Attributal Argument for God’s Ordination of Possibility

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84 responses to “Attributal Argument for God’s Ordination of Possibility”

1. 

   David Gawthorne

   December 5, 2009

   All the weight of your argument seems to rest on the second last paragraph of your blog entry and the line, ‘Why would God eternally think of an infinite number of imperfect worlds? I think that this is not necessary.’

   If it is possible to come up with a reason to posit an infinite number of merely possible worlds then the dominant view in analytical philosophy on possible worlds can be defended.

   Now, focusing on (3)(i), i.e. God’s power, it must surely be accepted that power is a property that is not exhausted by its actual manifestations. A man could naively attempt to kill another by merely willing that the other should have a heart attack, and the other man could coincidentally fall down and die of a heart attack. That does not mean that the first man has the power to will others to die. Further, power can be possessed though it is never manifest at all. One could own a gun but never use it, all the while having the power to kill from a distance.

   The usefulness of possible worlds semantics is that gives us a way to formalise talk about what might have been. Such talk is essential to the analysis of properties such as power.

   The point: if God did not posit an infinite number of merely possible worlds then what is the difference between an almighty God and a really lucky one? There are no worlds to compare to this one to say that, yes, had God willed differently then things would have been different – such is his power. It was essential for God to posit (or in some way ground) the possible worlds in order for Him to be powerful.

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2. 

   RazorsKiss

   December 5, 2009

   I think you missed the point I made where no one attribute can be considered apart from all the others. Why does God think of *any* imperfect worlds – if He is perfect? Why *must* God *conceive of* imperfect worlds at all, if He is sovereign? If God didn’t conceive of them – they would have no existence – abstract or otherwise – only He is self-existent. If God conceives of them, they exist – in an abstract form – and God therefore had an imperfect thought for His purposes. While it is permissible to think of hypotheticals, as we are *finite* beings; to say “well, because humans, (as finite) must do _X_, God (as infinite) must therefore do _X_” does not follow. Second, I notice all the weight of your arguments is resting on only a couple properties; which is the reason I added the portion about God’s simplicity. In short, the problem is with a whole host of God’s attributes. Making an argument from 1 or 2 (that don’t seem compelling upon examination) does not solve the problems with a host of others.

   For power, what is more powerful, and by what standard is it more powerful? Is it more powerful to create a world perfectly, for your own purposes, exhaustively ordained so that nothing apart from your own Will may ever occur – or to conceive of a multiplicity of worlds you never intended to actualize, for no other purpose than to discard them? Or, even worse, to conceive of a multiplicity of worlds *you do not know the outcome of*, so that you may explore them to their conclusion, etc. I’m sure you can see the flags being thrown at the concept of God having a *new* thought. If God knows all things, He knows them perfectly. If God knows all things perfectly, He knows what He has ordained to be. If God knows what He has ordained to be, what He has ordained cannot change. If what God has ordained can never change, it is eternal – therefore, you are left with a multiplicity of unnecessary, imperfect, yet eternal conceptions, immutable and ordained by God to be so. I could go on.

   So, why isn’t this utterly incoherent? I know this is a well-liked philosophical construct – but it is utterly, and absolutely foreign to the text of Scripture – which explains a God that can never be compatible with all possible worlds. This is the reason I am arguing from the nature of God Himself. I love God, and do not wish to impugn His name by believing something antithetical to His nature concerning Him.

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3. 

   David Gawthorne

   December 5, 2009

   Just because no one attribute cannot be considered apart from any others does not mean that anything entailed by the possession of one such property can be ignored. The whole host of God’s properties is irrelevant if even one property requires recourse to possible worlds for its analysis.

   God posits imperfect worlds so that his perfection and power may be manifest in the one world that He actualises. There is no imperfection in this, God positing imperfect worlds is simply part of what it means for Him to be all-powerful.

   It is not a question of what is MORE powerful (doing with or without merely possible worlds) but of the analysis of the very concept of power. In saying that God has any measure of power, we are committed to talking about His will being realised in any situation in which He wills anything at all. Talk of possible worlds is a way of formalising this condition, and then the question of the metaphysical truth-grounding for such talk arises, i.e. what corresponds to our talk about possible worlds?

   You have not demonstrated that possible worlds are foreign to the teaching of Scripture. You have not shown that it is antithetical to His nature to posit worlds that God intends not to create in order to manifest His power. You have not demonstrated that possible worlds are incoherent. You have merely argued that they are theoretically unnecessary. That is an appeal to parsimony and not a reductio. I have then given you a reason to suppose that possible worlds are necessary for the analysis of at least one property of God, regardless of whatever other properties we agree that He possesses.

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4. 

   David Gawthorne

   December 5, 2009

   Sorry, I meant to start, ‘Just because no one attribute CAN be considered…’

   Reply
5. 

   RazorsKiss

   December 6, 2009

   Just because no one attribute can be considered apart from any others does not mean that anything entailed by the possession of one such property can be ignored. The whole host of God’s properties is irrelevant if even one property requires recourse to possible worlds for its analysis.

   Yet, what I’ve been showing is that focus on only a few attributes – while ignoring the others – is the root cause of the issue to begin with. The issue is that it is posited that God fails to conceive of multiple worlds which are in accordance with His purposes. What is posited is that God eternally conceives of worlds imperfectly suited to His purposes – for the sole *purpose* of never intending to actualize them.

   God posits imperfect worlds so that his perfection and power may be manifest in the one world that He actualises. There is no imperfection in this, God positing imperfect worlds is simply part of what it means for Him to be all-powerful.

   Where can this conception be found in Scripture? What we find in Scripture is that what God intends, He will *surely* bring to pass. For what purpose, and from what Scripture, do we get this idea of “all possible worlds”? Where can we be shown in Scripture that God posits all of these non-actual hypotheticals for the sole purpose of discarding them? Where can we be shown in Scripture that God; 1) Conceives of these possible worlds 2) That this is, as you say, part of His being all-powerful, and 3) That such a conception is not incompatible with His perfection? Forgive me, but I’m not seeing any justification for the assertions.

   It is not a question of what is MORE powerful (doing with or without merely possible worlds) but of the analysis of the very concept of power. In saying that God has any measure of power, we are committed to talking about His will being realised in any situation in which He wills anything at all.

   That’s an interesting statement. Isa 46:10 says that God declares the end from the beginning – that His purpose will be established, that He will accomplish all His good pleasure. Where in Scripture does it ever show God contemplating, conceiving of, or even rejecting other possibilities? Since God is immutable, there has *never been* a time when God did not intend to do exactly as He has done – or that He did not intend to declare all things, from beginning to end, in perfect accordance with His good pleasure. In a world exhaustively ordained in accordance with the minutest detail of His will, from start to finish, what conceivable warrant is there in saying that God conceives of ways He *wouldn’t* do what He, in His eternal, timeless present, always what He intended to do?

   Talk of possible worlds is a way of formalising this condition, and then the question of the metaphysical truth-grounding for such talk arises, i.e. what corresponds to our talk about possible worlds?

   I would respectfully posit that this concept arises precisely because we are finite, imperfect, and ignorant. What corresponds to our talk about “possible worlds” is, quite frankly, every imperfection which differs from the perfection that is God. Every wrong conception we have, from our finite brains, is a correspondent to a “possible world”. Since these are *false* ideas – since they never happened, they do not exist, and cannot exist – they are therefore *impossible* ideas. I can conceive of a married bachelor. That doesn’t mean that God must, therefore, conceive of a world in which married bachelors are commonplace. It just means we’re so wedded to our wish for autonomy that we seek to replace our finitude with God’s infinitude. Since we think of dumb ideas – impossible ideas – God must have to, as well! I don’t think this is remotely the case.

   You have not demonstrated that possible worlds are foreign to the teaching of Scripture.

   Sir, with all due respect, you haven’t shown that my argument to demonstrate that it is, is unwarranted. Thus far, I’ve only seen the assertion that, essentially, if we can think of “ifs” that are non-actual, God should be able to as well. Why?

   You have not shown that it is antithetical to His nature to posit worlds that God intends not to create in order to manifest His power.

   I don’t know. Can God conceive of a world that imperfectly conforms to His will? This question, it seems to me, boils down to “can God conceive of a world in which He does not perfectly carry out His purposes”? I would posit that such an idea is an absurdity.
   
   You have not demonstrated that possible worlds are incoherent.

   I dont know. The idea that God eternally conceives of worlds not perfectly conforming to His purposes cannot seem anything but incoherent, from what God reveals of Himself to man.

   You have merely argued that they are theoretically unnecessary. That is an appeal to parsimony and not a reductio.

   I don’t think this is the case. I think that an argument which necessarily violates God’s nature is inherently incoherent, reduces the question to absurdity due to the consequences of adiopting that premise, and therefore invalidates that premise.

   Perhaps there may be a reason you think that this is not so. May I ask – what theological background are you coming from? It should be obvious by this point that I am a Calvinist – therefore, I am not going to have much sympathy for anything that smacks of an assault on the sovereignty of God – or on any other aspect revealed to us in Scripture. In my experience in apologetics, most problems concerning theology result from an external idea by which al Scripture is viewed. From that problematic area, the effect snowballs, until it affects multiple places. I’m just not seeing any argument from Scripture that says “because this verse says X, we can say God does Y; because God does Y, we can say that Z is the most reasonable explanation”, just as a for instance. You just say “Z is true” – then reason from Z – except that X and Y really haven’t shown up.

   I have then given you a reason to suppose that possible worlds are necessary for the analysis of at least one property of God, regardless of whatever other properties we agree that He possesses.

   Well, if you had given me an argument, sir, I might be able to engage you here. Unfortunately, all I’ve seen, as I said above, is that you believe Z to be true. While that may be what you believe, where are you getting that from?

   If you’d like me to go through verse by verse to support each point, I’d be more than happy to do so. However, I haven’t seen an *argument* from you that such is the case. It seems as if you’ve just given an assertion, assumed that this assertion is true, and then said that because you have assumed a priori that your assertion is true, my argument isn’t correct. I’m not seeing the connection.

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6. 

   Micah Burke

   December 6, 2009

   “You have not demonstrated that possible worlds are foreign to the teaching of Scripture.”

   Wow, apparently God’s own words aren’t clear enough?

   {I am} God, and there is no one like Me, declaring the end from the beginning, And from ancient times things which have not been done, Saying, ‘My purpose will be established, And I will accomplish all My good pleasure’… Truly I have spoken; truly I will bring it to pass. I have planned {it, surely} I will do it.” (Isa 46:9-11)

   Where in this does one find “all possible worlds”?

   God has declared the end from the beginning of and will accomplish all He desires. Do you believe this or not?

   Do molinists/middle knowledge folks have an answer for Scriptures like these?

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7. 

   David Gawthorne

   December 6, 2009

   My argument is simple. God has the property of being powerful. Power is either solely or partly defined in terms of subjunctive conditionals. The truth of subjunctive conditionals requires truth at some or all possible worlds. Thus, if there are no possible worlds then God is not powerful. God is powerful, therefore, there are possible worlds.

