Two of the most common objections to the Transcendental Argument for God from both inside and outside of Christianity appear to be inconsistent with each other.
Consider:
1. TAG is circular.
2. TAG is unstated.
Perhaps the two can be reconciled, but I believe it would take more than the typical surface level treatment of TAG to do so. One notable exception might be when a bare assertion is offered as the proof itself. However it would be odd to describe a mere assertion as “circular”.
Comments
76 responses to “Two Initial Objections to TAG”
Chris,
Maybe I can help you understand.
I’ve seen both charges levied against TAG in different situations, and in the majority of those cases the charge was justified. I’ve seen cases when presuppositionalists clearly assume the truth of their intended conclusion in their defense of that conclusion (i.e., arguing in a circle), and I’ve seen many other cases when the presuppositionalist is simply reluctant (or unable?) to spell out his argument (they typically claim to have an argument). It should be noted that presuppositional apologists come to the table with different levels of understanding, some being less informed, and others having learned their apologetic strategies from more developed sources. Many apologists in the presuppositional camp do give the impression that they think merely asserting that their god is the foundation of logic, knowledge, morality, etc., is equivalent to presenting an argument, which of course is simply ridiculous.
It is also interesting to note that, when Collett considers the objection that Van Til’s argument from predication begs the question, he does not deny this, and instead reverts to the old stand-by that other arguments do essentially the same thing. (See his essay “Van Til and Transcendental Argument” in Reason and Revelation, p. 276; details in my blog: http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2009/12/argument-from-predication.html). I take this as an admission that Van Til’s argument is in fact circular, and my examination of the argument (which I suspect is more than “the typical surface treatment of TAG” that your readers are used to seeing) bears this out.
So I would not say that the two charges you consider are inconsistent per se, for there are cases when presuppositionalists do not lay out their argument (and thus it’s unstated), and when the argument is laid out, it often (pretty much always so far as I’ve seen) turns out to be circular. In fact, Van Til tells us that he would “prefer to reason in a circle to not reasoning at all,” suggesting that he believed these two be the only possible alternatives available (see A Survey of Christian Epistemology, p. 12).
Mind you, there are even more serious problems with TAG, but circularity and/or difficulty even stating it are bad enough.
Regards,
Dawson
I can imagine a number of situations in which TAG is circular or TAG is unstated but have a hard time imagining how it might be both in the same situation. An assertion is just that and not an argument and Collett attempts to state TAG.
Certainly “there are cases when presuppositionalists do not lay out their argument (and thus it’s unstated)” and there are situations when “the argument is laid out” but “turns out to be circular” but I do not see how this reconciles 1 and 2.
Chris,
Who is saying that the same argument commits both errors at the same time?
Regards,
Dawson
In my experience it is rather common to find people claiming both whether in the case of the gentleman I encountered in an IRC room several months ago or within the contributions of Christian apologists who should know better.
I see. Then here’s the problem so far as I see it: first, presuppositional apologists have a hard time stating TAG – specifically in spelling out the argument’s premises and explaining how they support the intended conclusion. Then, if they do manage to present an actual argument, it turns out to be circular, as both Van Til and Collett admit.
Although I cannot speak for the sources you have in mind, I’d say that my assessment should clear up any confusion you may have here.
Of course, if my assessment is accurate (and it reflects what I’ve personally encountered, with expressed support by presuppositional theorists), then I’d say presuppositionalists need to rethink their TAG significantly, if not altogether abandon it.
Regards,
Dawson
I’ve seen a significant number of people state TAG and do not know that they have a hard time stating it. It is also clear that many of the examples that can be provided are not circular. For example, “If knowledge then God, knowledge, therefore God” does not appear to be circular. Likewise, “Logic, If not-Christianity then not-Logic, therefore Christianity” is not circular that I can see.
In the case of Van Til it is frequently claimed that he never actually offered an argument. Yet it is also frequently claimed that his argument was circular. Sometimes these claims come from the same people!
Van Til and Collett do not admit that TAG is circular in some problematic (i.e. fallacious manner) which is what I take the objection to mean.
I do not think I am confused. I think that people offering knee-jerk reactions to TAG which may be based upon hearsay fail to think deeply enough about the argument to even address the surface level conflict between the two objections in question.
Chris wrote: “I’ve seen a significant number of people state TAG and do not know that they have a hard time stating it.”
That’s good. Perhaps you could introduce me. I’ve not found very many who have a) stated TAG in its fullness and b) have been willing to discuss my concerns with it. I have, however, run into a huge number of internet apologists who have no problem stating the conclusion of TAG, but have a very difficult time explaining how it is supposed to follow from any premises which are offered in support of it. Quite frankly, I often get the impression that apologists think I’m dysfunctional in some sense for not simply accepting the conclusion on their say so.
Certainly you know that a sound argument is a valid argument with true premises. The models you cited are clearly valid, but to be accepted as sound arguments, one would need to establish the truth of their premises. Of course, the controversial premise in the argument “If knowledge, then God/Knowledge/Therefore God” is the first premise. To show that the argument is sound, you would have to produce an argument defending the first premise, for its truth is certainly not self-evident, and an inability to defend it would render the whole argument dismissable.
So what would be the argument for the first premise? Or should I ask: is there one? And here’s the clincher: would any argument proposed in support of the premise “if knowledge, therefore God,” presuppose the truth of the conclusion of the argument which this premise is used in the argument to support?
One reason why I would reject TAG right off the bat is the fact that it takes the notion of “a priori knowledge” seriously (see for instance Butler, “The Transcendental Argument for God,” The Standard Bearer, p. 91). I’m persuaded that there is no such thing.
Also, the point which Collett brings to light about the basic model of TAG is that the conclusion seems to have no clear inferential relationship to the premises, since it is said to follow whether or not the minor premise is affirmed or denied. Given this, it appears to be an assertion that there exists some fundamental relationship between some principle or idea and the Christian god, dressed up in the form of an argument without any actual inferential connection between the two. Collett says as much when he write:
“the truth value of the conclusion is not a function of the truth value of the antecedent minor premise (i.e., premise 2), since the conclusion remains true whether C or ~C obtains… In the nature of the case, the truth of a ‘transcendental conclusion’ does not depend upon the truth value of its antecedent premise, regardless of whether this premise affirms causality or any other principle” (“Van Til and Transcendental Argument,” Reason and Revelation, pp. 270-271).
Collett says this is the case because “a transcendental conclusion constitutes the very ground for the proof of that premise” (Ibid.).
Thus if the “transcendental conclusion” is something akin to “therefore God exists,” it is claimed via “transcendental argument” that this conclusion “constitutes the very ground for the proof” of the premises which are given in the argument to support that premise. (And round and round we go.) What justifies the supposition, affirmed in the initial premise, that there’s any relationship at all between knowledge and the Christian god in the first place? What justifies the assumption, inherent in the transcendental methodology which Collett elucidates, that the existence of the Christian god “constitutes the very ground” of the argument’s minor premise?
It seems to me that TAG starts midstream, without presenting any real reason for supposing that there is any such relationship between knowledge and the Christian god. It seems to be nothing more than an assertion of such a relationship camouflaged in the form of an argument which has no genuine substance to begin with at all.
So it isn’t any wonder to me that Collett does not deny the circular nature of this type of argument. Again, I’ve written about this at length on my blog here: http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2009/12/argument-from-predication.html
To be sure, there are other very good reasons to reject claims like “if knowledge, then God,” such as those which I have raised on my blog. I don’t find that presuppositionalists are able to raise any satisfactory responses to the counterpoints which I have articulated against such claims. In fact, I’ve presented my own argument – If knowledge, then non-theism – see here: http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2010/04/if-knowledge-then-non-theism.html
So far, I’ve seen only a very weak attempt to interact with this.
As for the version of TAG which seeks to prove the Christian god’s existence by way of citing logic, I’ve yet to see any attempts to defend this version from the many issues which I have raised against it (see here: http://www.katholon.com/Logic.htm). Because of their failure to examine the kinds of issues that I raise, I often get the impression that presuppositionalists are bluffing. But I don’t expect them to admit this.
Regards,
Dawson
I’m sorry, but both examples that you’ve presented actually do contain the implicit premise that God exists. Since your conclusion is assumed from the very beginning, both arguments are circular. You simply haven’t explicitly stated all of the premises of the argument.
Where is the implicit premise “God exists” in either example? Are you saying that either of the examples contains the conclusion in the premises in a different way from all other such arguments? If not it is strange to single out TAG as being “circular”. Can you explicitly state all the premises of the argument?
The observation in the post still stands.
The premise that God provides the necessary preconditions for knowledge is the one that needs to be proven. Obviously, if you are going to try to prove the existence of God, then you cannot start your argument with a premise that assumes God necessarily must exist or else knowledge could not exist. You first have to successfully argue that God is a precondition to knowledge. Most proponents of TAG even acknowledge this and unfortunately it is here where things usually fall apart for those trying to argue TAG.
Since an unprovable premise is not the same thing as a circular argument and since you assume the argument may be stated; your assertions, even if true, are irrelevant to the original post.
Declaring your premise unprovable doesn’t make it immune from being a circular argument. Wouldn’t it be nice if we could argue that way?
A premise is not an argument, ergo you are not making much sense Agreus! 🙂
I never stated that a premise was an argument. Your premise entails the truth of your conclusion (God’s existence), which is what makes your argument circular.
What does “it” refer to in, “Declaring your premise unprovable doesn’t make it immune from being a circular argument”?
If “it” refers to a premise, then refer to my previous comment. A premise is not an argument.
If “it” refers to TAG, then your statement is correct. An unprovable premise does not mean that TAG is not circular. However, you are citing an allegedly unprovable premise in an effort to explain how TAG is circular. Since an unprovable premise is not the same thing as a circular argument and since you assume the argument may be stated (in your admission that there are premises); your assertions, even if true, are irrelevant to the original post.
But now you’ve written something I’m even more interested in, which is, “Your premise entails the truth of your conclusion (God’s existence), which is what makes your argument circular.” I asked earlier if the examples of TAG provided contain the conclusion in the premises in a different way from other like arguments.
The conclusion of the first example is “God”.
The first premise is “If knowledge then God”.
The second premise is “knowledge”.
The first premise does not entail the conclusion by itself. The same is true of the second premise.
The conclusion of the second example is “Christianity”.
The first premise is “Logic”.
The second premise is “If not-Christianity then not-Logic”.
The first premise does not entail the conclusion by itself. The same is true of the second premise.
Perhaps you are saying that the premises entail the truth of the conclusions of the arguments and hence they are circular. For example, argument X:
If the premises of an argument entail the truth of the conclusion of the argument then the argument is circular.
The premises of argument X entail the truth of the conclusion of the argument.
Therefore argument X is circular.
Are you saying something like that?
Chris,
In the case of the first argument (“If knowledge, then God”), when you say that “the first premise does not entail the conclusion by itself,” are you saying that knowledge does not presuppose the existence of the Christian god? Also, can you explain what you mean “does not entail the conclusion *by itself*”? It’s unclear what the qualifier “by itself” is supposed to mean here.
I have the same question in regard to your second example regarding logic. Are you saying that logic does not presuppose the existence of the Christian god?
If you think that knowledge and/or logic does presuppose the Christian god, I’d like to know how the questionable premises of either argument do not assume the truth of its intended conclusion.
In regard to circularity in TAG, I did address this in an earlier comment which I submitted to this post of yours. You have not approved it, so I posted it on my own blog. I invite Agreus to check it out.
Also, I have already shown how knowledge entails non-theism and how logic does not and cannot presuppose the Christian god. If you need assistance finding where I have done this, please let me know.
Regards,
Dawson
[…] recently wrote that two of the most popular objections to TAG are in fact inconsistent with one another. The […]
I don’t normally have to approve your comments. I will check on it.
Hello Chris,
I would not contend that you have any obligation to approve my comments or anyone else’s. But whether or not you are so obligated is not the issue as I see it. To my knowledge, you have never rejected a comment of mine in the past, and the comment which I made was germane to the topic and in keeping with the discussion you and I were having. So I’m at a loss as to why you did not approve it.
It appears that my comment has now been approved. Thank you.
Now that it is part of the public discussion, do you have any reaction to what I stated in my comment? If anything, I’d love to discuss the peculiarity of transcendental arguments as Collett conceives of them, wherein the conclusion is said to derive from a set of premises regardless of whether one of them is affirmed or denied. I’ve tried to understand this from Collett’s article, but I seem to be missing something. In fact, if I read your 9 April comment to your blog “Response to ‘Van Til, Bahnsen, Logic and TAG’ by Ronald W. Di Giacomo” (https://choosinghats.org/?p=1055) correctly, you yourself seem to have difficulty understanding this. If I’m wrong and you do understand it fully, I’d appreciate your insights on this.
