways in which judgments about the adequacy of observation statements draw on presupposed knowledge in a way that renders those judgments fallible.1
Chalmers uses the example of Aristotle’s idea that fire is a substance. Fire was observed, and it could be seen rising into the air so that it seemed accurate to say that fire …
In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Rene Descartes utilizes a method of doubt in order to determine whether or not there is any such thing as certainty. The American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce later critiques Descartes not necessarily on the basis of what many other philosophers find fault with in Descartes, but rather on the very method of doubt itself. While there appears to be plenty of room for debate about whether or not Peirce is fair to Descartes with respect to parts of Descartes’ method of doubt, Peirce is justified in the main point of his critique which …
In The Fixation of Belief Peirce describes four methods for the “fixation of belief”. According to Peirce, the goal of inquiry is to settle one’s opinion. Thus Peirce asks, “why should we not attain the desired end, by taking as answer to a question any we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything that might disturb it?” This is what Peirce refers to as the “Method of Tenacity”. Now I must wonder whether or not this reminds you of …
Mitch LeBlanc continues to espouse his inconsistencies regarding induction in his most recent post found here – http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/further-thoughts-and-clarifications-on-induction-and-the-christian-god/
Mitch Admits His Problem
He writes, “…I simply mean to suggest that one should be as skeptical about the problem of induction as the problem is skeptical of inductive reasoning itself.” With this he begs the question. I pointed out that he did so in his previous post and he continues to do so now. The existence of debate regarding a given topic does not entail skepticism. If he is unsure of whether or not there is a Problem of Induction then …
Mitch LeBlanc wrote an indirect response to me regarding the Problem of Induction wherein he relied heavily upon Michael Martin to deal with the presuppositionalist utilization of the famous problem. He apparently recognizes, to some extent, the alleged challenge set forth. My response to his post may be found here – http://choosinghats.blogspot.com/2009/09/mitch-leblancs-proposed-solution-to.html . He has now written another post here – http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/inductive-reasoning-and-the-christian-god/ wherein he states that I have missed the point of his previous article. He claims that his post is not intended to be a solution to the Problem of Induction and that it is debatable as to …