   If you want to engage with my argument, tell me how to analyse the property of being powerful without using subjunctive conditionals or how to make subjunctive conditionals true without possible worlds.

   Saying that God needed to posit or ground possible worlds in order to be powerful is not found in Scripture is not relevant because I am talking at an abstract conceptual level that is assumed in the Bible and in any historical account.

   For the record, I accept God’s unfettered sovereignty.

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8. 

   Mitchell LeBlanc

   December 6, 2009

   Interesting analysis from David. I am interested to hear the response.

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9. 

   ZaoThanatoo

   December 6, 2009

   RK: “Why would God eternally think of an infinite number of imperfect worlds? I think that this is not necessary. God, being one, is not required to think of an infinite number of possible, imperfect worlds. I think it is much more reasonable to consider that He thinks of one finite world infinitely – that one finite world has been eternally and infinitely known by the Trinity… – and as such, all possibilities within this world have been immutably ordained by Him.”

   Some questions come to mind:

   1.) What is your functional definition for the term “perfect” used throughout the post?

   2.) What does it mean to infinitely know one finite world?

   3.) What “immutably-ordained possibilities” are you referring to in the last sentence quoted above?

   You’ve essentially said that the only possible world is the world which God has decreed, since His “perfect” knowledge precludes knowing any imperfect alternatives to His decree. I don’t understand where “possibilities” fit into your arguments above, unless you’ve switched at that point from discussing the divine perspective to the human one, though there’s nothing in the context which would lead me to believe that is the case.

   4.) Finally, what role (if any) does God’s knowledge of counterfactuals have within the framework you propose in this post?

   (A biblical example of God’s knowledge of counterfactuals would be Jesus’ statements in John 15:22-24, “22If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not be guilty of sin. Now, however, they have no excuse for their sin. 23He who hates me hates my Father as well. 24If I had not done among them what no one else did, they would not be guilty of sin. But now they have seen these miracles, and yet they have hated both me and my Father.”)

   Please note that affirming God’s knowledge of counterfactuals does not entail affirming Molinism.

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10. 

    RazorsKiss

    December 6, 2009

    I’m going to rearrange the argument’s format a tad, to aid in clarity. I’ll post reponses once I’m done with that.

    Reply
11. 

    RazorsKiss

    December 7, 2009

    “The carnal mind, when once it has perceived the power of God in the creation, stops there, and, at the farthest, thinks and ponders on nothing else than the wisdom, power, and goodness displayed by the Author of such a work (matters which rise spontaneously, and force themselves on the notice even of the unwilling), or on some general agency on which the power of motion depends, exercised in preserving and governing it. In short, it imagines that all things are sufficiently sustained by the energy divinely infused into them at first. But faith must penetrate deeper. After learning that there is a Creator, it must forthwith infer that he is also a Governor and Preserver, and that, not by producing a kind of general motion in the machine of the globe as well as in each of its parts, but by a special providence sustaining, cherishing, superintending, all the things which he has made, to the very minutest, even to a sparrow.” (Institutes, I,16,1)

    I found this very interesting, when I found it last night. I had a suspicion Calvin would have something to say along the lines I’m going. The argument I advanced hits on something re: The Problem of Evil and similar arguments that have been advanced many times. 1) They don’t address the entirety of who God is. 2) They don’t account for the interrelationship of God’s attributes. 3) They don’t address the interrelated exercise of God’s attributes in His creation.

    Similarly, when we examine the “all possible worlds” idea, we find that this conception fails to properly address God’s meticulous, exhaustive sovereignty over all of His creation. It also fails to properly address God’s timelessness in His exercise of exhaustive sovereignty.

    It seems to me that this desire to hold to *true* counterfactuals is grounded in an assumption of the *ability* for autonomy. In reality, we find no such grounds in Scripture. “The mind of man plans his way, But the LORD directs his steps.” Or, “The king’s heart is {like} channels of water in the hand of the LORD; He turns it wherever He wishes. “. We have a desire to further our illusory goal of autonomy, and thereby project our finitude on God’s ordination – and from that ordination, on His thoughts concerning it. Yet, “For My thoughts are not your thoughts, Nor are your ways My ways,” declares the LORD. This is not a matter of *degree*, but of *category*. God is not “less finite” in His thoughts and actions, but *infinite*. Thus, God’s thoughts concerning His creation are not *less finite*, but *infinite*. Since they are timeless thoughts, there is no linearity, and there is no “progression” to them. To say that this is so, is to misunderstand the nature of the thoughts possessed by an eternal, immutable, infinite God.

    To say that, for instance, it is *possible* that one of our Lord’s bones would be broken, is to overthrow the purposes of God’s sovereign ordination. The very idea of counter-factuals necessitates that they be *counter-possible*. That is the contention I’m trying to convey, despite my inferiority of language.

    If: God has decreed in himself, from all eternity, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably, all things, whatsoever comes to pass.
    Then: Nothing that God has NOT decreed in himself, from all eternity, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably, CAN come to pass.

    In other word, God’s decree fixes, without one possible iota of deviation, that which CAN come to pass. Alternate possibilities are thereby utterly, definitionally, *impossible*.

    Take this argument:
    God is necessary in all possible worlds. God is necessarily immutable in all possible worlds. God’s decree is immutable in all possible worlds. All possible worlds are identical. Modal collapse results – there is one possible world.

    Does that make it plainer, what I’m saying? Unless you want to strip out the *rest* of God’s attributes, “all possible worlds” is incoherent. There are no “counter-factuals” if you really hold to God’s absolute sovereignty. Only those who wish to posit a will in man independent from the ordination of God can seek to preserve this idea.

    While we can *conceive* of a world in which counter-factuals are “true” – this does not mean such a world is possible. It only means that we are finite, and think in finite terms. For “…the Glory of Israel will not lie or change His mind; for He is not a man that He should change His mind.” “Declaring the end from the beginning, And from ancient times things which have not been done, Saying, ‘My purpose will be established, And I will accomplish all My good pleasure’; Calling a bird of prey from the east, The man of My purpose from a far country. Truly I have spoken; truly I will bring it to pass. I have planned [it, surely] I will do it.”

    To say it is *possible* that God NOT do as He has eternally decreed – or that it is *possible* that God decreed things otherwise, is to so badly maul the doctrine of God as to leave it an unrecognisably mangled heap! God in his immutable perfection (wanting nothing to complete Him, lacking nothing, without fault) timelessly ordained all that He pleased to bring about.

    The wonder and majesty of this conception, I fear, has been badly impugned by this idea of “all possible worlds”. While I am a rather weak vessel to attempt to do so, I feel that it must be answered. I hope this answers your questions.

    Reply
12. 

    Wes Widner

    December 7, 2009

    “While we can *conceive* of a world in which counter-factuals are “true” – this does not mean such a world is possible.”

    I’m not sure how this holds since a counter-factual only retains it’s factual nature if there is a world wherein the event that did not obtain in world A would have in world B.

    I think you are confusing possible worlds with actualized worlds as I doubt you would have any problem with the notion that God retains knowledge of a wide range of counter factuals, and thus, logically possible worlds wherein counter factuals in our world would have obtained to become actualized facts.

    BTW: Eternal decrees and God’s ability to predestine have nothing to do with His holding logically possible worlds in his mind. I think Alvin Plantinga, a Calvinist, does a great job defining the difference between God’s omniscience and how God’s knowledge is not inextricably tied to his decrees.

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13. 

    ZaoThanatoo

    December 7, 2009

    Honestly, I don’t see where any of my questions were answered; it seems like a mere reiteration of the original post.

    Thank you for condensing your argument. It’s much clearer now. However, I don’t think you’ve fully understood the position which you are criticizing. Specifically, it seems that you have in mind a single use of possible worlds semantics which is most often attached to a Molinistic conception of God’s knowledge; but possible worlds terminology is much broader than the Molinist’s application.

    Another way of formulating “possible worlds” conceptions would be to say that God has perfect knowledge of His own omnipotence, so He knows everything that He would be capable of decreeing (all possibilities). He decrees out of this perfect knowledge the world in which He is most glorified. Alternative possible worlds is a semantic classification grounding the infinite alternatives conceivable in light of God’s omnipotence.

    To say we can *conceive* of a true counterfactual *IS* to say that it is *possible*; and God must also have conceived of that possibility or I know things which He does not, which contradicts His omniscience.

    Otherwise, if there is only one possible world, to what is Christ making counterfactual reference in John 15? Or was he merely “thinking in finite terms” at that point?

    On a different note, these statements were interesting:
    “Since they are timeless thoughts, there is no linearity, and there is no ‘progression’ to them. To say that this is so, is to misunderstand the nature of the thoughts possessed by an eternal, immutable, infinite God.”

    The second sentence is quite a bold assertion. Are you actually claiming to properly understand “the nature of the thoughts possessed by an eternal, immutable, infinite God”?

    And why must timeless thoughts have no linearity? How many timeless thoughts have you thunk? 😉

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14. 

    RazorsKiss

    December 7, 2009

    Wes: I don’t think you read the whole post.

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15. 

    Mitchell LeBlanc

    December 7, 2009

    RK said: “While we can *conceive* of a world in which counter-factuals are “true” – this does not mean such a world is possible.”

    This sees to be precisely what it means, by definition.

    I won’t say much more now, as I suspect Zao will keep you buys for awhile. Good on you for reformulating the argument, it is clearer now.

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16. 

    Mitchell LeBlanc

    December 7, 2009

    seems*

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17. 

    Wes Widner

    December 7, 2009

    RK: Your arguement seems to hinge on the following rather arrogant statement:
    “As Christians (and this argument is largely particular to the Reformed faith) we start our reasoning with The Triune God, as revealed in His scriptures.”

    I think our problem is found not so much in the text itself, but the interpertation and philosophical grid we are each operating from.

    Zao, I believe, has issued a very well-defined argument above regarding the logical consistency of the “possible worlds” knowledge god possesses.

    However, I want to reiterate what I mentioned above regarding the misplaced emphasis on God’s omnipotence vs. God’s omniscience.

    Reformed Theology makes much of “God’s sovereign choice” and ability to bring about all He intends however it speaks very little about how God goes about choosing and planning and why, if God’s will always obtains, there is evil and darkness in the world he chose to create.

    I believe we would both conclude that this is the best of all possible worlds (even if you think this is the only possible world), however only one view accounts for the plethora of events and circumstances which obviously (and by God’s own admission) run contrary to His will.

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18. 

    davidgawthorne

    December 7, 2009

    RK

    I have to acknowledge the good point you make in your post about God having all of his properties necessarily. If God cannot differ in any possible world and his attributes determine the world he creates then he must create the same world in all possible worlds. Fair enough, on the face of it, anyway.

    However, that argument assumes that counterfactual truths require transworld identity, i.e. things are included at more than one world.

    Consider a theorist on possible worlds such as David Lewis. He holds to a strict Indiscernibility of Identicals. On such a view, everything has all of its properties necessarily.