As an example, Christian presuppositionalists (Collett and Frame come to mind specifically) champion arguments which assert that causality presupposes the Christian god and that the conclusion that the Christian god exists follows from both the affirmation of causality as well as the denial of causality. (This is why I asked in my previous comment for you to make clear whether or not you are saying that either knowledge or logic does not presuppose the existence of the Christian god. I thought presuppositionalists did believe that knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god.) The Blarkian presuppositionalist could likewise claim that causality presupposes the existence of Blarko, and that the conclusion that Blarko exists follows from both the affirmation of causality as well as from the denial of causality. The transcendental model, as Collett informs it, seems especially prone to lending itself to establishing just about any conclusion one may want to affirm, even if it’s imaginative in nature. Do you think it still has apologetic value in spite of such concerns?
Regards,
Dawson
Chris, either you are making an arbitrary if..then statement or else you are presenting TAG with unstated (implicit) premises, in which case your argument is circular. If you are just making an arbitrary if..then statement, then I have no problem with it, other than the conclusion is false because the premise is false. If you are trying to present an argument for TAG, then you simply have not stated the argument to avoid it from appearing circular.
What do you mean by “arbitrary if..then statement”? Would you consider the following to be an arbitrary if then statement?:
“If you are just making an arbitrary if..then statement, then I have no problem with it…”
Is this one an “arbitrary if..then” statement?:
“If you are trying to present an argument for TAG, then you simply have not stated the argument to avoid it from appearing circular.”
If not, why not? You will also need to establish your statement above. This is what I have been asking you to do. What is circular about either of the examples provided? Be specific, don’t just repeat what you have heard.
It seems that you are merely substituting “arbitrary” for my earlier “unprovable”. However, I have already answered you on this. An argument with an unprovable premise (or an “arbitrary” premise if I understand you correctly) is not a circular argument and a premise is not an argument.
Arguments with implicit premises are not necessarily circular. In order for your charge of circularity to stick with respect to the second option you will need to make the alleged implicit premises of the examples explicit and demonstrate how their presence results in circular argument.
You can repeat that the arguments appear circular all night long but it is a far cry from actually showing where and how they are circular. It is not up to me to produce premises that you imagine are hidden somewhere and believe constitute circularity in the arguments when revealed. This is very strange thinking on your part – if you know that there are implicit premises and you know that their being made explicit demonstrates that the arguments are circular then why not produce said premises and put this thing to rest?
Three more things worth noting:
1. I don’t think you actually addressed my questions from the last two comments.
2. You wrote, “Your premise entails the truth of your conclusion (God’s existence), which is what makes your argument circular.” I already addressed this in my previous comments and asked for clarification, but now you appear to be charging TAG with circularity while citing a different reason for doing so (an implicit premise)! Is TAG circular because a “premise entails the truth of [its] conclusion” or is it circular because I am “presenting TAG with unstated (implicit) premises”?
3. None of your comments is actually relevant to the inconsistency between the two surface level (but very popular) objections to TAG I presented. You are presumably trying to establish that TAG is circular or that it is unstated which is fine but it is difficult to see how you might go about establishing both!
Chris, your argument is a logically valid deductive argument, however that does not tell us much other than your argument is logically valid. Your premises, “If Knowledge, then God” has not been established and hence your argument is unsound. A sound argument is only sound if it is both logically valid and all of its premises are actually true.
If that is all there is to your argument and you have no problem with the unsoundness of it, then that is fine. But I doubt that you are satisified with that. Most people who argue TAG try to support their premises with some sort of argument, which I have always found to be a circular one.
Dawson, excellent post on your website. It gets to the heart of the matter. I encourage Chris to read it if he hasn’t already and respond to it here.
Woops, I see it’s already posted here so I guess Chris has read it, but just not responded yet.
The two examples of TAG which Chris has presented are the following:
Argument A:
Premise 1A: “If knowledge then God”
Premise 2A: “knowledge”
Conclusion A: “therefore God”
Argument B:
Premise 1B: “Logic”
Premise 2B: “If not-Christianity then not-Logic”
Conclusion B: “therefore Christianity”
Chris stated that neither of these arguments appears to be circular, so far as he can see.
In my 18 May comment above, I gave reasons – reasons gleaned from relevant literature sympathetic to presuppositionalism – for suspecting that the circularity of the TAG argument is hidden from view, particularly when the focus is trained exclusively on the bare models which Chris has presented. The models which Chris has presented are carefully constructed to keep their inherent circularity (and other problems) safely out of view. That is why I raised the issue of soundness versus validity of an argument as well as questions about how Premise 1A and Premise 2B are supported. To accept the conclusion of either argument, both premises of either argument must be demonstrably true.
So far as I have seen throughout this discussion, Chris has made no attempt to demonstrate the truth of his argument’s premises.
I suspect, strongly I might add, that as we examine the individual cases for the controversial premises of these arguments (namely Premise 1A and Premise 2B above), that circular logic will be uncovered. It is for this reason that I think Chris resists presenting support for the premises of his two argument models. I suspect this is the reason why he also resists interacting with my comments. If I’m wrong on this, it’s up to Chris to show us that I’m wrong and where I’m wrong.
It is in the interest of settling once and for all the question of whether or not TAG is *ultimately* circular that I asked Chris to state for the record whether or not he thinks knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god.
It seems that the only alternatives here are
i) yes, knowledge and logic do presuppose the existence of the Christian god, and
ii) no, knowledge and logic do not presuppose the existence of the Christian god.
Since Chris is a student of Van Til and Bahnsen, I would think that he would insist that both knowledge and logic are not presuppositionally neutral phenomena, that they are underwritten by certain presuppositions, and that those presuppositions honor the grace and sovereignty which Christianity attributes to its god.
Neither alternative seems to bode well for the presuppositionalist position. Consider:
If on the one hand knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god, then Premise 1A and Premise 2B contain elements which assume the truth of their respective Conclusions A and B (the existence of the Christian god, or the truth of Christian theism, which assumes the existence of the Christian god), and thus the two models of TAG which Chris has presented are by definition circular.
If on the other hand knowledge and logic turn out not to presuppose the existence of the Christian god, then knowledge and logic are at best presuppositionally neutral, perhaps even anti-theistic (as I have argued on my website). Since presuppositionalism insists that neutrality is a form of self-deception, I’m guessing that Chris would not affirm this horn of the dilemma. But then he’s faced with affirming the ultimate circularity of TAG.
It is because of this dilemma, and Van Til’s adamant rejection of presuppositional neutrality, that the apologetic master rejected the latter alternative and stated explicitly that he would “prefer to reason in a circle to not reasoning at all” (A Survey of Christian Epistemology, p. 12).
So, Chris, how do you untangle this mess?
Regards,
Dawson
“Chris, your argument is a logically valid deductive argument”
Glad you grant this!
“however that does not tell us much other than your argument is logically valid.”
It tells us the argument.
“Your premises, ‘If Knowledge, then God’ has not been established and hence your argument is unsound.”
An argument with an unestablished premise is not necessarily unsound.
“A sound argument is only sound if it is both logically valid and all of its premises are actually true.”
Yes, but note that just because a premise has not been established does not mean that the premise is false. Thus an argument with an unestablished premise is not necessarily unsound.
“If that is all there is to your argument and you have no problem with the unsoundness of it, then that is fine.”
Again, the argument is not necessarily unsound because the premise is not necessarily false, even if it has not been established. You would need to provide arguments in order to demonstrate that the premise in question is false in order to support your statement that the argument is unsound.
“But I doubt that you are satisified with that.”
You’re right, I’m not, because I do not believe that it is unsound.
“Most people who argue TAG try to support their premises with some sort of argument,”
What sort of argument do they try to support the premises with?
“which I have always found to be a circular one.”
If we remove these allegedly circular arguments given in support of the premises of TAG we are back to the problem of an unsupported premise, but an unsupported premise is not the same thing as a circular argument. But aside from this, notice that your claim is that the arguments given in support of the premises of TAG are circular and not TAG itself. So then TAG is not what is circular, but rather the arguments which support its premises. This is different (again!) from what you have said before.
Is TAG circular because a “premise entails the truth of [its] conclusion” or is it circular because I am “presenting TAG with unstated (implicit) premises” or is it circular because the premises of TAG are supported by “some sort of argument…found to be a circular one”? Not only are these different from each other, they are each problematic as explained.
To summarize, you have attempted to show that TAG is circular by making three different claims as to why it is circular. Your most recent claim implies that it is not actually TAG which is circular, but rather the arguments given in support of its premises which are circular. You have not established that TAG is circular. There is also implicit concession in what you have written that TAG is not unstated.
Notice that you have not established either:
1. TAG is circular.
or
2. TAG is unstated.
Not only have you been unsuccessful in raising either of these objections on its own, you have not reconciled the two so as to show that there is no inconsistency in affirming both objections.
Chris stated: “note that just because a premise has not been established does not mean that the premise is false.”
Chris, are you acknowledging here that you have not established the (alleged) truth of your arguments’ premises? It seems that you are.
Chris stated: “Thus an argument with an unestablished premise is not necessarily unsound.”
You’re trifling here, perhaps in an interest to delay the inevitable. If an argument’s premises have not been established as truthful, one should not accept its conclusion as soundly established. Would you disagree?
Until TAG’s premises are established as truthful, one should not accept its conclusion as soundly established.
Would you disagree with this?
Do you think TAG’s conclusion should be accepted on someone’s say so? Yes or no?
Chris stated: “You would need to provide arguments in order to demonstrate that the premise in question is false in order to support your statement that the argument is unsound.”
I’ve already done this. Do you need the links again???
Regards,
Dawson
“Chris stated: ‘note that just because a premise has not been established does not mean that the premise is false.’ Chris, are you acknowledging here that you have not established the (alleged) truth of your arguments’ premises?”
No.
“Chris stated: ‘Thus an argument with an unestablished premise is not necessarily unsound.’ You’re trifling here, perhaps in an interest to delay the inevitable.”
You’re trifling here, perhaps in an interest to divert attention away from the point of the post and subsequent discussion. 😉
“If an argument’s premises have not been established as truthful, one should not accept its conclusion as soundly established. Would you disagree?”
No.
“Until TAG’s premises are established as truthful, one should not accept its conclusion as soundly established. Would you disagree with this?”
No.
“Do you think TAG’s conclusion should be accepted on someone’s say so? Yes or no?”
If that someone is God, yes. If that someone is not God and presents TAG as a sound argument, yes. If that someone is not God and does not present TAG as a sound argument, which is what I assume you are asking about, no.
“Chris stated: ‘You would need to provide arguments in order to demonstrate that the premise in question is false in order to support your statement that the argument is unsound.’
I’ve already done this. Do you need the links again???”
No.
Chris,
Since you’re now answering yes and no questions, please address the following:
1) Does knowledge presuppose the existence of the Christian god?
2) Does logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god?
Thanks,
Dawson
I would answer both of those questions in the affirmative, but that’s not relevant to whether or not TAG is circular. Isolated premises do not entail conclusions by themselves; they must be placed within the context of an argument. The claim here has been that the argument those premises are a part of is circular. I am trying to determine in what sense that is true. Agreus has cited three different reasons for his claim that the argument is circular, but none of the three actually demonstrates that the argument is circular.
Thanks for making your position on both knowledge and logic presupposing the existence of the Christian god clear. This is important, and it confirms the suspicion that circularity haunts TAG.
On your view, both knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god. Consequently, your two argument models contain elements (namely knowledge and logic) which, on your view, presuppose the very truth of the conclusions of those two argument models.
Observe:
Argument A:
Premise 1A: “If knowledge then God”
Premise 2A: “knowledge” (which presupposes the existence of the Christian god)
Conclusion A: “therefore God”
Argument B:
Premise 1B: “Logic” (which presupposes the truth of Christianity by way of presupposing the existence of the Christian god)
Premise 2B: “If not-Christianity then not-Logic”
Conclusion B: “therefore Christianity”
In both cases, we have an argument whose conclusion is assumed in the background of a key element of one of its premises. Thus what we have here is a case of presuppositional smuggling. You can deny the circularity here all you like, but Van Til’s already confessed it.
Meanwhile, the TAG models which you have presented remain incomplete because you have not provided support for their controversial premises respectively. Moreover, I have already given ample reasons on my website why both knowledge and logic do not presuppose the Christian god. To date I’ve seen no good attempt to overcome those reasons.
So the charge of circularity stands, and unfortunately for presuppositionalists they are just the beginning of TAG’s inherent problems.
Regards,
Dawson
Thus I present the following argument, my very own “argument from predication”:
Premise 1: If predication is a conceptual operation, then predication does not presuppose the Christian god.
Premise 2: Predication is a conceptual operation.
Conclusion: Therefore, predication does not presuppose the Christian god.