    To give an account of things counterfactually possessing different properties at different possible worlds, Lewis proposed that each thing at the actual world has a counterpart thing in some or all possible worlds that is sufficiently similar to the actual thing so that statements of possibility concerning the properties the actual thing might have possessed (its de re modal properties) can be assessed by reference to those counterparts.

    On such a counterpart view of de re modality, God’s necessary existence is made true by reference to an infinite array of counterparts that have most of the properties of our one actual God, but fall short on perfection. The actual God is perfect unlike any of His merely possible counterparts.

    The possibility of different worlds is made true by reference to all of His counterparts in possible worlds that, at their worlds, will a different world. God is greater than any of these non-actual Gods, but that are sufficiently similar to allow an assessment of what might have been had God’s mind (read, the mind of a God-counterpart at any given possible world) been different.

    There may be any number of objections to the counterpart theory of de re modality. Yet, it is one way to make talk of counterfactuals coherent, even talk of other ways that God might have willed the world.

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19. 

    C.L. Bolt

    December 8, 2009

    “RK: Your arguement seems to hinge on the following rather arrogant statement:
    ‘As Christians (and this argument is largely particular to the Reformed faith) we start our reasoning with The Triune God, as revealed in His scriptures.’”

    How is this statement arrogant?

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20. 

    RazorsKiss

    December 8, 2009

    Warning: uber-long comment to follow 🙂

    Zao: Okay, I thought I had sprinkled my answers throughout, but they may have been buried or unclearly stated as such. You have some good questions 🙂

    A1) Wanting nothing for completion, lacking nothing, without fault
    A2) To know, without limitation, everything whatsoever about His creation
    A3) Every single action, reaction, thought, intent, relationship, movement, etc. within His eternally purposed creative order.

    This might need some explanation, since I’m probably a little rough here. You’ve essentially said that the only possible world is the world which God has decreed, since His “perfect” knowledge precludes knowing any imperfect alternatives to His decree. I don’t understand where “possibilities” fit into your arguments above, unless you’ve switched at that point from discussing the divine perspective to the human one, though there’s nothing in the context which would lead me to believe that is the case.

    The bolded portion in your comments is probably where possibility fits in your understanding of the argument.

    My contention revolves around multiple attributes of God. Since God is eternal, His thoughts and decree are eternal. Since God is sovereign, His thoughts and decree are sovereign. Since God is immutable, His thoughts and actions are immutable. But I said that 🙂 Why it affects possibility: Since God’s thoughts and actions are as revealed in Scripture, they are necessarily in accordance with God’s nature. When we examine His nature, we find that His nature precludes that which “all possible worlds” requires. Namely, “all possible worlds” requires *true* counter-factuals. IE: they actually *could* happen. If they *cannot* happen, under any circumstances – due to the eternal, immutable, omnipotently sovereign decree of God – they are, definitionally, *im*possible. God *cannot* know them as truly possible. God already, and I think ithis is *by definition*, mind you, decreed that they most assuredly are *not* possible. That’s where possibility enters the picture. I’m not using the typical language used when speaking about all possible worlds because I’m trying to be, above all things, theologically centered here. If “God has decreed in himself, from all eternity, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably, all things, whatsoever comes to pass” – then nothing He has NOT decreed CAN come to pass. Definitionally, that means it is absolutely, uncategorically, impossible. Not merely “something God could could have actualized, but did not” – but as God’s thought, intent, and decree are all *eternal and immutable* – it never could have been otherwise – else God would be eternally thinking of a host of self-definedly impossible, self-contradicting possibilities, all of which oppose His eternal will. This, I hope you see, is utterly incoherent.

    A4.) I touched on this briefly, but let me expand it for you.

    If every counterfactual’s hypothetical truth entails possible world Px, this entails that for every conceived, factual action F, there are multiple, counterfactual possibilities Fx. These counterfactual possibilities, on this view, entail possible worlds.

    The problem is that this conception is derived from our own thinking. Since we can, for instance, conceive of the counterfactual “I was sitting at my computer, when a nicely toasted pastrami on rye fell out of heaven, crashed through my roof, into my hand, without any resultant damage to my hand” – instead of the actual “I am typing at my computer without cometary sandwich interruption.” I can conceive of this possibility (it is humorously unlikely, but I included it because it was the first thing that popped into my head; I’d like my imaginary pastrami on rye with light mustard, please!) but the fact that I can conceive of it does not make it true. It merely means that I have a good imagination. At least that I have a strange one! However, just because I can conceive of a possibility does not mean it is possible. In fact, it doesn’t mean that it *can* be possible. Not due to probability, or any such reason – but because God has already determined all things whatsoever that come to pass in His creation. While I can conceive of a more likely possibility – such as “I was typing this comment, but my daughter woke up asking for a drink of water” – that *also* does not mean that it is possible. It merely means that I think it is possible. We are not the determiner of possibility. To extrapolate from our finite conception of what is “possible” to say that God also has to consider “all the possibilities” is to mistakenly ascribe to God those properties which are only natural to us.

    It is much akin to the idea that because we exist in time, God must also. Or that God is literally saying He has hands, when He tells Moses to say “the hand of the LORD will come {with} a very severe pestilence” in Exo 9:3. Just because God “lisps with us as nurses are wont to do with little children?” Or that God really changed His mind concerning Ninevah? Is that what really happened? God was pronouncing a judgment He knew would never be fulfilled – because they obeyed Him, as He decreed they would. Just as He gave a law for Israel to fulfill, knowing that His decree had established that they never could fulfill it.

    Such examples are not “true counterfactuals” – they are lisps. Like the hand of God, the unkeepable law, and the judgment of Ninevah. My contention is that these counterfactuals which lead to “possible worlds” are considered “possible” at all. Definitionally, they are impossible. God has, from eternity, decreed all things that come to pass. Which, by implication, means that all things not decreed cannot come to pass. I do indeed think that Christ was “lisping” to us in John 15. That, if it were possible, they would have done otherwise. However, they did not. They could not. Therefore, they are judged guilty of sin – and haters of God.

    I affirm counterfactuals to this extent: they are an array of impossibilities – which God has not ordained, nor shall He. God knows the ways we plan. Yet, he directs our steps. That is an excellent verse for demonstrating the difference between the creature and the Creator. Proverbs 6:9 – “The mind of man plans his way, But the LORD directs his steps.” We can conceive of many impossible things as “possible”. This does not necessitate that they *are* possible. God, however, is not a finite creature, ignorant of the next moment, limited by time. God ordains all things inalterably from His timeless eternity; with utter sovereignty, power, and perfection. Therefore, to say that a counterfactual is “true”, is to deny quite a few things about God. Notice – I use quotes around “true” to show that I do not actually believe the concept is valid.

    Let me now direct my attention further to your next comment.

    Another way of formulating “possible worlds” conceptions would be to say that God has perfect knowledge of His own omnipotence, so He knows everything that He would be capable of decreeing (all possibilities). He decrees out of this perfect knowledge the world in which He is most glorified. Alternative possible worlds is a semantic classification grounding the infinite alternatives conceivable in light of God’s omnipotence.

    While I appreciate that change of wording and goals from that of the molinist, similar issues arise. I agree that God has a perfect knowledge of His capability. I would quibble a bit over the use of “most glorified”,as well as “capable of decreeing” being equal to “possibility”. I would argue that this is the world in which God receives the perfect glory He deserves – through justice poured out toward sin and mercy lavished upon sinners. To say that a world in which God receives *less* glory is “possible”, when God ordains that which can, and that which cannot be, sounds incoherent to me.

    To say we can *conceive* of a true counterfactual *IS* to say that it is *possible*; and God must also have conceived of that possibility or I know things which He does not, which contradicts His omniscience.

    The problem is that it is assumed that this counterfactual is, in fact, “true”. It is not. As I said earlier, I used the quotes around true to denote that I was not giving my own opinion as to the validity of that term. We assume that it is possible – when we are not the ones who determine whether or not this is actually so. You do NOT know whether any event *can* happen. You are capable of conceiving a state of affairs in which God is not sovereign, for instance. Is this state of affairs possible? No. Does that mean that God must know that this state of affairs is possible, on pain of you knowing something God does not? Certainly not. You have falsely conceived of a possibility – which is, in actuality, impossible. I can conceive of the counterfactual “cometary sandwich” incident. If God doesn’t think that this CSI is possible, do I have knowledge that God lacks – or am I just flat-out wrong? I think our basic problem, as humans, is that we ascribe our nature to God, far too often. When God lisps to us, we assume He’s speaking naturally. To our nature, He may be speaking naturally. He is, however, speaking as if to a toddler.

    As to whether my statement is bold – perhaps it is. However, we are told that what is revealed belongs to us. As I examine Scripture, it is clear to me that concepts as “linear”, and “progression” are denotations exclusive to time and space. As God inhabits neither, but is the Creator of both, such concepts are inapplicable to His thoughts, are they not? Lines have the properties of ‘beginning and ending” – and there is a distance between the beginning and end of a line. God, however, declares the end from the beginning – therefore, this cannot be properly considered natural to God. Progress, similarly, denotes a change in place or time – a movement from a starting point, and toward and end. While His creations progress, this is also not a natural property of God. Therefore, both ideas can be properly discarded as being descriptive of His thought. The very concepts necessitate temporality or change – and are therefore inapplicable to God.

    Reply
21. 

    RazorsKiss

    December 8, 2009

    Wes: I’m baffled, frankly, by your insistence that you doubt I “would have any problem with the notion that God retains knowledge of a wide range of counter factuals, and thus, logically possible worlds wherein counter factuals in our world would have obtained to become actualized facts.”

    That’s is precisely what I am arguing *against*. An insistence to the contrary seems… strange.

    Your arguement seems to hinge on the following rather arrogant statement:

    Like Chris, I’d very much like to know how that is arrogant.

    I think our problem is found not so much in the text itself, but the interpertation and philosophical grid we are each operating from.

    I think that ripping the God of Scripture to shreds to preserve a particular definition of creaturely libertarian freedom is very much a problem with the text. A problem of ignoring it.

    Zao, I believe, has issued a very well-defined argument above regarding the logical consistency of the “possible worlds” knowledge god possesses.

    It’s also one that disagrees with yours in premises and conclusions, so I wouldn’t look for much support there.

    Reformed Theology makes much of “God’s sovereign choice” and ability to bring about all He intends however it speaks very little about how God goes about choosing and planning and why, if God’s will always obtains, there is evil and darkness in the world he chose to create.

    While I’m sure you believe this, I would suggest that an examination of Calvin’s extensive treatment of this subject in Institutes, Edwards’ work on the human will and God’s means of executing His will over that of His creatures, and that of any of a host of other Reformed authors would rectify what seems to be a gap in your understanding of Reformed theology. There is quite a bit of material available on that subject. Listen to or read any reformed exegesis of Romans 9, or Romans 8:28ff. It should be quite plainly evident to you.