I fail to see how this argument of yours doesn’t do the same thing you are accusing Chris’ arguments of doing.
How so, Danielj? My argument does not seek to conclude that the Christian god exists, and its premises do not contain elements which are underwritten with the assumption that the Christian god exists. In order for my argument to do what Chris’ arguments do, my argument would have to do both of these things, but it doesn’t.
Regards,
Dawson
Did anybody else not realize that I was implying that the second premise of Dawson’s argument “assumes” the conclusion of the argument? Is it not the same exact “presuppositional smuggling” he accused Chris of?
Was that really not clear enough?
Chris’ argument:
Premise 1A: “If knowledge then God”
Premise 2A: “knowledge” (which presupposes the existence of the Christian god)
Conclusion A: “therefore God”
Dawson’s argument:
Premise 1: “If Predication is conceptual, then no God”
Premise 2: “Conceptual predication” (which presupposes the non-existence of God)
Conclusion: “Therefore, no God”
Danielj, you’re misleading your intended audience by mischaracterizing my argument. For one, my argument does not seek to establish the conclusion “therefore, no God.” Second, my argument nowhere characterizes predication as presupposing the non-existence of God. My argument is quite clear as I have laid it out and defended it. If it has problems, you’ll need to show that it has problems as it is stated and defended, not as you have revised it.
Regards,
Dawson
“If we remove these allegedly circular arguments given in support of the premises of TAG we are back to the problem of an unsupported premise…..”
Chris, what you are doing is not actually addressing the problems of TAG rather you are quibbling about semantics. As Dawson said, “You’re trifling here, perhaps in an interest to divert attention away from the point of the post and subsequent discussion”. For the purposes of clarification, let’s call TAG unstated version, TAG v1, which is the unsupported deductively valid form of the argument. Let’s call the second version, TAG v2, which is the enhanced version of TAG that attempts to argue in support of the premise “If God, knowledge.” With this clarification in mind, let’s review the questions you skeptically posed to me in your last post:
“Is TAG circular because a ‘premise entails the truth of [its] conclusion’”
TAG v2 is circular because its premise entails the truth of its conclusion.
“or is it circular because I am ‘presenting TAG with unstated (implicit) premises’”
I never said that either TAG v1 nor V2 were circular because you were presenting them with unstated premises.
“or is it circular because the premises of TAG are supported by ‘some sort of argument…found to be a circular one’?”
Here you are referring to TAG v2, which is a circular argument because it presupposes what it attempts to prove, the details of which have yet to be expounded upon because we are nitpicking over semantics.
Typically if someone argues TAG, they will use the enhanced version as TAG v1 isn’t a persuasive argument for someone skeptical of the existence of God and TAG is supposedly the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God and not just a deductively valid argument (TAG v1). In fact, TAG v1.0 isn’t an argument for the existence of God at all and we may as well call it the Transcendental Assumption of God’s Existence.
That said, when you talk about the Transcendental Argument for God, you must have in mind TAG v2, which is in fact circular. In this case, you just have not stated the premises in full, which when revealed makes the argument circular. This is what has been pointed out to you for both of your arguments by Dawson. I hope this clarifies things for you.
“To summarize, you have attempted to show that TAG is circular ”
I have not delved into the problems of TAG rather I am trying to unravel your semantical confusions. Why you are expending so much energy quibbling over semantics is telling. Dawson is actually addressing the problems of TAG.
Danielj, you’re misleading your intended audience by mischaracterizing my argument. For one, my argument does not seek to establish the conclusion “therefore, no God.”
Does anybody have the Alexa rating for this site? I’m pretty sure we are the audience. In either case, your argument only then seeks to establish that predication isn’t a sufficient condition for the Christian God and the second premise smuggles that conclusion in.
It doesn’t change the point.
Danielj wrote: “your argument only then seeks to establish that predication isn’t a sufficient condition for the Christian God and the second premise smuggles that conclusion in.”
Excuse me? Please explain how you got the idea that my argument “seeks to establish that predication isn’t a sufficient condition for the Christian God.” I would suggest that you read my piece, and do so carefully, noting what you read as you read through it.
It was clear from your earlier comments that you’ve not read my piece, or that if you have, you surely did not read it carefully. Originally you seemed to think that my argument was trying to establish the conclusion “therefore, no god.” My argument does not do this. The conclusion of my argument is very clear: that predication does not presuppose the Christian god. I corrected you on this once. Now you come back and seem to think that my argument “seeks to establish that predication isn’t a sufficient condition for the Christian God.” It doesn’t seek to do this.
At any rate, Danielj, we are discussing Chris Bolt’s arguments here. If you want to discuss my blog, I’d certainly be happy to, and you already have my e-mail address. Please first go read the piece from beginning to end, then come to me with your questions if you like. But enough with trying to revise what my argument does or seeks to do.
Regards,
Dawson
The conclusion of my argument is very clear: that predication does not presuppose the Christian god. I corrected you on this once. Now you come back and seem to think that my argument “seeks to establish that predication isn’t a sufficient condition for the Christian God.”
They are the same thing to me.
You didn’t “correct” me bro.
Christians believe “if predication, then God” which establishes predication as a sufficient condition for God. Where predication exists, God does. Maybe that is a bad way to word it. Whatever. I don’t really care about that.
Point is, I know exactly what you mean (as does everybody else reading this) and you’ve done the exact same thing that Chris has done and everybody sees it.
I don’t really want or need to discuss it with you anywhere. But, since I’m a glutton for punishment, are you denying that you’ve done so?
Danielj, your comments are practically incoherent.
You’re saying that predication is “a sufficient condition for God,” and that Christians believe this? Historically Christians have claimed that their god’s existence is unconditional, not that some condition needs to obtain in order for it to exist. By characterizing prediction “as a sufficient condition for God,” you seem to be going against the historical grain of Christian orthodoxy. If that is not what you meant, I’d suggest that you take a little more care in expressing yourself. So far, with each post you submit, you make some serious gaffs.
As for my argument doing “the exact same thing that Christ has done,” you need to be more specific. Chris presented an argument which is supposed to establish the existence of the Christian god. I have not done this. Also, the premises of Chris’ argument contain elements which presuppose the existence of the Christian god. If you think my argument does this, you need to show this, citing specific points which I make in developing my argument. For instance, show where my argument seeks to establish the existence of the Christian god, and show where my argument’s premises contain elements which presuppose the existence of the Christian god.
If you’re claiming something else, I’d encourage you to use more care in expressing your concerns with clarity.
Regards,
Dawson
Danielj, your comments are practically incoherent.
Well don’t read them.
You’re saying that predication is “a sufficient condition for God,” and that Christians believe this?
No. That was a big mistake. I need to slow down and be careful when I type. I’m saying that it is sufficient evidence for the Christian God.
Historically Christians have claimed that their god’s existence is unconditional, not that some condition needs to obtain in order for it to exist.
I do believe His existence is unconditional. I also believe that predication is in some way “wrapped up” in God’s existence. Certain conditions obtain as a result of God’s existence and predication is one of them. Must predication exist because God exists? I wanna say that it has to be so. I wanna say God is “bound” to be coherent, that He must be coherent, and that we must be able to predicate things because of His very nature and existence.
I’m not capable of fleshing that out adequately right now. I’m sorry if I’m not clear enough.
By characterizing prediction “as a sufficient condition for God,” you seem to be going against the historical grain of Christian orthodoxy.
It wasn’t my intention and I certainly see why you are confused by the statement.
If that is not what you meant, I’d suggest that you take a little more care in expressing yourself. So far, with each post you submit, you make some serious gaffs.
Noted.
As for my argument doing “the exact same thing that Chris has done,” you need to be more specific.
I think you know exactly what I mean but I’ll try to be more clear for you.
If you’re claiming something else, I’d encourage you to use more care in expressing your concerns with clarity.
Here is Dawson:
Thus I present the following argument, my very own “argument from predication”:
Premise 1: If predication is a conceptual operation, then predication does not presuppose the Christian god.
Premise 2: Predication is a conceptual operation.
Conclusion: Therefore, predication does not presuppose the Christian god.
Here is Chris:
Premise 1A: “If knowledge then God”
Premise 2A: “knowledge”
Conclusion A: “therefore God”
Dawson’s second premise seems to perform the same function as Chris’ second premise. So, if Dawson accuses Chris of circularity then I would simply suggest to Dawson that Chris might rightfully declare “Tu quoque!”
Am I just way off base here? Am I wrong?
If I am, someone please explain why. I’m here to learn from everybody.
Danielj wrote: “I’m saying that [predication] is sufficient evidence for the Christian God.”
Can you explain how? Could predication be sufficient evidence for Blarko, too? If not, why not? What is it about predication that makes you think it serves as evidence for the Christian god?
Predication is a finite action performed by a human mind. It is fallible, it is non-omniscient, it is limited to what man can know by his own cognitive capacities. How does any of this serve as “evidence for the Christian God”?
Danielj wrote: “I also believe that predication is in some way ‘wrapped up’ in God’s existence.”
I have no idea what this is supposed to mean. Can you rephrase? Are you sure you aren’t confusing predication with your imagination?
Danielj wrote: “Certain conditions obtain as a result of God’s existence and predication is one of them.”
Why do you believe this? Is it a feeling? Is it just a hunch? A faith? Or is there a real inference here? If you feel there’s a real inference here, can you spell it out for us?
Danielj wrote: “Must predication exist because God exists? I wanna say that it has to be so.”
You “wanna say” this? It’s a desire of yours that this is the case?
Danielj wrote: “I wanna say God is ‘bound’ to be coherent, that He must be coherent,”
So your god’s coherence is not something it has any volitional control over, is that right? It’s coherent whether it wants to be or not? It can’t choose one way or another? That’s what you appear to be saying here. Is that really what you “wanna” say?
Danielj wrote: “and that we must be able to predicate things because of His very nature and existence.”
The Blarkist says something very similar to this. It’s easy to attribute things we find in real life to something we imagine.
Regarding my argument from predication, Danielj wrote: “Dawson’s second premise seems to perform the same function as Chris’ second premise.”
What does this mean? What “same function”? The premises in my argument are presented in support of the argument’s conclusion. That is their function. I wouldn’t debate this.
Danielj wrote: “So, if Dawson accuses Chris of circularity then I would simply suggest to Dawson that Chris might rightfully declare ‘Tu quoque!’”
Chris would be wrong to do this, for my argument’s premises do not presuppose the truth of the conclusion which they are intended to support in the context of the argument itself. The conclusion is an inference drawn from the premises, not something that was presupposed all along, as it is in the case of Chris’ argument.
If you truly think that my argument is circular, you need to do more than merely “suggest” this and urge Chris to declare “tu quoque.” You need to show that one of my argument’s premises actually presupposes the truth of the conclusion as a more primitive background assumption, rather than an inference drawn from them.
Meanwhile, you appear to be agreeing that Chris’ argument is in fact circular. Is that correct?
Regards,
Dawson
Meanwhile, you appear to be agreeing that Chris’ argument is in fact circular. Is that correct?
No.
I’m saying that If you accuse Chris of smuggling his conclusion into his second premise I fail to see how you haven’t opened yourself up to the same charge in doing so because of the similarity of your arguments. I also think that you know exactly what I mean by that and have known what I meant this entire discussion. I also think that because of what I perceive to be disingenuousness on your part, I end really not enjoying our discussions. I find they are like trying to bleed onions.
Danielj wrote: “I’m saying that If you accuse Chris of smuggling his conclusion into his second premise I fail to see how you haven’t opened yourself up to the same charge in doing so because of the similarity of your arguments.”
Perhaps you did not understand what I meant by presuppositional smuggling. The premises of Chris’ arguments contains an element (‘knowledge’ in one, ‘logic’ in the other) which, according to him, presuppose the existence of the Christian god. Do you get that? The premises of both arguments contain elements which presuppose the truth of the conclusions of those arguments.
My argument does not do this. If you disagree, and think that my argument contains an element which presupposes the argument’s conclusion, kindly show which element that is, and also how it presupposes the conclusion. So far, you’ve simply insinuated that my argument is guilty of the same charge leveled against Chris’ argument. But you’ve not shown this. If you can’t show it, then I’ll take that as an indication that it’s an empty charge.
Also, I asked a number of questions about your claim that predication somehow serves as “evidence” for the Christian god. I’d love to see some answer to those questions. Got any?
Regards,
Dawson
Argument B:
Premise 1B: “Logic”
Premise 2B: “If not-Christianity then not-Logic”
Conclusion B: “therefore Christianity”
The contrapositive of 2B is: If logic then Christianity.
We have the logically equivalent:
Argument B’:
Premise 1B’: “Logic”
Premise 2B’: “If logic then Christianity”
Conclusion B’: “therefore Christianity”
B’ assumes the consequent, therefore the logically equivalent B assumes the consequent, a logical fallacy.
I retract my previous, incorrect, comment after further thought.
Agreus,
You have not raised any problems with TAG. Rather, you have asserted over and over again that TAG is circular while providing different reasons which are inconsistent with each other as to why this is supposedly the case. I am not “quibbling about semantics.” A circular argument which is used to support a premise of TAG is not the same thing as TAG itself being circular, and an unsupported premise in TAG is not the same thing as TAG itself being circular. That’s not semantics; those are two different descriptions of two different situations. I am asking you why you believe that TAG is circular. So far you have not provided a cogent answer as I have addressed each of your answers every time you have produced them.
You have now divided TAG into v1 and v2 in an ad hoc attempt to save your argument. TAG v1 is not circular given your definition of it because an argument with unsupported premises is not necessarily circular and the examples of the argument I presented are clearly not circular.
TAG v2 you state is an “enhanced version of TAG that attempts to argue in support” of its first premise. You have now repeated yourself in stating that TAG v2 is circular because its premise entails the truth of its conclusion. I have already addressed this argument. The argument fails because a premise does not in and of itself entail anything. A premise must be placed within the context of an argument in order for it to entail a conclusion. But what does your objection then look like? Earlier I asked for more clarification from you on this when I wrote, “Perhaps you are saying that the premises entail the truth of the conclusions of the arguments and hence they are circular. For example, argument X:
If the premises of an argument entail the truth of the conclusion of the argument then the argument is circular.
The premises of argument X entail the truth of the conclusion of the argument.
Therefore argument X is circular.
Are you saying something like that?”
Rather than answering my question, you changed the reason you were giving for thinking that TAG is circular. Now you are denying that you have done this, for you wrote, “I never said that either TAG v1 nor V2 were circular because you were presenting them with unstated premises.” Yes you did, in this comment – https://choosinghats.org/?p=1207&cpage=1#comment-1595 – where you wrote, “Chris, either you are making an arbitrary if..then statement or else you are ***presenting TAG with unstated (implicit) premises, in which case your argument is circular***.” I quoted you directly. I have also already pointed out the problems with this supposed reason for circularity.
You quoted me, “or is it circular because the premises of TAG are supported by ’some sort of argument…found to be a circular one’?” You wrote in response, “Here you are referring to TAG v2, which is a circular argument because it presupposes what it attempts to prove, the details of which have yet to be expounded upon because we are nitpicking over semantics.”
Again, we are not “nitpicking over semantics.” Maybe you are no longer following the discussion, or you are intentionally trying to write off the problems with your claims, but the issue is your inconsistency, not semantics. You are giving reasons for your assertion that TAG is circular and I am telling you what is wrong with the reasons you are giving. The reasons you are giving not only each fail as explained in my comments, but they are in fact inconsistent with each other! You are saying *different* things; this is not reducible to “semantics”.
What do you mean when you write that TAG v2 “is a circular argument because it presupposes what it attempts to prove”? Where, specifically, does the argument do this? If you could please be very specific and stop changing your answer every time I ask you this it would be very helpful. You are free to expound upon the details; I am encouraging you to! I want to know why you think either of the examples provided is circular. So far you have failed to produce something to back up your frequent claims to this effect.
Please, tell me plainly, how are either of the two examples provided circular? I do not think you will surmount this difficulty because I do not believe that either of the examples provided actually is objectionable due to circularity. Your objection, I think, is based upon hearsay.
“Typically if someone argues TAG, they will use the enhanced version as TAG v1 isn’t a persuasive argument for someone skeptical of the existence of God”
In other words you cannot find where the arguments I actually presented are actually circular. Fine, so you think that the circularity rests in the support for the premises. Also fine, but as I’ve already mentioned this is not the same thing as saying that TAG is itself circular. Further, I am willing, ready, and waiting to see the alleged support for the premises and how it is circular.
“and TAG is supposedly the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God and not just a deductively valid argument (TAG v1).”
Since TAG stands for Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God you are saying that ‘TAG is supposedly TAG and not just a deductively valid argument.’ Maybe you can help me to make sense out of that.
“In fact, TAG v1.0 isn’t an argument for the existence of God at all and we may as well call it the Transcendental Assumption of God’s Existence.”
Rhetoric and subsequent boredom – let’s see the circularity! 😉
“That said, when you talk about the Transcendental Argument for God, you must have in mind TAG v2, which is in fact circular.”
That’s what you keep asserting over and over again, yes. But where’s the demonstration that it is circular?
“In this case, you just have not stated the premises in full, which when revealed makes the argument circular.”
Actually I did state the premises in full. They are stated above in each of the examples provided. If you want to argue against some straw man of TAG then feel free to state it and show that it is circular, but I don’t know why you’d care to do that.
If you want to “reveal” whatever it is you think is being hidden (and here you’re talking again about implicit premises which you just a moment ago denied doing!) then feel free to do so. You are claiming that TAG is circular. Again, even if it were the case that the supporting arguments were circular, the supporting arguments are not TAG. It is up to you to state these supporting arguments and demonstrate that they are circular or else you have really failed to make any substantial case against TAG in terms of its circularity.
“This is what has been pointed out to you for both of your arguments by Dawson. I hope this clarifies things for you.”
You haven’t actually said anything new, so no you have not clarified anything. Please be specific and tell me how TAG is circular. I read what Dawson has written and do not see that he has done this, but I am asking you to provide this information for me.
In response to me writing, “To summarize, you have attempted to show that TAG is circular,” you wrote, “I have not delved into the problems of TAG.” However, you have certainly been repeating quite often your assertion that TAG is circular. You are correct that you have not “delved” into the alleged problems with TAG. You seem content just repeating yourself, but that is neither an argument nor persuasive.
“rather I am trying to unravel your semantical confusions.”
You have provided three different reasons for thinking that TAG is circular, each one has been answered now, and each one is inconsistent with the other two. You are the one claiming that TAG is circular and you need to provide some support for your claim. I’m not confused. I’m waiting for you to make a consistent and successful argument.
“Why you are expending so much energy quibbling over semantics is telling.”
More rhetoric. I am not quibbling over semantics. You are, however, hand waiving. When this conversation is complete I will be posting it as its own entry. If you do not demonstrate circularity within TAG in your next post the thread is over and the conversation is posted as is. It’s going to look bad at this point, so I do hope you produce some actual argument or evidence or whatever it is you have that demonstrates that TAG is circular!
“Dawson is actually addressing the problems of TAG.”
First, no he’s not. Second, that’s not the point of the post. Third, what about you? Fourth, you still have not clarified how TAG can be both unstated and circular.
Chris wrote: “so you think that the circularity rests in the support for the premises.”
It has already been established, with admissions on your part, that the premises of your versions of TAG contain elements which assume the truth of TAG’s conclusion. Thus they are circular by definition. I already explained this in earlier comments to this post. You have chosen to ignore what I’ve stated. I have my suspicions why.
Chris continued: “but as I’ve already mentioned this is not the same thing as saying that TAG is itself circular.”
Yes, you’ve denied the circularity, you’ve asserted that it’s not circular, but your own admission about the assumptions undergirding the elements contained in the premises of your versions of TAG are enough to seal the case for circularity. Deny it all you like, Chris. But any way you try to slice it, it comes up all circles.
John Frame acknowledges the circularity of TAG explicitly when he writes:
”Rather, the argument is circular in that it appeals to criteria of truth and rationality which are themselves Christian in that they accord with Christian presuppositions. But if that is true, then we are presenting an argument that assumes from the outset that Christianity is true; it assumes, in other words, the conclusion it attempts to prove.” (Presuppositional Apologetics: An Introduction)
Of course, Frame wants to deny the fallaciousness of circularity. But this is a different matter from what we’ve been discussing here. First it is important to recognize that TAG is in fact circular. You either admit this or you don’t. Frame has admitted it, and your own admissions about what your arguments’ premises presuppose make it clear that your own versions of TAG are indeed circular. Why not admit that your versions of TAG are in fact circular, as is clear from the foregoing conversation, and try to deny that circularity is fallacious? Frame has taken this path. Bahnsen did too. Why do you resist going down this path with your forebears? Do you see something that they didn’t?
Chris: “Further, I am willing, ready, and waiting to see the alleged support for the premises and how it is circular.”
And I am willing, ready, and waiting to see a fully developed version of TAG which is not circular. I’ve examined yours, Bahnsen’s, Frame’s, and many others, and circularity is one of the common themes which they all share. If you want to settle the matter once and for all, this is probably your only hope: present a fully stated TAG, which would include support for the premises which inform it. Show that you can build an argument for the existence of your god whose premises do not assume its existence from the outset. That is what you would need to do to present a non-circular argument for your god’s existence. Until then, I’m content to rest on the above analysis, confirmed by a congress of authorities on presuppositionalism, that TAG is in fact circular.
Regards,
Dawson
“Chris wrote: ‘so you think that the circularity rests in the support for the premises.’ It has already been established, with admissions on your part, that the premises of your versions of TAG contain elements which assume the truth of TAG’s conclusion.”
Established? I think not! 🙂 The portion of text you quoted from me here is a characterization of one of Agreus’s alleged reasons that TAG is false. Not only is Agreus arguing differently from Agreus, but you are too. The latter is at least much more understandable, but I do not know why you quoted something that has nothing to do with the argument you are trying to make.
What “element” does the premise “Logic” or the premise “Knowledge” contain which assumes the truth of TAG’s conclusion?
“Thus they are circular by definition.”
Again, premises are not circular, arguments are circular.
“Chris continued: ‘but as I’ve already mentioned this is not the same thing as saying that TAG is itself circular.’ Yes, you’ve denied the circularity, you’ve asserted that it’s not circular”
Have I actually done this? I may have but I am not sure that I have. The burden is at any rate on Agreus to show that the argument is circular and I have explained each time he changes his reasons for supposing that TAG is circular why his arguments do not actually work. I don’t need to say whether TAG is circular or not. I’m waiting on why he thinks either of the two examples are circular and he has not given a tenable answer yet. Again, stating that support given for premises is made up of circular arguments is not the same thing as stating that TAG is itself circular. That’s on you two to show.
“but your own admission about the assumptions undergirding the elements contained in the premises of your versions of TAG are enough to seal the case for circularity.”
You agree that logic and knowledge assume the truth of Christianity and the existence of God?
“John Frame acknowledges the circularity of TAG”
That’s great, but I want to know why Agreus thinks TAG is circular.
“Chris: ‘Further, I am willing, ready, and waiting to see the alleged support for the premises and how it is circular.’ And I am willing, ready, and waiting to see a fully developed version of TAG which is not circular.”
Again the quote from me has nothing to do with what you wrote afterward. Agreus continues to state (inconsistently with the other arguments he has raised) that the arguments given in support of TAG are circular. Again, this is different from claiming that TAG is itself circular and even then Agreus needs to produce these arguments he keeps claiming are circular and demonstrate how they are circular.
“I’ve examined yours, Bahnsen’s, Frame’s, and many others, and circularity is one of the common themes which they all share.”
Where are the two examples I presented circular? Be very specific. I’ve already explained why it cannot in this case be a premise itself.
But now you’ve gone and worked yourself into a real pickle, for you’ve charged Bahnsen’s TAG with circularity. Recall the topic of the post which Agreus has not come anywhere close to addressing yet. Raising the objections to TAG that “TAG is circular” and “TAG is unstated” is quite confusing and likely confused as the two objections do not appear to be consistent with one another. Now, Agreus has had enough trouble just trying to establish that TAG is circular, but even if he does he will need to reconcile this objection with the objection that it is unstated or else he has not moved the discussion beyond what I originally posted.
Interestingly though, you wrote, “Who is saying that the same argument commits both errors at the same time?”
You are. You’ve charged Bahnsen’s TAG with circularity, but you’ve also written many times before that Bahnsen’s TAG is not an argument. For example in this post – http://www.katholon.com/poof.htm you wrote, “It seems, in the case of his debate with Gordon Stein, Bahnsen fails to present an argument.”
How can your objection that Bahnsen’s version of TAG is circular be reconciled with your objection that it is unstated? Further, why did you ask me a question as to who says the same argument commits both errors at the same time when you have been writing on this topic for over five years and must know very well that you are one of the people who fall into these inconsistent objections to TAG?
“If you want to settle the matter once and for all, this is probably your only hope: present a fully stated TAG, which would include support for the premises which inform it.”
I’m hardly the one hanging onto a thread of hope here. 😉 I’ve presented two examples of TAG which both you and Agreus have charged with circularity. Agreus has further claimed (inconsistent with his other objections) that the circularity is actually in the arguments which are given in support of the premises of TAG. But again, this is a different thing from claiming that TAG is itself circular. It is also upon Agreus now to produce the support for the premises of TAG which he claims is circular. There is no reason for me to produce all of this since both of you claim that the arguments are circular, carry the burden of proof, and have objected to each of the two arguments as presented anyway.