    I believe we would both conclude that this is the best of all possible worlds (even if you think this is the only possible world), however only one view accounts for the plethora of events and circumstances which obviously (and by God’s own admission) run contrary to His will.

    There, Wes, we have the problem in a nutshell. In your theology, things happen which God did not want to happen. There are things which God could not prevent, does not control, and are out of His hands. Scripture says that God will *accomplish* all His good pleasure. That not even a sparrow’s fall, or the hairs of our head are beneath His notice – they are numbered, and in no wise apart from our Father’s will. I’m sorry, Wes, but those sort of unscriptural beliefs, springing from the desire for autonomy, are the root from which this idea grows.

    First, I don’t believe this is the “best of possible worlds” – that statement, by using “best”, necessitates more than one possibility, as it has to be the ‘best of” more than one. Precisely the opposite conclusion that I have been aiming for. Secondly, it is not the “best” world for God’s purposes – it is the “perfect” world for God’s purposes. While I do agree that we can conceive of hypotheticals, I do not agree that because we can conceive of them, they are truly possible. Why this is so, I set out in my argument. Such a conception makes absolute hash out of the attributes of God. Exemplified by the breathtaking statement I read earlier; that God, you believe, is NOT immutable in all respects – or the earlier comment regarding the will of God. Once you lower your view of God, all sorts of things begin to creep in.

    I’ve noticed thus far that everyone critiquing things thus far has chosen a different portion of the argument as the portion that it “hinges” on, centers on, or focuses on. This seems to me a good sign that I am accomplishing one of my aims – demonstrating that God’s simplicity defuses many of the issues found in traditional arguments, as long as you account for the totality of His attributes as best as you able. It could just be that I am universally unreadable – in which case I hang my head in shame – but I don’t think it’s *that* bad yet 🙂

    Reply
22. 

    Mitchell LeBlanc

    December 8, 2009

    I just have a quick question about how this would effect some of God’s attributes. (influenced by Zao)

    Does God know that if he attempted action X, he would succeed/fail?

    It seems to me that if he does, then your argument collapses and further, if he does not, then is not omniscient (or perhaps even omnipotent)…

    Reply
23. 

    RazorsKiss

    December 8, 2009

    God only acts perfectly – He cannot act otherwise. God, being God, succeeds by virtue of acting. So I’m really not seeing the dilemma. There is no external standard which determines whether God succeeds or fails. God’s actions are necessarily successful, because it is God who performed them. God, being God, always knows that He will succeed – because He is God, and knows His perfection… perfectly. That is why Wes’ position is so sub-biblical. God tries, and fails, to do as He really wanted to do.

    Reply
24. 

    David Gawthorne

    December 8, 2009

    I still don’t see how you can differentiate necessity from mere actuality without recourse to counterfactuals and, thus, possible worlds.

    You say that God’s actions are necessarily successful, and that He exists necessarily, but can that mean beyond saying that His action is – as a matter of fact – successful or – as a matter of fact – He exists… unless you have some account of modality?

    Reply
25. 

    David Gawthorne

    December 8, 2009

    Ahem “…but WHAT can that mean..?”

    Reply
26. 

    RazorsKiss

    December 8, 2009

    What is every state of affairs that cannot exist? Impossible, right? It is necessarily impossible that God fail. It just is. Understand me – I *am really* saying that *it is impossible* for God to fail. Also understand me; since God never fails – and since God only created one world – it’s just plain impossible for God to have *failed* by creating another. Yes, I am saying that it would be a failure, because God *doesn’t* mess up – that this one is imperfect, as Wes believes. God does things perfectly right, the first time. I believe this for much the same reason I believe in Limited Atonement, actually. God doesn’t try and fail. He always accomplishes precisely what He intends.

    While we, as finite creatures, think of things in “actual, possible, impossible” – God thinks of things as “possible, impossible”. There is *no reason* to extrapolate our ignorance to God – and every good reason not to. That’s probably the central reason I pursued this inquiry to begin with. Again, as regards to necessity – this is GOD, man! Of *course* everything He does is necessary! He’s God! Of COURSE what He does is *by definition* necessary. *God is necessary* – therefore, his actions will *necessarily* perfect, immutable, etc. That’s the point I’m trying to get across with the separation of thoughts and actions in my argument. Wes utterly missed it. I’m not just saying God thinks things – I’m also saying God *does* things – and what He does, is what is *necessarily* perfect. It may not be very palatable. I think, however, that it is true, no matter how unpalatable. Which is much more important.

    Reply
27. 

    Mitchell LeBlanc

    December 8, 2009

    I do not think that sufficiently answers my question RK. There are obviously things which God cannot do. Does God know that if he attempted these things, he would fail? (I’m not saying he would attempt them).

    Or failures aside, does God know that if he attempted X, he would succeed? (keep in mind that there exists a class of actions which God cannot perform)

    Reply
28. 

    Ryft Braeloch

    December 8, 2009

    As far as I know, to think there exists temporal succession with respect to God’s being (e.g., temporal priority of a thought vis-a-vis some action) contradicts the orthodox tenet of simplicity.

    Reply
29. 

    ZaoThanatoo

    December 8, 2009

    RK,
    I am surprised by (and grateful for) the time which you took to provide such a thorough response to my questions. Given the way that you’ve framed the argument, I agree with David’s assessment: it succeeds.

    However, I think that (given my non-Molinist perspective on things) it only really requires a shift from “possible worlds” semantics to “conceivable worlds” semantics, without much change in actual content beyond that (given that calling them “impossible worlds” would probably produce as much confusion as pastrami from heaven). 😉

    Finally, just some food for thought regarding eternality, immutability, impassibility, etc. These are all attributes which seem to necessarily be defined apophatically, since we have no positive experience of timelessness, etc. But this requires caution no less than cataphatic statements regarding divinity. Do we really know enough about timelessness to state that there is no linearity or progression of any kind associated with eternality? Certainly it would be something radically different from the the kind of linearity experienced by finite, temporal entities, but does that rule it out altogether? I’m not convinced that it does. Ascribing simultaneity to eternal thoughts, feelings, etc. is still using temporal language to describe essentially non-temporal referents. Time is, for us, inescapable.

    Just to show that I’m not all alone in my trepidation regarding certain traditionally Reformed conceptions of immutability, eternality, etc., I’ll close out with a quote from Don Carson: “…it will not do to hide behind the relationship between time and eternity, for the very good reason that we know almost nothing about it. We scarcely know what time is; we certainly do not know what the relationship between time and eternity is. Is it so very obvious that there is no sequence in eternity? Granted that sequence, if there is such, must look very different to an eternal being than to us, does it follow that there is no such notion?” (quoted from How Long, O Lord? p. 165)

    Reply
30. 

    RazorsKiss

    December 9, 2009

    Zao: I’m glad you bore with me, and my layman’s argument 🙂

    The reason I’m arguing against the “possible” verbiage is because “possible” – in a massive array of objections to Christianity, to God, or what have you – is spoken of as if everything is *equally* possible. In effect, assuming their own naturalistic ideas as to what is “possible”, and placing God within that constraint. The use of “possible” in that context seems, to me, to be “giving ground” that we rightly should not be giving.

    As to the consequences of considering God’s thoughts – I agree, it’s a tough, and ultimately impossible task. However, as I’ve thought about it, for quite some time now, I have come to the conclusion that when we come to areas that verge, or enter the realm of speculation, I will want to err on the side of caution – that being defined as cautious in zealously defending God’s nature. IE: if I’m speculating either way, I’ll speculate the direction that most seems to uphold his transcendence, eternality, immutability, etc. Now, I could be wrong – it’s not a hill I’d die on. I think it makes sense, though. I won’t quibble overly much about sequence, progression, or linearity – I just gave my position so that it’d be clear where I was coming from.

    Reply
31. Are Possible Worlds Compatible with Christian Theism? | Urban Philosophy

    December 11, 2009

    […] that the notion of Possible Worlds are wholly incompatible with Christian theism. He has offered an argument for his claim. I’ve briefly formulated an argument which attempts to show the opposite, that […]

    Reply
32. Possible Worlds and Christian Theism: Pt. 2 | Urban Philosophy

    December 20, 2009

    […] but no such response has arrived. With that said I will attempt to deal with RK’s post in a more direct […]

    Reply
33. 

    Pierre-Simon Laplace

    June 5, 2010

    The conclusion of the argument as originally stated up above is:

    (Concl.): The actual world is the only possible world.

    I’ve helped Razor out here, since a state of affairs is not a maximal state of affairs, assuming that a possible world just is a maximal state of affairs (this is the majority view of Actualists about possible worlds). A state of affairs just is a way the world is, but not a maximal way the world is. A state of affairs SOA is maximal if and only if for any state of affairs x, SOA either includes x or precludes x.

    The problem is two-fold: (a) RazorKiss has no idea what’s he’s doing re philosophical logic, and (b) (Concl.) and the premises of the argument above entails that Christian Theism is false. In showing (b), I’m fairly sure I’m showing (a), especially since in showing (b) I don’t go beyond first year Intro to Logic (give or take a little propositional modal logic)….

    There is one proposition which I’m certain RazorKiss is committed to, and it’s the following:

    (Principle RK): God’s thoughts or (inclusive use of the disjunction) ordinations (and/or decrees) are the truth-makers for all true propositions.

    Principle RK follows from the fact that RazorKiss says repeatedly that God ordains “all things.” He even says that God ordains his own attributes [premise (10)]. God’s ordination or (inclusive disjunction) thoughts explain why all true propositions are true. Why is it true that 2 + 2 = 4? Because… God ordained that this be true. The truth-maker for that proposition is God’s thoughts or (inclusive) ordination.

    Now it follows from (Concl.) by the definition of necessity in normal modal logics [where the adjustment in the semantics is made that the only world is the actual world] that:

    (1) All true propositions are necessarily true.

    Consider the following proposition:

    (2) The Christian God’s cognitive activity in terms of thoughts or (inclusive) ordination is the truth maker for all true propositions. [restatement of Principle RK]

    From (1) and (2) it follows by substitution that:

    (3) The Christian God’s cognitive activity in terms of thoughts or (inclusive) ordination is the truth-maker for all necessarily true propositions.

    If (3) is true it’s easy to see how (4) below follows by entailment:

    (4) The Christian God exists. [call this proposition ‘C’]

    Since the Christian God’s activity (whether cognitive or ordinational) is necessary for any proposition to have a truth value (on RazorKiss’s view) it follows that:

    (5) For any proposition p, necessarily if p, then C.

    But now C is a tautology…that is to say the following proposition is true:

    (5’) C is a tautology.

    …since a tautology (at least in classical propositional logic) is a formula or proposition which follows from the empty set of propositional parameters [1] (i.e., if any proposition entails C, then C is a tautology)….things are deeply problematic:

    (6) For any proposition q, necessarily if q, then C. [by definition of a logical truth or tautology]
    (7) Necessarily, if q & ~q, then C. [by UI from (7)]
    (8) Therefore, q & ~q iff C. [since entailment implies the biconditional]

    The conclusion in (8) is deeply problematic for it leaves one open to the following demolishing argument:

    (9) C is a tautology. [from (5’) and this will serve as the first premise]
    (10) Necessarily, ~(q & ~q). [premise]
    (11) Therefore, necessarily ~C. [from (8) by substitution]

    Now one can’t give up (9), and one can’t give up (10), so it follows deductively that it is necessarily false that the Christian God exists, which by necessity elimination entails that the Christian God does not exist.