Chris wrote: “I do not know why you quoted something that has nothing to do with the argument you are trying to make.”
Your ignorance on this appears to be a self-inflicted wound. The discussion is not about Agreus personally, but about whether or not TAG is circular. I’m pointing out the fact that TAG is circular, regardless of how perplexed you are by Agreus’ or anyone else’s comments.
Chris asked: “What ‘element’ does the premise ‘Logic’ or the premise ‘Knowledge’ contain which assumes the truth of TAG’s conclusion?”
Referring to my 21 May comment above, the premises 1A and 2B contain elements (“knowledge” and “logic” respectively) which are, according to you, theistically construed. We know this because you answered in the affirmative when I asked if you think knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god. Your two versions of TAG attempt to draw the conclusion that the Christian god exists from premises which contain elements which assume the existence of the Christian god. That’s circularity, flat and simple.
I wrote: “Thus they are circular by definition.”
Chris responded: “Again, premises are not circular, arguments are circular.”
Yes, and your two versions of TAG are circular. In my above statement, the “they” in “they are circular” refer to the two versions of TAG which you have presented.
Chris: “Again, stating that support given for premises is made up of circular arguments is not the same thing as stating that TAG is itself circular. That’s on you two to show.”
A circular argument contains premises which assume the truth of its conclusion. Both of your versions of TAG do exactly this, as I’ve pointed out several times now. Agreus no longer has any burden here; it’s been met.
For a broader picture, which presuppositionalists should be willing to consider, note that your two versions of TAG, to be consistent with the presuppositional approach, presuppose the truth of the Christian worldview. They have to, or you as their architect will be guilty of the sin of neutrality, which Bahnsen and others have characterized as a pretense. I already explained this in previous comments to this post. It’s that nasty dilemma which presuppositionalism forces you to straddle precariously. It is because of this that authors like Van Til and John Frame have openly admitted the circularity of their apologetic arguments.
Chris: “You agree that logic and knowledge assume the truth of Christianity and the existence of God?”
For one thing, we are not discussing my worldview here. And no, I do not agree that logic and knowledge assume the truth of the Christian worldview or the existence of any god. I’ve made this clear in posts to my blog which directly speak to this.
That having been said, we must keep in mind that the arguments under consideration are *your* arguments, and that – by your own open affirmation – they contain premises which assume the truth of the conclusions those arguments are advanced to secure, and thus are circular, by definition. Speaking directly to the point, knowledge and logic are theistically construed by the two versions of TAG in a specifically Christian sense, and therefore those premises assume the truth of the conclusions of your arguments. You aren’t denying that the underlying philosophical context of your two versions of TAG construe knowledge and logic in a Christian-theistic manner, are you? Why not take a clearly identified position and be willing to stand with it?
I wrote: “John Frame acknowledges the circularity of TAG” and then proceeded to quote Frame explicitly acknowledging this.
Chris responded: “That’s great, but I want to know why Agreus thinks TAG is circular.”
Of course, Agreus could easily say in response to you, “Because presuppositionalists openly admit that TAG is circular” and be done with it. But I suspect you’d find some reason to buck against this.
Chris wrote: “Agreus continues to state….”
Perhaps you disagree, but I don’t think there’s any need to make this discussion revolve around Agreus personally. I’d rather discuss the issues, and I’m confident that Agreus would too. The topic of your post is TAG, not some particular understanding or misunderstanding of mine or Agreus’.
Chris wrote: “… that the arguments given in support of TAG are circular. Again, this is different from claiming that TAG is itself circular”
So far, I don’t think you’ve presented any arguments in support of TAG, and I may be wrong, but I don’t think Agreus contended that “the arguments *given in support* of TAG” are circular.” That remains to be seen. But it’s clear that your two versions of TAG do contain premises which assume the truth of the conclusions which they’re intended to support.
Keep in mind that premises are involved in establishing an argument’s conclusion. Surely you know this, Chris. Consequently, every element of a premise is contextually involved in supporting that conclusion. You seem anxious to divorce the underlying context of certain elements of your arguments’ premises from their supportive role in establishing your argument’s conclusions, perhaps in an effort to outrun the charge of circularity. This won’t succeed, since an argument’s soundness is intimately connected to the truth value of its premises.
Chris: “Agreus needs to produce these arguments he keeps claiming are circular and demonstrate how they are circular.”
Actually, you’ve presented the arguments which are circular. They are the two versions of TAG which you have presented. Do you deny their circularity? Yes or no?
I wrote: “I’ve examined yours, Bahnsen’s, Frame’s, and many others, and circularity is one of the common themes which they all share.”
Chris asked: “Where are the two examples I presented circular? Be very specific. I’ve already explained why it cannot in this case be a premise itself.”
See above. I have not stated that “a premise itself” is circular. The supportive context of the conclusions of each of your arguments is circular, for in each case that supportive context assumes the truth of your argument’s conclusions. Simply, the premises of your arguments assume the truth of your arguments’ conclusions.
In my 17 May comment above, I asked: “Who is saying that the same argument commits both errors at the same time?”
Chris responded: “You are. You’ve charged Bahnsen’s TAG with circularity, but you’ve also written many times before that Bahnsen’s TAG is not an argument. For example in this post – http://www.katholon.com/poof.htm you wrote, ‘It seems, in the case of his debate with Gordon Stein, Bahnsen fails to present an argument.’”
It’s true, I did write that, and it should be clear that I wrote that specifically about Bahnsen’s presentation in his debate with Gordon Stein. I don’t think he presented an argument in that debate, but rather asserted his conclusion in one form or another throughout the debate. In Bahnsen’s portion of the debate, I saw no presentation of an inference which led to the conclusion “therefore, God exists” or “therefore, the God of Christian theism exists.” In the context of his debate with Stein, if Bahnsen had an argument, it remained unstated.
This recognition in no way conflicts with the possibility that elsewhere (such as in his writings – see for instance his books Always Ready and Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, Bahnsen may have presented renditions of TAG which are in fact circular.
Note the phrase in my question “at the same time.” In my piece “Bahnsen’s Poof”, did I make the two-fold claim that, on the one hand, Bahnsen left TAG unstated, and on the other he presented a circular argument? No, I didn’t. Search my article “Bahnsen’s Poof,” and show where I claimed that Bahnsen committed both offenses “at the same time.” You’ll not find it. I checked. Have you?
Chris: “How can your objection that Bahnsen’s version of TAG is circular be reconciled with your objection that it is unstated?”
Easily. I’m not saying that Bahnsen committed both offenses *at the same time*. That couldn’t be hard to figure out, is it?
Chris: “Further, why did you ask me a question as to who says the same argument commits both errors at the same time when you have been writing on this topic for over five years and must know very well that you are one of the people who fall into these inconsistent objections to TAG?”
For one, I don’t fall into the category of persons who claim that Bahnsen or anyone else commits both offenses *at the same time* (since I haven’t), and two, I don’t think I’ve seen anyone charge a presuppositionalist of committing both offenses *at the same time*. It is because you expressed concerned about both offenses and their apparent conflict with each other, that I asked if you knew of anyone who charged that both offenses were committed *at the same time*. In response to my query, you cited no one specifically.
Again, if you can find where I accuse Bahnsen of committing both offenses *at the same time*, I’d love to know. If I did, I’m happy to admit my fallibility. I do so readily now.
I wrote: “If you want to settle the matter once and for all, this is probably your only hope: present a fully stated TAG, which would include support for the premises which inform it.”
Chris wrote: “I’ve presented two examples of TAG which both you and Agreus have charged with circularity.”
And I pointed out exactly how they’re both circular. Are you denying the circularity of your two versions of TAG? Yes or no?
Chris: “Agreus has further claimed (inconsistent with his other objections) that the circularity is actually in the arguments which are given in support of the premises of TAG.”
I must have missed this. Can you quote from Agreus’ comments where he stated this? I’m not disputing what you say here, just wondering where he stated this specifically, or how you got the impression that this is what he was saying.
At any rate, it would be beneficial to the discussion overall if you would make it crystal clear whether or not you think TAG is circular. It’s a simple yes or no question at this point. What say you?
Chris wrote: “It is also upon Agreus now to produce the support for the premises of TAG which he claims is circular. There is no reason for me to produce all of this since both of you claim that the arguments are circular, carry the burden of proof, and have objected to each of the two arguments as presented anyway.”
So, you will not rise to the challenge. I figured you wouldn’t. I suspect that it’s because you know deep down that the circular logic of your argument will be exposed.
Regards,
Dawson
“Your ignorance on this appears to be a self-inflicted wound. The discussion is not about Agreus personally, but about whether or not TAG is circular. I’m pointing out the fact that TAG is circular, regardless of how perplexed you are by Agreus’ or anyone else’s comments.”
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I’m not ignorant on this, there are no self-inflicted wounds on my side of things, I never stated or implied that the discussion is about Agreus personally, no “fact” of the circularity of TAG has been established, I am not perplexed by Agreus’ comments, and I am not perplexed about anyone else’s comments. While the discussion has focused a great deal on whether or not TAG is circular, the greater worry is how the two objections in the post can be reconciled. Now that we see your rhetoric is empty, let’s review why I wrote, “I do not know why you quoted something that has nothing to do with the argument you are trying to make.” You wrote, “It has already been established, with admissions on your part, that the premises of your versions of TAG contain elements which assume the truth of TAG’s conclusion.” You had quoted me, “…so you think that the circularity rests in the support for the premises.” Your assertion that premises of the arguments contain elements which assume the truth of TAG’s conclusion has nothing to do with the claim of Agreus that I was addressing in what you quoted from me, because it is pertaining to the support of the premises being circular. You are making a different argument from the one that Agreus is making and which I was addressing in the portion you quoted from me prior to going off to repeat your own argument.
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“Referring to my 21 May comment above, the premises 1A and 2B contain elements (‘knowledge’ and ‘logic’ respectively) which are, according to you, theistically construed. We know this because you answered in the affirmative when I asked if you think knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god.”
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Yes I believe, on the basis of argument, that knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian God, but this has nothing to do with whether or not the arguments provided are in fact circular. To state, as I have, “logic” or “knowledge” says nothing with respect to what the premises entail or even presuppose in terms of the argument itself. If you want to argue something along the lines of deductive arguments always containing the elements necessary for their conclusions then you may but I already addressed this much earlier in the discussion and it was dropped. The question pertaining to that argument would be why TAG is arbitrarily singled out in such a case.
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“Your two versions of TAG attempt to draw the conclusion that the Christian god exists from premises which contain elements which assume the existence of the Christian god. That’s circularity, flat and simple.”
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I asked, “What ‘element’ does the premise ‘Logic’ or the premise ‘Knowledge’ contain which assumes the truth of TAG’s conclusion?” Repeating that the premises contain elements which assume the truth of TAG’s conclusion is a circular answer, flat and simple.
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“A circular argument contains premises which assume the truth of its conclusion.”
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Yes, I know what a circular argument is.
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“Both of your versions of TAG do exactly this, as I’ve pointed out several times now.”
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No, they don’t, and you have not pointed this out. This is starting to remind me of the Argument Clinic.
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“Agreus no longer has any burden here; it’s been met.”
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Agreus isn’t even arguing the same thing that you are. Agreus isn’t even arguing the same thing that Agreus is arguing! So no, Agreus will not be able to hide behind you right now, regardless of how many of his arguments are not working. Aside from this you quoted me and then provided something again which did not relate to the quote, because I wrote, “Again, stating that support given for premises is made up of circular arguments is not the same thing as stating that TAG is itself circular.”
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“For a broader picture, which presuppositionalists should be willing to consider, note that your two versions of TAG, to be consistent with the presuppositional approach, presuppose the truth of the Christian worldview. They have to, or you as their architect will be guilty of the sin of neutrality, which Bahnsen and others have characterized as a pretense. I already explained this in previous comments to this post. It’s that nasty dilemma which presuppositionalism forces you to straddle precariously. It is because of this that authors like Van Til and John Frame have openly admitted the circularity of their apologetic arguments.”
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You’re not grasping that whether or not an argument is circular has little to do with what the person presenting it believes must be the case with respect to the conceptual scheme it is offered from. You call yourself an Objectivist but you are slipping into subjectivism here.
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“For one thing, we are not discussing my worldview here.”
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I did not say that we were.
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“And no, I do not agree that logic and knowledge assume the truth of the Christian worldview or the existence of any god. I’ve made this clear in posts to my blog which directly speak to this.”
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Good. So what’s circular about the argument?
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“That having been said, we must keep in mind that the arguments under consideration are *your* arguments, and that – by your own open affirmation – they contain premises which assume the truth of the conclusions those arguments are advanced to secure, and thus are circular, by definition.”
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I see, so if you just happened to find the arguments written on a piece of paper and did not know where they came from, they would not be circular by definition anymore. By the way, they are not my arguments, though I have presented them here as examples of how TAG might be stated. Again, you’re making what should be an objective matter contingent upon the beliefs of individuals which may or may not even be known. This appears to be very strange reasoning you’re starting to use here Mr. Bethrick. People do not suddenly make arguments become circular by offering them.
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“Speaking directly to the point, knowledge and logic are theistically construed by the two versions of TAG in a specifically Christian sense, and therefore those premises assume the truth of the conclusions of your arguments.”
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Now rather than the circularity of the arguments being contingent upon the attitudes and beliefs of the individuals presenting them you are stating that the circularity of the arguments is due to the premises which state “knowledge” and “logic” in terms of the premises themselves because they are theistically construed. How the simple premise, “Knowledge” or the simple premise, “Logic” is “theistically construed” such that the argument is circular is really beyond me. Consider:
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If knowledge, then God does not exist.
Knowledge.
Therefore, God does not exist.
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The argument is valid and it is not circular. Notice that it takes the very same form of one of the examples I provided. The second premise, “Knowledge”, is the very same premise that appears in the example I provided. To say that the premise is theistically construed in terms of the premise or the argument itself such that the argument is circular is simply false. Is the second premise in this argument theistically construed? You will say no, for you already wrote, “I do not agree that logic and knowledge assume the truth of the Christian worldview or the existence of any god.” You should know that A=A. “Knowledge” = “Knowledge”. It’s the same premise in both arguments.
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“You aren’t denying that the underlying philosophical context of your two versions of TAG construe knowledge and logic in a Christian-theistic manner, are you?”
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Irrelevant.
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“Why not take a clearly identified position and be willing to stand with it?”
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I’m not the one claiming that TAG is circular and coming up short in showing that it is.
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“Of course, Agreus could easily say in response to you, ‘Because presuppositionalists openly admit that TAG is circular’ and be done with it. But I suspect you’d find some reason to buck against this.”
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Certainly I would, because (to begin with) he has been given the opportunity many times now to tell me why he finds the arguments circular and has never once answered it this way. Rather, he has answered it three different other ways!
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“Perhaps you disagree, but I don’t think there’s any need to make this discussion revolve around Agreus personally. I’d rather discuss the issues, and I’m confident that Agreus would too. The topic of your post is TAG, not some particular understanding or misunderstanding of mine or Agreus’.”
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The misunderstandings of you and Agreus are pertinent to the discussion. Agreus is arguing one way, and you are arguing another. If you’re going to quote my responses to him and then write something which falls outside of the context of my discussion with Agreus as though it delivers him from the jam he’s gotten himself into then I will point that out.
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“So far, I don’t think you’ve presented any arguments in support of TAG”
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I don’t have to. Agreus claims to know what they are and that they are circular.
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“I may be wrong, but I don’t think Agreus contended that ‘the arguments *given in support* of TAG’ are circular.”
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As Doug Wilson said to Dan Barker, “Well, read it again.”
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“That remains to be seen.”
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It’s in the comments. I’m not going to track it down yet again for your sake. 😉
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“But it’s clear that your two versions of TAG do contain premises which assume the truth of the conclusions which they’re intended to support.”
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No, it’s not. 🙂
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“Keep in mind that premises are involved in establishing an argument’s conclusion. Surely you know this, Chris. Consequently, every element of a premise is contextually involved in supporting that conclusion. You seem anxious to divorce the underlying context of certain elements of your arguments’ premises from their supportive role in establishing your argument’s conclusions, perhaps in an effort to outrun the charge of circularity. This won’t succeed, since an argument’s soundness is intimately connected to the truth value of its premises.”
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Are you saying that either of the examples contains the conclusion in the premises in a different way from all other such arguments? If not it is strange to single out TAG as being “circular”. Perhaps you are saying that the premises entail the truth of the conclusions of the arguments and hence they are circular. For example, argument X:
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If the premises of an argument entail the truth of the conclusion of the argument then the argument is circular.
The premises of argument X entail the truth of the conclusion of the argument.
Therefore argument X is circular.
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Are you saying something like that? It sounds like it when you write, “Simply, the premises of your arguments assume the truth of your arguments’ conclusions.” We might just replace “entails” with “assumes”.
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“Actually, you’ve presented the arguments which are circular. They are the two versions of TAG which you have presented. Do you deny their circularity? Yes or no?”
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Neither you nor Agreus have demonstrated that they are circular, and the quote you are responding to here is not actually addressed in your reply since Agreus thinks that these other arguments are the ones which are circular but has failed to produce them and demonstrate how they are circular.
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“… it should be clear that I wrote that specifically about Bahnsen’s presentation in his debate with Gordon Stein.”
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No, it is not clear at all and I think the reason is that you did not write that specifically about Bahnsen’s presentation in his debate with Gordon Stein. You wrote, “In their discussion, Paul (a presuppositionalists) and Nick (a non-believer) seem to differ on whether or not Bahnsen actually presented an argument for his god-belief assertions.” Note, “for his god-belief assertions,” period. There is no, “in the context of his debate with Stein.” There is a reason for this; you wrote, “Paul attributes the following statement to Nick: ‘Bahnsen never argued for his position.’” Note – “never argued”. You continue:
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“But I would also draw your attention to statements made by Michael Martin himself which relate to this controversy. In his essay Does Induction Presume the Existence of the Christian God? Martin makes the following comment:
In order to evaluate TAG systematically it is necessary to have a clear statement of it. I have been unable to find one. To be sure, the conclusion of TAG is clear enough. However, although Bahnsen in his lectures reiterated TAG’s conclusion, he said very little about how this was reached.”
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The quote refers not specifically to the Stein debate, but to TAG itself and you quote Martin approvingly, writing, “it seems that Martin found Bahnsen’s lack of a clear argument frustrating.” You also wrote, “it seems that the best way to refute Nick’s statement would be to reproduce Bahnsen’s argument.” Since you argue in favor of Nick’s statement rather than against it by providing the argument you claim is in Always Ready and Van Til’s Apologetic, the implication is that you believed Bahnsen had no argument. Otherwise how do you square your comments with the quote from Martin? Why would you have not qualified your disagreement with Martin? You and those who read you have also referred to TAG as a “poof” outside of the context of the Bahnsen Stein debate.
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Still, let’s say I’m wrong. Where is the circular example of TAG presented by Bahsen in Always Ready and Van Til’s Apologetic? Your statements require there being more than just a “possibility” of a circular argument in these places.
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Finally, why do you think Bahnsen would not have stated an argument in his debate if he held one and was able to state it elsewhere? Your story does not seem to hold up very well, but then, I think Bahnsen did use an argument in his debate with Stein, I believe Brian Knapp has been through this with you before, and I believe that it was not circular.
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“So, you will not rise to the challenge. I figured you wouldn’t. I suspect that it’s because you know deep down that the circular logic of your argument will be exposed.”
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Note that you are providing rhetoric while I am providing reasons. It is upon Agreus now to produce the support for the premises of TAG which he claims is circular. There is no reason for me to produce all of this since both of you claim that the arguments are circular, carry the burden of proof, and have objected to each of the two arguments as presented anyway.
“In the case of Bahnsen’s debate with Stein, my understanding is that Bahnsen’s side of the resolution was that the Christian god exists. I found nowhere in his opening statement where Bahnsen put forward an argument which takes the above form and leads to the conclusion ‘therefore God exists.’ Certainly not in any non-question-begging manner anyway.” - Dawson Bethrick
“Well, which is it? Did you not see any argument which takes the above form, or did you not see one which takes the above form in a non-question-begging manner?” – Brian Knapp
@Mr. Bolt:
Many people often consider TAG to be both circular and unstated because when one views the argument one gets the feeling that there must be more to it, because the argument is just a bunch of bare assertions. So that moves some people to say the argument is unstated; And in it’s unstated format the argument is patently circular. However those people don’t realize that TAG basically has no more supporting premises. That it really is fully stated, and that it’s just a circular argument plain and simple. That’s how they are both “consistent” with each other.
Chris wrote: “I do not know why you quoted something that has nothing to do with the argument you are trying to make.”
Your ignorance on this appears to be a self-inflicted wound. The discussion is not about Agreus personally, but about whether or not TAG is circular. I’m pointing out the fact that TAG is circular, regardless of how perplexed you are by Agreus’ or anyone else’s comments.
Chris asked: “What ‘element’ does the premise ‘Logic’ or the premise ‘Knowledge’ contain which assumes the truth of TAG’s conclusion?”
Referring to my 21 May comment above, the premises 1A and 2B contain elements (“knowledge” and “logic” respectively) which are, according to you, theistically construed. We know this because you answered in the affirmative when I asked if you think knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god. Your two versions of TAG attempt to draw the conclusion that the Christian god exists from premises which contain elements which assume the existence of the Christian god. That’s circularity, flat and simple.
I wrote: “Thus they are circular by definition.”
Chris responded: “Again, premises are not circular, arguments are circular.”
Yes, and your two versions of TAG are circular. In my above statement, the “they” in “they are circular” refer to the two versions of TAG which you have presented.
Chris: “Again, stating that support given for premises is made up of circular arguments is not the same thing as stating that TAG is itself circular. That’s on you two to show.”
A circular argument contains premises which assume the truth of its conclusion. Both of your versions of TAG do exactly this, as I’ve pointed out several times now. Agreus no longer has any burden here; it’s been met.
For a broader picture, which presuppositionalists should be willing to consider, note that your two versions of TAG, to be consistent with the presuppositional approach, presuppose the truth of the Christian worldview. They have to, or you as their architect will be guilty of the sin of neutrality, which Bahnsen and others have characterized as a pretense. I already explained this in previous comments to this post. It’s that nasty dilemma which presuppositionalism forces you to straddle precariously. It is because of this that authors like Van Til and John Frame have openly admitted the circularity of their apologetic arguments.
Chris: “You agree that logic and knowledge assume the truth of Christianity and the existence of God?”
For one thing, we are not discussing my worldview here. And no, I do not agree that logic and knowledge assume the truth of the Christian worldview or the existence of any god. I’ve made this clear in posts to my blog which directly speak to this.
That having been said, we must keep in mind that the arguments under consideration are *your* arguments, and that – by your own open affirmation – they contain premises which assume the truth of the conclusions those arguments are advanced to secure, and thus are circular, by definition. Speaking directly to the point, knowledge and logic are theistically construed by the two versions of TAG in a specifically Christian sense, and therefore those premises assume the truth of the conclusions of your arguments. You aren’t denying that the underlying philosophical context of your two versions of TAG construe knowledge and logic in a Christian-theistic manner, are you? Why not take a clearly identified position and be willing to stand with it?
I wrote: “John Frame acknowledges the circularity of TAG” and then proceeded to quote Frame explicitly acknowledging this.
Chris responded: “That’s great, but I want to know why Agreus thinks TAG is circular.”
Of course, Agreus could easily say in response to you, “Because presuppositionalists openly admit that TAG is circular” and be done with it. But I suspect you’d find some reason to buck against this.
Chris wrote: “Agreus continues to state….”
Perhaps you disagree, but I don’t think there’s any need to make this discussion revolve around Agreus personally. I’d rather discuss the issues, and I’m confident that Agreus would too. The topic of your post is TAG, not some particular understanding or misunderstanding of mine or Agreus’.
Chris wrote: “… that the arguments given in support of TAG are circular. Again, this is different from claiming that TAG is itself circular”
So far, I don’t think you’ve presented any arguments in support of TAG, and I may be wrong, but I don’t think Agreus contended that “the arguments *given in support* of TAG” are circular.” That remains to be seen. But it’s clear that your two versions of TAG do contain premises which assume the truth of the conclusions which they’re intended to support.
Keep in mind that premises are involved in establishing an argument’s conclusion. Surely you know this, Chris. Consequently, every element of a premise is contextually involved in supporting that conclusion. You seem anxious to divorce the underlying context of certain elements of your arguments’ premises from their supportive role in establishing your argument’s conclusions, perhaps in an effort to outrun the charge of circularity. This won’t succeed, since an argument’s soundness is intimately connected to the truth value of its premises.
Chris: “Agreus needs to produce these arguments he keeps claiming are circular and demonstrate how they are circular.”
Actually, you’ve presented the arguments which are circular. They are the two versions of TAG which you have presented. Do you deny their circularity? Yes or no?
I wrote: “I’ve examined yours, Bahnsen’s, Frame’s, and many others, and circularity is one of the common themes which they all share.”
Chris asked: “Where are the two examples I presented circular? Be very specific. I’ve already explained why it cannot in this case be a premise itself.”