    So even if RazorKiss’s argument were valid [which it most certainly is not] and sound, it’s soundness entails that its first premise is false.

    ————————-
    [1] See on this Graham Priest, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd Edition 2008), 5.

    Reply
34. 

    Christopher G. Weaver

    June 5, 2010

    Interesting.

    Laplace is right. Tautologies in sentential logic are about relations between propositions. A singular proposition (not a Russellian one mind you) can’t as far as I can see be a tautology.

    Two other criticisms of RazorKiss’s naive argument include:

    (1) Tautologies are proof-theoretically verifiable (via a truth-table or truth-tree), but there’s no way to non-stipulatively proof-theoretically verify the proposition that the Christian God exists if that proposition really is a tautology.

    (2) If this is the only possible world, then every proposition true at this world is necessarily true. But if every proposition is necessarily true, there are no non-trivial truth-conditions for counter-factual conditionals. Since the orthodox conception of those semantics says:

    (TCs for CFs): (p > q) just in case either L~p, or the (p &q)-world is closer to the actual world, than the (p & ~q)-world is.

    But now for any formula of the form (p > q), given RazorKiss’s argument, that counterfactual will be true by virtue of the trivial L~p disjunct in Lewis semantics.

    So on RazorKiss’s argument, every counterfactual conditional is true, even the following one….

    (Crazy CF): If it were the case that Jesus had a 40 sisters, then it would be the case that Christianity is both true and false.

    But on any good semantics (at least on Lewis semantics) for CFs, p > q entails p -> q. So we have:

    (Crazy C): If it is the case that Jesus had 40 sisters, then it is the case that Christianity is both true and false.

    But both of these conditionals are absurd.

    Reply
35. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 5, 2010

    The conclusion of the argument as originally stated up above is:

    (Concl.): The actual world is the only possible world.

    Not what I said.

    I’ve helped Razor out here, since a state of affairs is not a maximal state of affairs, assuming that a possible world just is a maximal state of affairs (this is the majority view of Actualists about possible worlds).

    I didn’t say any of that did I? Actualism says many things I don’t hold to. I’m neither an Actualist in any real sense, nor do I say that the actual world is the “maximal state of affairs”, nor do I cast “state of affairs” in any other way than that defined by the entirety of the argument as outlined prior. If you’re going to insist on redefining everything I say, at least attempt to do so accurately.

    I defined “state of affairs” as “encompassing all of creation in time”. In other words, everything in existence that He created. That is the “state of affairs” as used in this argument.

    A state of affairs just is a way the world is, but not a maximal way the world is. A state of affairs SOA is maximal if and only if for any state of affairs x, SOA either includes x or precludes x.

    “Maximal” assumes something which is denied by this argument – that there is any other definition for perfection that that which God has established for His own works. There is no outside standard for “maximal” being applied to *this* state of affairs that God has created. God does precisely what He intends, precisely in the way that he intends to do so, and perfectly so. In other words, you’ve run afoul of one of the horns of this argument.

    Here’s the first problem for your argument:

    What God does is necessarily perfect. Therefore, all of His works are perfectly in accordance with His will, unchangeably so, and eternally so. Making that arbitrary jump to “maximal” is precisely what that horn of the argument precludes.

    The second problem is that I’m arguing theologically, from theology proper. The queen of the sciences is Theology, not Philosophy. That’s precisely why you make the arbitrary jump to “maximal”, redefining the terms I presented. You’re arguing philosophically, while I’m arguing theologically. I’m arguing from who God is – you’re arguing from who you are. From the standpoint of man, “possibilities” are just as “possible” as actualities. However, as I’ve argued elsewhere, this is a function of ignorance. Applying the same standard to God violates the creature-creator distinction. God is not a man.

    The problem is two-fold: (a) RazorKiss has no idea what’s he’s doing re philosophical logic, and (b) (Concl.) and the premises of the argument above entails that Christian Theism is false. In showing (b), I’m fairly sure I’m showing (a), especially since in showing (b) I don’t go beyond first year Intro to Logic (give or take a little propositional modal logic)….

    While I’m sure that’s rhetorically fulfilling, what your argument to follow fails to address is the fundamentals of my argument. In essence, you’ve redefined my terms, then argued from that basis to your desired conclusion. While it was a nice strawman bonfire, it didn’t address the argument itself.

    There is one proposition which I’m certain RazorKiss is committed to, and it’s the following:

    (Principle RK): God’s thoughts or (inclusive use of the disjunction) ordinations (and/or decrees) are the truth-makers for all true propositions.

    False. First, God’s nature is self-sufficiently truth in itself. Analogically, our knowledge of truth must be in accordance with God’s insofar as God has revealed it.

    Principle RK follows from the fact that RazorKiss says repeatedly that God ordains “all things.”

    Recall a fundamental principle of Theology – God transcends His creation. God’s innate truth is more than we can fathom. Our knowledge of truth is analogical. Since God is the transcendent Creator, and since “without Him nothing was made that was made,” since God “decrees all things whatsoever that come to pass”, this is necessarily true, per Scripture, that God ordains all things. It is the language of Scripture, it is in all the protestant confessions, and it is the bedrock of the Sovereignty of God.

    He even says that God ordains his own attributes [premise (10)].

    I think I may have been unclear there – perhaps this will assist you in seeing my intent there. “God’s ordination of all things encompasses all of God’s attributes” is intending this – that all of the attributes of God are involved in that ordination of all things. Therefore, when discussing that ordination of all things, all of God’s attributes must be addressed, due to Simplicity. In my own defense, however, I do believe my intent is fully explicated in (1)-(6) of my own argument.

    God’s ordination or (inclusive disjunction) thoughts explain why all true propositions are true. Why is it true that 2 + 2 = 4? Because… God ordained that this be true. The truth-maker for that proposition is God’s thoughts or (inclusive) ordination.

    Perhaps. It depends on how you’re defining your terms at that point, but I’ll cautiously agree.

    Now it follows from (Concl.) by the definition of necessity in normal modal logics [where the adjustment in the semantics is made that the only world is the actual world] that:
    (1) All true propositions are necessarily true.

    I’m with you so far. I don’t see how truth, unless you ascribe to some subjective truth value, can be anything other than necessarily true.

    Consider the following proposition:

    (2) The Christian God’s cognitive activity in terms of thoughts or (inclusive) ordination is the truth maker for all true propositions. [restatement of Principle RK]

    I think it would be more accurate to say that God is truth, and is both sufficiently and necessarily the Ordainer of all analogical knowledge of the truth within His creation.

    From (1) and (2) it follows by substitution that:

    (3) The Christian God’s cognitive activity in terms of thoughts or (inclusive) ordination is the truth-maker for all necessarily true propositions.

    Just to make sure this is clear, I’d like to repeat – what we know as truth is analogical to the perfection of God’s own truth, and is correspondent to our capacities as creatures.

    If (3) is true it’s easy to see how (4) below follows by entailment:

    (4) The Christian God exists. [call this proposition ‘C’]

    Once again, as we discussed in chat recently – we don’t argue TO God’s existence. We’re arguing FROM God’s existence. How are we speaking of the nature, character, and attributes of God all this time without already assuming He exists? Did I ever include that as a premise in the conclusion, that we’re arguing to? The premise we’re arguing to is that since God exists, as He has revealed Himself to exist, it is necessarily true that there is no other possible state of affairs whatsoever. If you don’t believe me, look over the last couple lines of my argument, then look at the first line of it. What is first? What is last? Reversing the order is completely your own doing, not mine.

    Since the Christian God’s activity (whether cognitive or ordinational) is necessary for any proposition to have a truth value (on RazorKiss’s view) it follows that:

    (5) For any proposition p, necessarily if p, then C.

    False. My argument essentially states that since C is true (but not the bare C you propose), and that the God who exists, as He has revealed Himself to us, ordains any proposition p, ~p is definitionally impossible. See the difference? In other words, this is not TAG. This is a positive argument directly from revelation, not an indirect argument from the impossibility of the contrary. This is the positive assertion of Christian Theology Proper. God is who He is; and by the revelation He has given us concerning Himself, we know Him, and that He has ordained all things. Since He has, there is nothing aside from or additional to those “all things”.

    This is the fundamental bedrock of presuppositionalism. We presuppose as true that which God has revealed about Himself.

    I’m not going to address the rest of your argument, because it all progresses on the fundamental misunderstanding of what I’m doing here, what I’m saying, and where I’m coming from. This isn’t an argument for the existence of God. This is an argument from revelation against putative Christian theologians and others who insist possibility supercedes and is apart from God’s ordination of all things in His creation.

    On the contrary – God ordains possibility, as well. Since you profess to be a Christian, and are arguing for possibilities other than that which are ordained by God, the argument is against your position, not related to the existence of God. This is presupposed, not argued for. What I want is a demonstration from Scripture that what I have argued for is not so. This is a theological argument. Argue Biblically. Remember, you must account for who God is, fully, in your response. That’s the ground on which we stand. There isn’t some neutral ground. All ground is God’s.

    Reply
36. 

    Christopher G Weaver

    June 5, 2010

    hey Razor….

    you’re really confused man

    Reply
37. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 5, 2010

    Well, that may be the case. However, it would be best to demonstrate this in order for your assertion to carry any weight. If I had a dollar for every time someone said I was “confused”, I’d be rich 😉

    Reply
38. 

    Mitchell LeBlanc

    June 5, 2010

    Never once have I seen so many intelligible words come together in such an un-intelligible way, RK. I think it’s a bit unreasonable for you to ask to have your confusion demonstrated to you in light of your recent post, it would take a few semesters! 🙂 <— Safety smiley.

    Reply
39. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 5, 2010

    You know me, never able to put two words together coherently 😉

    Reply
40. 

    Nocterro

    June 5, 2010

    “First, God’s nature is self-sufficiently truth in itself.”

    “what we know as truth is analogical to the perfection of God’s own truth, and is correspondent to our capacities as creatures.”

    “I think it would be more accurate to say that God is truth, and is both sufficiently and necessarily the Ordainer of all analogical knowledge of the truth within His creation.”

    What do these statements mean?

    Reply
41. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 5, 2010

    Noct:
    For the first :
    From Gill’s Body of Doctrinal Divinity:
    1. God is true in and of himself: this epithet, or attribute, is expressive,
    1a. Of the reality of his being; he truly and really exists: this is what every worshipper of him must believe (Heb. 11:6).
    1b. Of the truth of his Deity; he is the true and the living God; so he is often called, (2 Chron. 15:3; Jer. 10:10; 1 Thess. 1:9) in opposition to fictitious deities
    1c. This title includes the truth and reality of all his perfections; he is not only omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, eternal, and immutable, but he is truly so
    1d. This may be predicated of each Person in the Godhead

    More can be found at the link above.