See above. I have not stated that “a premise itself” is circular. The supportive context of the conclusions of each of your arguments is circular, for in each case that supportive context assumes the truth of your argument’s conclusions. Simply, the premises of your arguments assume the truth of your arguments’ conclusions.
In my 17 May comment above, I asked: “Who is saying that the same argument commits both errors at the same time?”
Chris responded: “You are. You’ve charged Bahnsen’s TAG with circularity, but you’ve also written many times before that Bahnsen’s TAG is not an argument. For example in this post – http://www.katholon.com/poof.htm you wrote, ‘It seems, in the case of his debate with Gordon Stein, Bahnsen fails to present an argument.’”
It’s true, I did write that, and it should be clear that I wrote that specifically about Bahnsen’s presentation in his debate with Gordon Stein. I don’t think he presented an argument in that debate, but rather asserted his conclusion in one form or another throughout the debate. In Bahnsen’s portion of the debate, I saw no presentation of an inference which led to the conclusion “therefore, God exists” or “therefore, the God of Christian theism exists.” In the context of his debate with Stein, if Bahnsen had an argument, it remained unstated.
This recognition in no way conflicts with the possibility that elsewhere (such as in his writings – see for instance his books Always Ready and Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, Bahnsen may have presented renditions of TAG which are in fact circular.
Note the phrase in my question “at the same time.” In my piece “Bahnsen’s Poof”, did I make the two-fold claim that, on the one hand, Bahnsen left TAG unstated, and on the other he presented a circular argument? No, I didn’t. Search my article “Bahnsen’s Poof,” and show where I claimed that Bahnsen committed both offenses “at the same time.” You’ll not find it. I checked. Have you?
Chris: “How can your objection that Bahnsen’s version of TAG is circular be reconciled with your objection that it is unstated?”
Easily. I’m not saying that Bahnsen committed both offenses *at the same time*. That couldn’t be hard to figure out, is it?
Chris: “Further, why did you ask me a question as to who says the same argument commits both errors at the same time when you have been writing on this topic for over five years and must know very well that you are one of the people who fall into these inconsistent objections to TAG?”
For one, I don’t fall into the category of persons who claim that Bahnsen or anyone else commits both offenses *at the same time* (since I haven’t), and two, I don’t think I’ve seen anyone charge a presuppositionalist of committing both offenses *at the same time*. It is because you expressed concerned about both offenses and their apparent conflict with each other, that I asked if you knew of anyone who charged that both offenses were committed *at the same time*. In response to my query, you cited no one specifically.
Again, if you can find where I accuse Bahnsen of committing both offenses *at the same time*, I’d love to know. If I did, I’m happy to admit my fallibility. I do so readily now.
I wrote: “If you want to settle the matter once and for all, this is probably your only hope: present a fully stated TAG, which would include support for the premises which inform it.”
Chris wrote: “I’ve presented two examples of TAG which both you and Agreus have charged with circularity.”
And I pointed out exactly how they’re both circular. Are you denying the circularity of your two versions of TAG? Yes or no?
Chris: “Agreus has further claimed (inconsistent with his other objections) that the circularity is actually in the arguments which are given in support of the premises of TAG.”
I must have missed this. Can you quote from Agreus’ comments where he stated this? I’m not disputing what you say here, just wondering where he stated this specifically, or how you got the impression that this is what he was saying.
At any rate, it would be beneficial to the discussion overall if you would make it crystal clear whether or not you think TAG is circular. It’s a simple yes or no question at this point. What say you?
Chris wrote: “It is also upon Agreus now to produce the support for the premises of TAG which he claims is circular. There is no reason for me to produce all of this since both of you claim that the arguments are circular, carry the burden of proof, and have objected to each of the two arguments as presented anyway.”
So, you will not rise to the challenge. I figured you wouldn’t. I suspect that it’s because you know deep down that the circular logic of your argument will be exposed.
Regards,
Dawson
“Many people often consider TAG to be both circular and unstated”
Have you experienced many people doing this?
“…because when one views the argument”
How does one “view” an unstated argument?
“…one gets the feeling that there must be more to it,”
Well obviously if the argument has not even been stated, there must be more to “it”.
“…because the argument is just a bunch of bare assertions.”
Arguments are composed of assertions. I do not see any problem there except for you, because you would want to simultaneously hold that the argument is both stated and not stated.
If you’re saying instead that the argument is merely an assertion, then recall that I’ve already dealt with this. A mere assertion is not an argument and cannot be properly labeled “circular”.
“So that moves some people to say the argument is unstated;”
Well I just showed why what they are saying does not make any sense.
“And in it’s unstated format the argument is patently circular.”
What does “unstated format” mean? How can an unstated argument have “format”? How can it even properly be called an argument? All you’re doing here is asserting that TAG, as an argument in “unstated format”, whatever that means, is “patently circular”. But this cannot be, as the two charges are inconsistent with one another. Merely asserting the opposite is not much of an answer to the problem, I’m afraid.
“However those people don’t realize that TAG basically has no more supporting premises.”
They don’t? Who are these people again, and how do you know that they don’t know? Maybe it would help if you could state TAG as you conceive of it so we can see what you mean about there being “no more supporting premises”. Of course “no more supporting premises” implies that there are some premises…and if you stated the argument it would no longer be unstated…and even if we had some mixed up bundle of premises which did not constitute an argument they still could not be called circular… Perhaps you could help me understand what you mean by providing an example.
“That it really is fully stated,”
Then it’s not unstated, is it?
“…and that it’s just a circular argument plain and simple.”
Circular arguments are typically stated so far as I know. Can you provide me with an example of an unstated circular argument?
“That’s how they are both ‘consistent’ with each other.”
Your explanation does not actually cohere, so you have not yet come close to reconciling the two. I’m not even sure why you would think that you had done so when you explicitly state, “That it [TAG] is really fully stated.” How can TAG be stated and unstated?
You may want to give this some more thought.
I wrote: “Referring to my 21 May comment above, the premises 1A and 2B contain elements (‘knowledge’ and ‘logic’ respectively) which are, according to you, theistically construed. We know this because you answered in the affirmative when I asked if you think knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god.”
Chris responded: “Yes I believe, on the basis of argument, that knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian God, but this has nothing to do with whether or not the arguments provided are in fact circular.”
It has everything to do with whether or not your versions of TAG are circular, as I explained. Your two versions of TAG are proposed to establish the existence of the Christian god (in the case of Argument A) and the Christian worldview (in the case of Argument B), which itself assumes the existence of the Christian. In the case of Argument A, we have two premises – “If knowledge, then God” and “Knowledge” – which, according to you, presuppose the existence of the Christian god. Similarly for Argument B in your construal of logic. The terms of your argument presuppose the existence of the Christian god, and those terms are then enlisted to establish the conclusion “therefore God” and “therefore Christianity” respectively. Your arguments’ premises presuppose the truth of the conclusions which they are given to support in your two versions of TAG.
Chris wrote: “To state, as I have, ‘logic’ or ‘knowledge’ says nothing with respect to what the premises entail or even presuppose in terms of the argument itself.”
The concepts ‘logic’ and ‘knowledge’ are not baseline concepts, but in fact broad abstractions condensing a wide constellation of more fundamental concepts. That is why I asked *you*, in my 21 May comment, whether knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god. You answered my questions explicitly in the affirmative. So on your view knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god. Then you present arguments for the existence of the Christian god which contain premises which presuppose the existence of the Christian god. Your arguments’ premises assume the truth of the conclusion which they are intended to support. Hence circularity. That’s precisely what I meant by presuppositional smuggling.
Your response is to deny all this, which is merely a testimony to the strength of your faith.
I wrote: “That having been said, we must keep in mind that the arguments under consideration are *your* arguments, and that – by your own open affirmation – they contain premises which assume the truth of the conclusions those arguments are advanced to secure, and thus are circular, by definition.”
Chris wrote: “I see, so if you just happened to find the arguments written on a piece of paper and did not know where they came from, they would not be circular by definition anymore.”
If I saw the two arguments you presented in your 20 May comment to this post “written on a piece of paper and did not know where they came from,” I would wonder what assumptions the arguer had in mind for the concepts ‘knowledge’ and ‘logic’. They are the driving force of any inference which the argument is supposed to exhibit. That’s why I asked the questions I posed to you in my 21 May comment.
Chris continued: “By the way, they are not my arguments, though I have presented them here as examples of how TAG might be stated.”
I’m referring to them as “your” arguments because you as opposed to anyone else attending the discussion presented them. I certainly did not propose them, so they certainly are not my arguments. If you’re plagiarizing someone else, well that’s not my problem.
Chris wrote: “Again, you’re making what should be an objective matter contingent upon the beliefs of individuals which may or may not even be known.”
The objective theory of knowledge recognizes that knowledge is contextual, and consequently that higher abstractions rest on the validity of those concepts which inform them. That is why I inquired about the underlying assumptions built into the concepts ‘knowledge’ and ‘logic’ as they are used in the two versions of TAG which you presented. There’s no subjectivism involved in asking you to provide more information about what your arguments’ premises assume.
Chris wrote: “How the simple premise, ‘Knowledge’ or the simple premise, ‘Logic’ is ‘theistically construed’ such that the argument is circular is really beyond me.”
We know that the underlying context of the two versions of TAG theistically construe their premises because you’ve affirmed this. The concepts ‘knowledge’ and ‘logic’ do not lose their underlying context simply because they appear in the premises of an argument.
You now appear to be wanting to say two different things. First that knowledge and logic presupposing the existence of the Christian god is simply your belief, and second that this presuppositional context informing the concepts ‘knowledge’ and ‘logic’ has nothing to do with your two versions of TAG since ‘knowledge’ and ‘logic’ as they are used in those arguments do not presuppose the existence of the Christian god (even though you believe they do). If so, it seems that you’re trying to have your TAG and eat it too.
So let me ask you: If ‘knowledge’ and ‘logic’ do not presuppose the existence of the Christian god, how are they supposed to support the conclusions of the two versions of TAG which you have presented?
At the same time, we can ask: without begging the question, how do the two versions of TAG which you’ve presented establish their conclusions? How do you demonstrate the soundness of each argument without arguing in a circle?
We’ve yet to see this, and we’ve seen evidence which strongly suggests that they are in fact circular. Some are even saying that they’re baffled that you do not see this. But I understand why: you’re guided by faith, not by reason.
Chris wrote: “The argument is valid and it is not circular.”
The argument which you’ve presented is certainly valid. This is a formal concern. The fact that an argument is valid does not guarantee that it is not circular, since circularity is an *informal* fallacy.
Chris wrote: “To say that the premise is theistically construed in terms of the premise or the argument itself such that the argument is circular is simply false.”
I’m not sure I understand this statement – I read it several times and it seems to turn in on itself, like a snake eating its own tail. It lacks stability of reference.
So let’s cut to the chase: do the concepts ‘knowledge’ and ‘logic’ *as the underlying context of TAG understands them*, presuppose the existence of the Christian god? Yes or no? If yes, then we have circular arguments. If not, then we have presuppositional neutrality. That’s why Van Til said that he would “prefer to reason in a circle to not reasoning at all” (A Survey of Christian Epistemology, p. 12). The granddaddy of presuppositionalism himself admits his allegiance to circular reasoning.
Chris wrote: “Is the second premise in this argument theistically construed? You will say no, for you already wrote, ‘I do not agree that logic and knowledge assume the truth of the Christian worldview or the existence of any god.’ You should know that A=A. ‘Knowledge’ = ‘Knowledge’. It’s the same premise in both arguments.”
Yes, I know that A = A. But I also know that the concepts ‘knowledge’ and ‘logic’ – as I stated above – are abstractions which rest on a hierarchy of prior concepts. Knowledge and logic as my worldview are certainly not the same as knowledge and logic as your worldview understands them. The two versions of TAG which you presented presuppose your worldview, not mine. On my worldview, the two versions of TAG are simply unsound, period, without any possibility of being resuscitated. But I doubt you’d agree that they’re unsound. You think their premises are true. That’s because you understand the underlying context of the premises in a different way from how I understand them. Contrary to your protestations to the opposite, that underlying context is relevant to the discussion. It is because presuppositionalists think knowledge and logic *presuppose* the existence of the Christian god that critics of presuppositionalism charge presuppositionalist arguments which try to draw the conclusion that the Christian god exists from premises which cite knowledge and logic (both of which presuppose the existence of the Christian god *on presuppositionalism’s assumptions*) are circular in nature.
I asked: “You aren’t denying that the underlying philosophical context of your two versions of TAG construe knowledge and logic in a Christian-theistic manner, are you?”
In response to this, Chris answered: “Irrelevant.”