    For the second: as Van Til would define it – analogical reasoning is: Thinking in subjection to God’s revelation and therefore thinking God’s thoughts after him. Therefore, when we examine truth, we are knowing God’s truth after Him, in subjection to God’s revelation, insofar as we as creatures are able to know it, being finite beings.

    As to the third, it is similar to the previous. God is Himself True. Only by analogy are we able to know that truth, as we cannot know the entirety of who He is. We know that which is revealed for us to know. As Deu 29:29 says; “The secret things belong to the LORD our God, but the things revealed belong to us and to our sons forever, that we may observe all the words of this law.”

    Reply
42. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 5, 2010

    Just as a side note – John Gill’s tome is exquisitely useful for this discussion, and has been invaluable for me. When he discusses who God is, he does so with the other attributes of God in mind, and does so in such a way as to bring out the interrelated aspects of theology in a rather clear way. He might suffer from semi-colon syndrome, but his prose and clarity of expression is truly magnificent on topics such as we are discussing. He truly was “the learned doctor.”

    Reply
43. 

    Nocterro

    June 5, 2010

    “God is true in and of himself: this epithet, or attribute, is expressive,”

    I don’t know what this means either.

    I think there may be some sort of language problem here – perhaps you are “speaking theologically”?

    How would a philosopher state this? Do you mean “God exists” is true?

    Reply
44. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 5, 2010

    “this attribute is expressive of”; – and then what it expresses are what compose the subpoints to follow, in his outline. If you click through to the link, it makes more sense contextually than what I quoted.

    Reply
45. 

    Nocterro

    June 6, 2010

    I’ve read the link over several times, and I am still very unclear on a few things. Gill seems to be using a lot of non-philosophical, flowery and/or poetic language. Perhaps this expresses some ideas about God which you are already aware of in a manner favorable to you, but it doesn’t seem to do much to explain these ideas to me. For example:

    “That it is essential to him, it is his very nature and essence; he is truth itself; he is not only called the God of truth, but “God the truth””

    “Creatures have but a shadow of being, in comparison of his; “Every man walks in a vain show”, or image; rather in appearance than in reality,”

    I still do not know what it means to say “God is true” or “God is truth”.

    “Truth” or “true” are descriptions we apply to propositions. For example, “This apple is red” is true.

    Is God a proposition?

    Reply
46. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 6, 2010

    Mr. Weaver’s earlier comment was moderated for whatever reason – but I want to point a few things out. 1) I’m arguing against non-actual states of affairs (our hypothetical conceptions of what *could* be) as being *possibly true at all*. 2) This means that counter-factuals are mere hypotheticals, cannot be true, and are a function of the ignorance of finite creatures, nothing more. 3) Weaver’s argument assumes that counter-factuals are true, ignores the discussion above wherein counter-factuals are addressed, and my position is given. I explicitly say above that counter-factuals are not possibly true.

    For instance: “I’m baffled, frankly, by your insistence that you doubt I ‘would have any problem with the notion that God retains knowledge of a wide range of counter factuals, and thus, logically possible worlds wherein counter factuals in our world would have obtained to become actualized facts.’

    That’s is precisely what I am arguing *against*. An insistence to the contrary seems… strange.”

    The same observation applies to Mr. Weaver’s comments on the subject. I’m aware that possible worlds language and counter-factuals are assumed by most of modern philosophy. Unfortunately, I’m not interested in what modern philosophy has to say on any topic of theology. In fact, I’m openly hostile to the majority of what modern philosophy opines concerning the nature and character of God and His works.

    My argument is simple. Since God is who He is, and since all of who He is is engaged in the works which He has accomplished, the nature of God will be inherently involved in those works. I’d encourage this new number of critics to revisit what I’ve actually said, instead of rewriting what I have said in accordance with their own assumptions they bring to the table. From Theology Proper, as I’ve outlined above, is there any room for possible worlds, counter-factuals, or “possibly true”? Again, this is a theological argument – argue theologically. Philosophy, properly considered, rests upon the bedrock of Theology. If you wish to think properly, think in accordance with Scripture. Arguing against the clarity of revelation by the means of “vain philosophy” – contrary to that clear revelation – is not acceptable argumentation. If you wish to argue against this, make an *internal critique*. Theologically. Okay?

    Reply
47. 

    Nocterro

    June 6, 2010

    *shrugs* I reject (1).

    Reply
48. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 6, 2010

    Noct: I think the problem is that this is not philosophy, and does not lend itself well to philosophical language.

    The study of God is a study of what He has revealed about Himself. I think what the elementary issue is, is your approach. Theology is epistemological. It is how you know what you know. You know, in theology, by what God has revealed to you. What God has revealed is that He is true. He is, himself, true. What He is, is true. One of His attributes is His truth; (which, if you look through my argument above, is interrelated with every other of His attributes, and inseparable from them) and His truth is His essence, His nature, is a necessity for Him being as He is. He can never be untrue. To be untrue is impossible for God.

    What Gill is enumerating is the various ways, forms, and manners in which God is, Himself, true. He is truly self-sufficient. He is truly self-existent. He is truly eternal, immutable. He is the truly living God, and so on and so forth. Gill is explaining the doctrine of God consistent with the doctrine of Divine Simplicity – where nothing God is, is without relation to everything ELSE God is.

    You mention the statement that “it is essential to Him; it is His very nature and essence” – this means that, as He follows up with, “To be false, fallacious, and insincere, would be to act contrary to his nature, even to deny himself; which he cannot do.” In other words, it is *necessary* that God be true – in all the ways that He is true – and that it is *impossible* for God to be otherwise.

    Since this is so about Him – concerning not only truth, but about every attribute of His – I can make the case, from that vantage point, that I make above. In fact, the only case you CAN make theologically, is that everything God is, is of necessity. When people attempt to argue that their conception of philosophy overrules this theological truth, especially those who claim the Christian faith, all I do is point them to the Scriptures. What do they say about this? Is it not Scripturally absurd to state that anything contrary to that God has ordained could be remotely possible?

    I don’t know if this answers your question, but I’m not sure there IS a good answer from the standpoint of philosophical thought that doesn’t begin from where Scripture demands we begin. Unless you start out with God and His word as your epistemological basis, you’re going to continually attempt to make this “shoehorn” into a system which just is not constructed to make any of this intelligible. Start from the standpoint of Scripture, and it’s internally consistent – and makes everything intelligible. That’s what the position of Sola Scriptura, and it’s apologetic counterpart, presuppositionalism, seek to make clear.

    Reply
49. 

    Mitchell LeBlanc

    June 6, 2010

    When you say you are arguing theologically, I have absolutely no idea what you mean. What you claim is “arguing theologically” merely seems to be the act of arguing philosophically while assuming some propositions to be true, which happen to be of some theological significance.

    What are theological arguments and how are they distinct from philosophical arguments about God(s)? Is the only difference, as I’ve hinted at above, which particular propositions you take to be true while you are arguing? That seems to fail as a distinguishing feature, insofar as you might want that feature alone to separate you from the established tradition.

    In your most recent comment, you put forth some assertions about how you define the term God, which are not informative whatsoever. As Nocterro has been pursuing, these are not illuminating statements. Statements such as:

    (1) God is who He is.

    You’re just espousing a reflexive relation. An entity is identical to itself, this is something philosophy has established for quite some time. Perhaps your ‘framework’ is just catching on?

    (2) All of who God is is engaged in the works which He has accomplished.

    It’s anyone’s guess as to what this actually means. When you say, “All of who God is” do you just mean to say God? It seems like the point you made with (1), if I understand it correctly, does not permit a distinction between “God” and “All of who God is”. Surely the referrer “God” is intended to pick out “All of who God is”, but if we take the referrer in (2) to be telling us something new, then it is not the case that the referrer “God” picks out “All who God is” but then (1) is false. So it seems that this first portion of (2) is either trivial and uninteresting, or at odds with what you’ve previously tried to establish in (1).

    There’s also some question as to what you mean when you use the term ‘engaged’, precisely what do you mean when you use this term? My reading of this portion of your sentence just seems to be saying (as per the aforementioned criticism) “God is engaged in the works which He has accomplished”, doesn’t this just mean “God is involved in what he does” (there’s some question as to whether or not ‘involved’ is a suitable replacement, this is how I understand your usage of the term). If that is correct, why isn’t it just the case that you mean that ‘for any action x, if x is performed by God then x is performed by God’. But again, this is trivial and uninteresting.

    (3) The nature of God will be inherently involved in those works.

    I assume that by “nature of God” you mean to pick out God’s essential properties, where by essential property you mean something close to ‘P is an essential property of an object o just in case it is necessary that o has P’. As an example: if God lacked omniscience, for example, he would not be God and as such omniscience is an essential property of God? If by “nature of God” you do not mean God’s essential properties, then I do not know what you mean. But if by “nature of God” you do mean essential properties, why aren’t you stuck with making a modal claim (claims that given your entire endeavor, you don’t think can be made)?

    That worry aside, you seem to be just telling us that God’s essential properties are inherently involved in his actions. Again, this is just trivial! If some action x is performed by some being G and some property p is an essential property of G then necessarily G exemplifies p when performing x. Again, trivial and uninteresting.

    Maybe what you mean to say is something else, that for any action x which brings about an object o that G performs, insofar as p is an essential property of G then any o that results from x will exemplify p.

    That’s a bit more interesting, but false. God is omniscient and we are not, not to mention the question of what it would even mean for the universe, for example, to be omniscient. Aside from these two possibilities (oh no!) I am clueless as to what you could (oh no!) mean.

    So all in all my reading of you reveals to me that you have only said:

    “for any action x, if x is performed by God then x is performed by God”

    But this doesn’t entail anything interesting, and it especially does not entail that “[there are no] possible worlds, [or] counter-factuals…”

    You might be frustrated with people rewriting what you’ve written, but it’s necessary to do so in order to try to understand what you’re saying. Sadly, if my above understanding is correct, you’ve told us nothing at all. You say that your “argument is simple” but what follows from that is not an argument at all, it’s a series of trivial statements written in an unclear manner that entail in no way the conclusion you are seeking to reach. If that is what “arguing theologically is”, perhaps we should distance it as far from philosophy as possible.

    Reply
50. 

    Mitchell LeBlanc

    June 6, 2010

    (I didn’t see RK’s most recent comment above because I was writing, apologies if some stuff is now repeated)

    Reply
51. 

    Nocterro

    June 6, 2010

    “(3) God is … incomprehensible(u)…”

    How does any of this work if this is true?

    Reply
52. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 6, 2010

    When you say you are arguing theologically, I have absolutely no idea what you mean.

    I’m sorry you don’t know what it means. I believe I defined it, however. The words do have their own definitions, as well, apart from my own restatement of them.

    What you claim is “arguing theologically” merely seems to be the act of arguing philosophically while assuming some propositions to be true, which happen to be of some theological significance.

    While this is an interesting commentary on your presuppositions, as Gill says, “What seems to be, and is not, is not true.”

    Theology, as I stated above, is epistemological. Philosophy operates only in accordance with Theology, and on the basis of Theology. This is the differentiation made by Paul in Col 2:8 – “See to it that no one takes you captive through philosophy and empty deception, according to the tradition of men, according to the elementary principles of the world, rather than according to Christ.” This is in the same context as Col 2:2-3, where he also says “that their hearts may be encouraged, having been knit together in love, and attaining to all the wealth that comes from the full assurance of understanding, resulting in a true knowledge of God’s mystery, that is, Christ Himself, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.

    What this is saying is that Scriptural revelation is epistemological. It is the only means by which we may truly have a consistent, intelligible understanding of anything at all. It is the foundation FOR philosophy.

    “What are theological arguments and how are they distinct from philosophical arguments about God(s)? Is the only difference, as I’ve hinted at above, which particular propositions you take to be true while you are arguing? That seems to fail as a distinguishing feature, insofar as you might want that feature alone to separate you from the established tradition.”

    As I stated above, in the argument which provides the context everyone seems to be missing on, when examining what I’m saying now, ALL of God’s revelation must be accounted for. All of it. All of who He is, not just parts, not just minor bits here and there, must be accounted for as true when engaging the nature of God, the nature of His work, or even your own nature. I included the fairly comprehensive section on the nature of God, I expanded my comments quite a bit in the comments to follow, and I have written elsewhere on this subject as well.

    “In your most recent comment, you put forth some assertions about how you define the term God, which are not informative whatsoever. As Nocterro has been pursuing, these are not illuminating statements.”

    Well, most things divorced from their context aren’t very informative. I would suggest you examine what I’ve said thus far – the post, the mass of text preceding the comments in question, especially, as well as what I linked to – to gain this context.

    Statements such as:

    (1) God is who He is.

    You’re just espousing a reflexive relation.

    Well, as I said, divorcing this statement from it’s context doesn’t seem to make sense. What do you think I’m referring to by saying “God is who He is?” Is that meant to be a simple tautology? Perhaps it might be beneficial to look at the argument above, which forms the context for thsi entire discussion. In that argument, Who is God defined as?

    “An entity is identical to itself, this is something philosophy has established for quite some time. Perhaps your ‘framework’ is just catching on?”

    Rhetoric may be emotionally fulfilling, but considering that your rhetoric is aimed at something which I find it hard to imagine you actually believe to be divorced from the entire context of the preceding 50 comments or so, it’s quite beneath you. It obviously has a context.

    “(2) All of who God is is engaged in the works which He has accomplished.

    It’s anyone’s guess as to what this actually means.”

    Once again, I’d imagine it would be quite possible to find some sort of contextual clue in the post that is under discussion, don’t you? I seem to remember spending a great deal of time on this subject, myself. “Anyone’s guess” is a bit hyperbolic, isn’t it?

    “When you say, “All of who God is” do you just mean to say God?”

    No, or I would have said that. See (3)-(5) in my argument.

    “It seems like the point you made with (1), if I understand it correctly, does not permit a distinction between “God” and “All of who God is”.

    Ironically, it’s meant to exclude reductionism. It only works if you pay attention to the original context of the post, however – especially (3a) and (5).

    Surely the referrer “God” is intended to pick out “All of who God is”

    Well, considering most people <emdon't pick out “all of who God is”, it’s meant to differentiate, per what is shown above, between a Biblically consistent approach to who God is, and misconceptions of who God is. Once again, context.

    “but if we take the referrer in (2) to be telling us something new, then it is not the case that the referrer “God” picks out “All who God is” but then (1) is false. So it seems that this first portion of (2) is either trivial and uninteresting, or at odds with what you’ve previously tried to establish in (1).”

    Or, per the context, it’s differentiating between the bare conception of “God” – for instance, the classical “core” that is used by certain school of apologetics – or the atheists/unbelievers they interact with – and the fully-orbed Biblical conception of who God is. Once again, context. I’ve noticed that as soon as someone says “surely” around here what follows is rarely “sure”.

    “There’s also some question as to what you mean when you use the term ‘engaged’, precisely what do you mean when you use this term? My reading of this portion of your sentence just seems to be saying (as per the aforementioned criticism) “God is engaged in the works which He has accomplished”, doesn’t this just mean “God is involved in what he does” (there’s some question as to whether or not ‘involved’ is a suitable replacement, this is how I understand your usage of the term). If that is correct, why isn’t it just the case that you mean that ‘for any action x, if x is performed by God then x is performed by God’. But again, this is trivial and uninteresting.”

    Well, once again, per the context of the post, I do believe that I spent a good bit of time explaining what is intended by that sentence. All one needs to do is refer to the original, the further explication in the comments, and draw the lines accordingly. I’m truly wondering if you think that text is divorced from the context in which it is placed.

    “(3) The nature of God will be inherently involved in those works

    I assume that by “nature of God” you mean to pick out God’s essential properties, where by essential property you mean something close to ‘P is an essential property of an object o just in case it is necessary that o has P’. As an example: if God lacked omniscience, for example, he would not be God and as such omniscience is an essential property of God? If by “nature of God” you do not mean God’s essential properties, then I do not know what you mean. But if by “nature of God” you do mean essential properties, why aren’t you stuck with making a modal claim (claims that given your entire endeavor, you don’t think can be made)?

    I do believe the post in question explains just exactly what is meant there, yet again. I really recommend you review it.

    That worry aside, you seem to be just telling us that God’s essential properties are inherently involved in his actions. Again, this is just trivial!

    Not if the intent is to remind the audience that ALL of God’s essential properties are inextricably bound up in all of His actions. This is not typically recognized in most argumentation, is it? I’ve certainly not found that to be the case.

    “If some action x is performed by some being G and some property p is an essential property of G then necessarily G exemplifies p when performing x. Again, trivial and uninteresting.

    Well, if, as you assume, I were merely offering a tautology, that might be a valid criticism. Since I am in reality offering a comparison of the typical argumentation versus Biblical argumentation, I don’t see how that follows. Perhaps both of those statements are just personal narrative, but I don’t think that’s the case.

    Maybe what you mean to say is something else, that for any action x which brings about an object o that G performs, insofar as p is an essential property of G then any o that results from x will exemplify p.

    No, not really. I’m pointing out that since God is Simple, all of His attributes must be accounted for in everything He does. Since this is so, many common misapprehensions about the work of God are done away with by that means.

    That’s a bit more interesting, but false. God is omniscient and we are not, not to mention the question of what it would even mean for the universe, for example, to be omniscient. Aside from these two possibilities (oh no!) I am clueless as to what you could (oh no!) mean.

    Honestly, Mitch, what you have offered is an acontextual reading which could easily have been rectified by referring to anything above the comment you’ve targeted. While, again, the rhetoric may be emotionally fulfilling for you, it’s nothing substantive. I appreciate the attempt, but you really should read what I’ve said, not what you want to replace what I’ve said with.

    “So all in all my reading of you reveals to me that you have only said:

    “for any action x, if x is performed by God then x is performed by God”

    But this doesn’t entail anything interesting, and it especially does not entail that “[there are no] possible worlds, [or] counter-factuals…”

    Well, if I had wanted to say any of the above, I think I would have said it that way. Since I didn’t, and wouldn’t, intend to overthrow everything I’ve said above, I hardly think that your restatement is relevant, do you? I attempted to reduce the gist of my argument to a general outline – this doesn’t mean that I forgot everything I wrote above.

    You might be frustrated with people rewriting what you’ve written, but it’s necessary to do so in order to try to understand what you’re saying.

    Actually, I’m more frustrated because people rewrite what I’ve written without reference to what ELSE I’ve written.

    Sadly, if my above understanding is correct

    It isn’t.

    you’ve told us nothing at all. You say that your “argument is simple” but what follows from that is not an argument at all, it’s a series of trivial statements written in an unclear manner that entail in no way the conclusion you are seeking to reach. If that is what “arguing theologically is”, perhaps we should distance it as far from philosophy as possible.

    Once again, rhetoric. Every statement has context. Instead of creating your own context to fit the template of what you desire to see from it, perhaps it would be both wiser and more beneficial if you’d read what I write in the context surrounding it. If you don’t desire to do so, I’m not going to force you – but I’m responding to illustrate something for our readers.

    This is the importance of context. Don’t let people isolate statements without referent to the context in which it appears. It’s not only unhelpful, an incredible waste of everyone’s time, but quite frankly, it’s dishonest. It’s quite obvious to my fellow CH writers what I was referring to. That leads me to suspect that the problem is not what I’m writing, but what someone wants to believe about the writer.

    Dear reader; don’t fall into that trap, and don’t allow others to divorce your statements from the context in which they are written.

    Reply
53. 

    C.L. Bolt

    June 7, 2010

    “(3) God is … incomprehensible(u)…
    How does any of this work if this is true?”

    Just fyi, I am not following this discussion, but as I have read it incomprehensible is not inapprehensible. What it means to say that God is incomprehensible is addressed at some length in most introductory level theology texts. It does not mean that God is completely unknowable, etc.

    Reply
54. 

    fishpasta

    June 7, 2010

    RK, would you be willing to go on Urban Phi’s vent server to clear up some confusion as to your argumentation against the existence of counterfactuals?

    Reply
55. 

    Nocterro

    June 7, 2010

    Incomprehensible:
    “Difficult or impossible to understand or comprehend; unintelligible: incomprehensible jargon.”

    Inapprehensible:
    “Not apprehensible; unintelligible; inconceivable.”

    Would you care to posit an alternate definition? Or at least point me to where one can be found?

    Reply
56. 

    Mitchell LeBlanc

    June 7, 2010

    You haven’t clarified anything! I’ve read the context, I know only what the goal of your argument is, but I do not see (at all!) how you get there. Also, why do you keep commenting on my effective use of language?

    You said: “It’s quite obvious to my fellow CH writers what I was referring to…”

    Then perhaps you can ask one of them to reformulate/restate/clarify/amend your argument. I certainly am not the only one who is having difficulty working through your statements.

    Reply
57. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 7, 2010

    Then, Mitch, I guess it’s really down to the fact that you just don’t get where I’m coming from. If that’s so, fine. From reading your prior comments from earlier in the thread, that is where you’ve been all along. I’ll just simply point out that it isn’t those who begin from a Christian foundation who have any problem with what I’m saying. If you want to take it as foolishness, that’s nothing unexpected. If you consider my explanations to not be acceptable to you, for whatever reason, I’m not burning any more time on it. I explained what I meant, and you don’t understand it. It’s not an easy topic in any case, and quite frankly, even from your theological training, it’s not where you’d come from there, either.

    Maybe I am just an utter failure at communicating my thoughts. However, does it really matter at this point? I don’t think I’ve ever had you understand anything I’ve written, so why waste any more time on me?

    Reply
58. 

    Nocterro

    June 7, 2010

    RK, would you mind addressing my posts on “imcomprehensible”?

    Reply
59. 

    Mitchell LeBlanc

    June 7, 2010

    Out of curiosity, does Chris Bolt understand/accept this argument?

    Reply
60. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 7, 2010

    Mitch: Yes, he does. We’ve talked about it extensively.

    Noct: Chris addressed the distinction above.

    Reply
61. 

    C.L. Bolt

    June 7, 2010

    Nocterro,

    “Would you care to posit an alternate definition?”

    Yes, I visit http://www.dictionary.com from time to time as I see you did. Did you note the “b” definition and the “Archaic” usage? It does not appear that you did. Do you think that given the historical context of the sources RK and many theologians use the word may be used in a way which is more similar to its Archaic use than its current use in non-theological contexts? I would think so!

    “Or at least point me to where one can be found?”

    I wrote, “What it means to say that God is incomprehensible is addressed at some length in most introductory level theology texts.” IIRC, John Frame discusses this in DKG and DG. If you want something easier than that, I think Wayne Grudem may discuss it as well in his text.

    Reply
62. 

    C.L. Bolt

    June 7, 2010

    Weaver and Laplace,

    Could you please explain your relation to each other?

    Thanks.

    Reply
63. 

    Nocterro

    June 7, 2010

    “Did you note the “b” definition and the “Archaic” usage? It does not appear that you did. Do you think that given the historical context of the sources RK and many theologians use the word may be used in a way which is more similar to its Archaic use than its current use in non-theological contexts? I would think so!”

    If this is the case, it seems that the attribute “incomprehensible” would be covered by the other attributes listed.

    The whole list just seems a bit odd, to be honest. This is just one problem I had with it. For example, I’m also wondering what it means for God to be “near”; although it seems that this argument is going to explode into several extremely long discussions – perhaps it is best to move onto something else.
    ——————————————–
    Weaver and Laplace are the same person, btw.

    Reply
64. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 7, 2010

    Noct: It’s as extensive a list as I could assemble of the attributes of God. Near, incidentally, refers to omni-presence, using Biblical language. (Acts 17:27)

    As for Incomprehensible, it’s related to other attributes, as Simplicity explains, but it is distinguishable from those others. It’s very closely related to Transcendence and Infinitude, for example. I really don’t mind these sorts of discussions. They’re quite pertinent, and you’re asking good questions.

    Reply
65. 

    Nocterro

    June 7, 2010

    OK, next one:

    what does it mean to say God is “spirit”? If it means he is composed of a non-physical substance, doesn’t “transcendent” cover that? What is the distinction here?

    Reply
66. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 7, 2010

    Transcendence is God’s being “Above us”. As “high above the heavens” “above all the earth”. He is utterly above, beyond, and supercedes everything in Creation.

    God is Spirit, which means He is noncorporeal, is utterly pure, as he is uncompounded (related to Simplicity), immortal, invisible, thinking, living, active, willing, affectionate, and immutable. All of these things and more are related to and defined by God being Spirit. For a more full explanation, see here.

    There’s much more to it than simply “incorporeal”. In it is tied up personality, thought, will, activity, and a host of other things. That’s the implication of what the chief point of that argument is – that nothing about who God is is separable from all of who God is. It’s intricate, vast, and majestic. Which is why Theology is always my first love. Knowing my Creator and Lord is the first and chief goal for any Christian – or at least it should be.

    Isa 43:10 – “You are My witnesses,” declares the LORD, “And My servant whom I have chosen, So that you may know and believe Me And understand that I am He. Before Me there was no God formed, And there will be none after Me.”

    Reply
67. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 7, 2010

    fishpasta: no thank you.

    Reply
68. 

    Christopher G Weaver

    June 7, 2010

    Razor:

    Do you believe that there neither are, nor could have been non-existent objects, right?

    Thanks

    Reply
69. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 7, 2010

    Is that a serious question?

    Reply
70. 

    Christopher G Weaver

    June 7, 2010

    Yes. Very serious.

    Reply
71. 

    Nocterro

    June 7, 2010

    RK,

    There is one more issue I want to discuss, then I’m going to move on to other things.

    “Why would God eternally think of an infinite number of imperfect worlds?”

    Does this imply that the actual world is perfect and/or the best possible world? Or is God only thinking of one imperfect world?

    Reply
72. 

    Laplace

    June 7, 2010

    Nocterro, he doesn’t think there are any other possible worlds. This (the actual world) is the best world for him, precisely because it is the only possible world.

    Reply
73. 

    chrisbolt

    June 7, 2010

    Pierre-Simon Laplace 5 June 2010 at 4:14 pm

    Christopher G. Weaver 5 June 2010 at 4:45 pm
    “Interesting. Laplace is right.”

    C.L. Bolt 7 June 2010 at 1:28 am #
    Weaver and Laplace, Could you please explain your relation to each other? Thanks.

    Nocterro 7 June 2010 at 1:37 am
    Weaver and Laplace are the same person, btw.

    Chris Weaver makes comments on blogs in order to express agreement with what he said 30 minutes earlier?

    Reply
74. 

    Nocterro

    June 7, 2010

    “Chris Weaver makes comments on blogs in order to express agreement with what he said 30 minutes earlier?”

    It appears so.

    Reply
75. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 8, 2010

    Noct: All of His creation is exactly as He intended it to be, and perfectly glorifies all of who He is.

    Reply
76. 

    brigand

    June 8, 2010

    “I am Legion” seems to think RazorsKiss is a veritable Pangloss, though I fail to see the philosophical Optimism undergirding his argument.

    Reply
77. 

    Bahama

    June 9, 2010

    Why would God need to think about or “go through” possible worlds in the first place?

    Reply
78. 

    Mitchell LeBlanc

    June 9, 2010

    Bahama:

    Why would God need to think about numbers in the first place? If one views possible worlds as abstract objects, God thinks about them in virtue of his omniscience. What do you mean when you say that God “goes through” possible worlds? God can’t help but actualize some world, that is, regardless of what action God performs he is, in fact, actualizing a world. Take for instance God’s decision to not create a universe, that is, to create no other being than himself… by doing so, God has actualized the possible world in which there exists only one contingent fact… that fact being that God did not will the existence of any object (there a many variations on the way this fact can be expressed).

    Presumably, God has free choice and so he doesn’t “go through” possible worlds, he actualizes some over others by virtue of his free actions.

    Maybe someone would want to say that God’s choices are determined by his essential properties, that is, the existence of any given world is simply entailed by the attributes of God. To make this move is to remove God’s free choice, it makes every proposition a necessarily true proposition and we can run arguments against the idea that God is morally praiseworthy under this conception (i.e. why is God morally praise worthy for creating us, if he had no choice in the matter?).

    Reply
79. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 9, 2010

    That section is dealing with Molinism, which purports to have God selecting from amongst infinite possible worlds and actualizing the best possible world, wherein the saved are maximized.

    As for Mitch’s argument – assumed autonomy is why all arguments against the transcendent God fail. Humans don’t get to put God in the dock. We’re already in the dock.

    Reply
80. 

    Mitchell LeBlanc

    June 9, 2010

    RK’s understanding of Molinism seems to be a bit amateurish. Molinism is consistent with a multiple unsurpassable world, or no best world hypothesis. So he is simply misunderstood when he says that Molinism purports that God actualizes the best possible world, he’s assuming that such a thing exists and Molinism need not make this assumption.

    Reply
81. 

    RazorsKiss

    June 9, 2010

    I’m generalizing, obviously. But then again I can never write anything coherent to Mitch 😉

    Reply
82. 

    Bahama

    June 16, 2010

    “Why would God need to think about numbers in the first place? If one views possible worlds as abstract objects, God thinks about them in virtue of his omniscience.”

    I think I agree with this somewhat, but I’m not sure if I agree with the analogy of thinking about numbers. Are numbers morally wrong to think about? No.

    We are trying to figure out if thinking about a possible world to be actualized is morally wrong.

    How do we go about doing that?

    If I think about murdering someone, would that be considered an abstract object?

    And if so, is it wrong to think about murdering someone? I would say yes.

    Let the wicked forsake his way and the evil man his thoughts. Let him turn to the LORD, and he will have mercy on him, and to our God, for he will freely pardon. Isaiah 55:7

    The LORD saw how great man’s wickedness on the earth had become, and that every inclination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil all the time. Genesis 6:5

    For the word of God is living and active. Sharper than any double-edged sword, it penetrates even to dividing soul and spirit, joints and marrow; it judges the thoughts and attitudes of the heart. Hebrews 4:12

    So, since we are assuming the Christian God in this post we see that the thoughts of a being are subjected to judgment of some moral standard. This moral standard can be no other than Himself.

    Can God not think about these possible worlds and still be omniscience? I don’t know. I can know that thinking about murdering someone is wrong without actually thinking about murdering someone. But knowing this would be based on an objective morality that comes from God. I think you addressed something along these lines below.

    “What do you mean when you say that God “goes through” possible worlds?”

    I mean, does God think about all the other possible worlds before He chooses which the “best” world to actualize is. I’m not sure if this question makes sense since trying to figure out what He does “before” something else doesn’t seem to make sense in eternity.

    This would then lead to another question: what is He basing the “best world” on?

    “God can’t help but actualize some world, that is, regardless of what action God performs he is, in fact, actualizing a world. Take for instance God’s decision to not create a universe, that is, to create no other being than himself… by doing so, God has actualized the possible world in which there exists only one contingent fact… that fact being that God did not will the existence of any object (there a many variations on the way this fact can be expressed).”

    Are you saying that the “the contingent fact that God did not will the existence of any object” IS the actual world?
    If the decision of actualizing a world is made in eternity would it not then be that this world is the only decision that He has made in terms of actualizing worlds? I may be getting confused at this point, but Im just trying to understand this concept a bit better.

    “Presumably, God has free choice and so he doesn’t “go through” possible worlds, he actualizes some over others by virtue of his free actions.”

    My response was always that His choice was based on His attributes or His nature, and it would be similar to saying that He cannot sin. So, technically His choice isn’t “free.”
    I don’t know if He actualizes “some.” I only know He actualizes “one.” Perhaps it’s the only one He can actualize.

    “Maybe someone would want to say that God’s choices are determined by his essential properties, that is, the existence of any given world is simply entailed by the attributes of God. To make this move is to remove God’s free choice, it makes every proposition a necessarily true proposition and we can run arguments against the idea that God is morally praiseworthy under this conception (i.e. why is God morally praise worthy for creating us, if he had no choice in the matter?).”

    Can you explain how “it makes every proposition a necessarily true proposition” so I can understand it better?

    Reply
83. 

    Bahama

    June 16, 2010

    That was to Mitch

    Reply
84. Certainty, Possibility, and You | Choosing Hats

    January 3, 2011

    […] numbers of alternative possibilities. Both of these options are addressed, at length, in my Attributal argument. They are simply non-options, and in fact impugn the Biblical witness to God’s nature and […]

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