There you go: Chris is trying to evade the fact that higher abstractions (such as ‘knowledge’ and ‘logic’) rest on a set of more fundamental concepts, thus acontextualizing the conceptual informing of the premises of his two versions of TAG. He’s had to do this in order to escape the charge of circularity, but the cost of this transaction is that the concepts ‘knowledge’ and ‘logic’ are conceptually contentless. To satisfy the demands of his faith, he has sacrificed meaning for the sake of saving face. That’s why I predict that you will continue to deny your arguments’ inherent circularity. You want to claim that you have arguments, and now that you’ve presented them, you’re engaging in damage control. But both Van Til and John Frame have already openly admitted the circularity of their arguments. You seem to have adopted a heretical version of presuppositionalism, a version of the apologetic method in which you’re not prepared to go all the way with the authorized precedents.
I wrote: “… it should be clear that I wrote that specifically about Bahnsen’s presentation in his debate with Gordon Stein.”
Chris responded: “No, it is not clear at all and I think the reason is that you did not write that specifically about Bahnsen’s presentation in his debate with Gordon Stein.”
Actually, I did write that specifically about Bahnsen’s presentation in his debate with Gordon Stein, but it may not be apparent to those who were not party to the original discussion. As the intro to my article “Bahnsen’s Poof” (http://katholon.com/poof.htm) states, what I wrote in that article came from a post which I had submitted to the “All Bahnsen Discussion List.” My post was not the initial contribution to the larger discussion, but one following a line of prior postings from other members of that list. The context of the whole discussion was Bahnsen’s debate with Stein from the beginning. It was in this debate with Stein that Bahnsen, according to his followers (members on the All Bahnsen Discussion List), presented an argument for the existence of the Christian god. That is why I presented an examination of Bahnsen’s opening statement in that post in the first place, since that’s where we were told that we would find an example of Bahnsen’s argument establishing the existence of the Christian god “in action.” I found no such argument, just a series of assertions which *presupposed* the existence of the Christian god.
Also, I nowhere claimed that Bahnsen’s argument was “unstated” *and* “circular” at the same time. I’ve asked Chris to show us where I stated this, but he’s not been able to produce a statement of mine to this affect. That’s because I’ve made no such statement.
Chris continued: “You wrote, ‘In their discussion, Paul (a presuppositionalists) and Nick (a non-believer) seem to differ on whether or not Bahnsen actually presented an argument for his god-belief assertions.’ Note, ‘for his god-belief assertions,’ period. There is no, ‘in the context of his debate with Stein.’ There is a reason for this; you wrote, ‘Paul attributes the following statement to Nick: ‘Bahnsen never argued for his position.’ Note – ‘never argued’.”
Chris, how do you know that “there is no ‘in the context of his debate with Stein’” present in my statements? The post was one of many contributions to a larger discussion. No one else present in the discussion accused me of claiming on the one hand that Bahnsen left his argument “unstated” and on the other hand that his argument was “circular.” And you’ve not been able to uncover where I’ve charged Bahnsen of committing both offenses *at the same time*. Got anything better than your late-to-the-game analysis?
You then note that I drew attention to Martin’s statement to the effect that he’s found no “clear statement” of TAG in order to “evaluate [it] systematically.” But in quoting Martin (even “approvingly,” as Chris says), am I claiming that Bahnsen left TAG “unstated” and also presented a circular argument *at the same time*? Clearly not. Show where I charged Bahnsen for committing both offenses *at the same time*. Otherwise, it appears you’re reaching here, and rather desperately I might add.
In my article “Bahnsen’s Poof,” I wrote: “it seems that the best way to refute Nick’s statement would be to reproduce Bahnsen’s argument.”
In response to this, Chris stated: “Since you argue in favor of Nick’s statement rather than against it by providing the argument you claim is in Always Ready and Van Til’s Apologetic, the implication is that you believed Bahnsen had no argument.”
Again, the context of the debate on the message board was Bahnsen’s debate with Stein. That is why I presented an analysis of Bahnsen’s opening statement, for this is the statement for which Bahnsen should have been most prepared and in which we should find him presenting any argument, if he had one. Again note: I did not charge Bahnsen of the two offenses in question; I did not say that he left his argument “unstated” and *then* claimed that he presented a circular argument.
Chris asked: “Otherwise how do you square your comments with the quote from Martin?”
See above: I quoted Martin as a secondary source expressing frustration with Bahnsen for not presenting a clearly stated argument. The record shows that I did not quote Martin re: Bahnsen and *then* claim that Bahnsen presented a *circular argument*. Are you really having trouble understanding this?
Chris wrote: “Why would you have not qualified your disagreement with Martin? You and those who read you have also referred to TAG as a “poof” outside of the context of the Bahnsen Stein debate.”
Chris, one last time: can you find where I claimed that Bahnsen left his argument *unstated* and also presented a *circular* argument at the same time? You’ve not shown such an instance in my writings.
Chris wrote: “Your statements require there being more than just a “possibility” of a circular argument in these places.”
Actually, if you’re claiming that I have charged Bahnsen or anyone else with both offenses *at the same time*, you need to show where I did this. This is a requirement that you must meet. If you can’t do so, then admit it.
Chris asked: “Finally, why do you think Bahnsen would not have stated an argument in his debate if he held one and was able to state it elsewhere?”
Are my suspicions on Bahnsen’s motivations really germane to the present topic of discussion?
Regards,
Dawson
@Mr Bolt
“Perhaps you could help me understand what you mean by providing an example.”
Here’s an example that shows how TAG is a fallacious circular argument:
Premise 1A: “If knowledge then God”
Premise 2A: “knowledge”
Conclusion A: “therefore God”
The argument above is fallacious because the second premise does nothing to substantiate the initial claim in {P1}
It’s that simple. TAG is an extremely bad argument.
Premise 1: If p, then q
Premise 2: p
Conclusion: q
Would you please explain how this is fallacious Secular Walk?
The Secular Walk,
I asked, “Can you provide me with an example of an unstated circular argument?”
In response you provided a stated argument. That’s not unstated. So you did not provide an example of what I asked for.
Not only is what you wrote not relevant to what you wrote before and ignores my counter to your original comment, but it makes very little sense.
The premises of any argument like the one you stated above (which is an instance of Modus Ponens) are to be “substantiated” by other arguments, evidences, etc. given in support of the premises.
Yeah, it’s “simple”, but you have not shown that TAG is “an extremely bad argument.” You’ve instead merely asserted it after I refuted your last comment and then showed that you likely do not really have what it takes to keep up on this one right now. :/
I’d encourage you to read through the discussion very carefully and give it some more thought. You might also want to purchase or check out an introduction to logic textbook. I recommend Copi.
Mr. Bolt and Mr. Bethrick,
I am a new reader to this particular blog, but this discussion has piqued my interest. Not too long ago, I earned myself a B.A. in Mathematics and have always had an interested in philosophy, logic, and argument. I emphasize these facts and I do NOT mention my religious beliefs (or lack thereof) so that you do not judge my arguments and discussion prematurely. That said, I have a few things to say.
With regard to the burden of proof, Alex Michalos states in his Principles of Logic (1969) that “one who makes an assertion must assume the responsibility of defending it. If this responsibility or burden of proof is shifted to a critic, the fallacy of appealing to ignorance is committed.” Thus, before any other discussion can proceed, Mr. Bolt, you must clearly state and prove your version of the Transcendental Argument for God along with (I should hope) clear statements of, explanations of, and justifications for your premises. To the best of my knowledge, this has not been done.
If this has already occurred, Mr. Bethrick, the burden of proof then falls to you to clearly and logically show why the TAG fails. From reading the above posts, this has only been done in part.
At the end of the day, I must, for various reasons, take Mr. Bethrick’s side in this discussion. However, I believe he is going about this the wrong way. As I understand it, Christian apologetics assert that there is a rational basis for their faith. I aim to prove that this claim to rationality is fundamentally flawed.
First, I assert the existence of an objective reality. This is a bold assertion, but I believe it to be justified if for no other reason than that if no such reality exists, why are we arguing anyway?
Second, I assert that all things are themselves. More specifically, to be X is to be a thing of specific nature made of specific attributes pertaining to X. A thing that has no attributes is not a thing at all. Thus, it is in the nature of an object to be necessarily distinct from other objects. Furthermore, to exist is to have identity.
Third, I assert that I am a conscious, rational being. Indeed this must be the case, otherwise what is observing the objective reality already asserted? To paraphrase Ayn Rand, the mind cannot create reality, but rather, it is a means of discovering reality.
Now, I propose that the metaphysics of our reality can only be one of two ways, objective and subjective, and that these two metaphyics are mutually exhaustive and mutually exclusive. The fact that these two are mutually exhaustive is obvious, but mutual exclusivity takes a bit more effort. Suppose our reality possesses an objective metaphysics. Then, if we introduce any degree of subjectivity, we have effectively “poisoned the well” (to quote a good friend), causing us to be uncertain of ANY objectivity, thus violating our first premise. Furthermore, this implies that the metaphysics of our objective reality is strictly objective.
Having established these premises (Rand refers to them as axioms, but I hesitate to go that far myself) and some preliminary discussion, we may now examine the statement “God exists”. This can be rephrased (by our second premise) as “God is God”. However, this statement makes an objective claim about an entity that can only possibly function, as (ever so loosely) defined, within a subjective metaphysics. Given a belief in an objective reality, the statement “God exists” is strictly absurd.
HOWEVER!!! This argument does not make any claims about the existence of God! It only shows that any rational claims to the existence of God are impossible. As long as one abandons rationality, the existence of God is pretty much a-okay.
@Mr. Bolt
Ok, let me give you a fair opportunity to substantiate why if knowledge exists, then God exists. Why does knowledge necessitate God?
Chris, I just sifted through the past week or so of comments after having returned from a trip and all I can say is that the versions of TAG you have presented so far really are nothing more than bare assertions. It is what I earlier referred to as TAG v1 (or the Transcendental Assumption of God). Is this your idea of a good argument?
Exactly Agreus; I tried to point this out to Mr. Bolt but he decided to red herring to his unstated/circular distraction, instead of dealing with the real issue. Whether TAG is valid and sound, and proves God.
I’m still waiting on a substantiation from you Mr. Bolt, on why Knowledge/logic necessitates God. Too long of a lag time in response means I can conclude your position is false because you either can’t answer, won’t, or did not respond in a timely manner, such that I can move on, assured my position has not been impugned.
Yes it’s a poor argument. The argument is deductively valid, as is the following:
If large green peas, then Jolly Green Giant. Large green peas. Jolly Green Giant.
Obviously, this isn’t a good argument for the existence of the Jolly Green Giant. Yet Chris, who supposedly is a huge proponent of TAG, seems to think these types of arguments are pretty convincing arguments for the existence of God.
“Too long of a lag time in response means I can conclude your position is false because you either can’t answer, won’t, or did not respond in a timely manner, such that I can move on, assured my position has not been impugned.”
This would of course be a purely subjective standard applicable apparently only to yourself unless of course you are willing to produce an objective standard upon which you think I or anyone else for that matter is bound to obey. My world view allows for such a standard but that is necessarily dependent upon a transcendent God.
For instance you state that if an answer is not delivered in a “timely manner” it is therefore “false”. Which necessarily relies upon both an objective standard of that which is “correct” vs. that which is “false” and also (inappropriately I think) suggests that the “correct” answer on this topic is somehow bound by an arbitrary timeline which you affix.
@Nick F, Chis Bolt, etc
(irritated sigh) Can any of the opposition here/theists, stop with these silly little distractions and red herrings like unstated this, or harping about timely manner, and get to the important issue here. Can you prove God with TAG or am I correct in my Strong Atheism?
So again I ask, can Mr. Bolt, or Nick, give logical, empirical, observational, or scientific substantiation for why logic/knowledge necessitates the existence of God?
Stop messing around with nonsense and get to the important question here.
@Nick
Also, try not to use fabrications/lies Nick. I didn’t state (“if an ANSWER is not delivered in a “timely manner” it is therefore “false”,) as you claimed i stated.
P1 – If knowledge, then God
How can there be knowledge if reality is only a product of God’s mind? If truth or falsehood in the Universe can be revised according to somebody’s whims, then it doesn’t make sense to call it reality anymore, no matter who is the revisor.
P2- Knowledge – In a subjective Universe? I don’ t think so.
P3 – Therefore, God exists…in your imagination.
Secular, please re read your own statement. You specifically stated “Too long of a lag time in response means I can conclude your position is false because you either can’t answer, won’t, or did not respond in a timely manner…”
I really dont understand how you could have missed that. Perhaps you apply a different level of scrutiny to others comments than you do your own.
More to follow…
Have a good Memorial Day
@Nick
Oh you have got to be kidding me. You really don’t see a difference between you saying I said (“if an ANSWER is not delivered in a “timely manner” it is therefore “false”)
And what I actually said which was “(.”…means I can conclude your POSITION is false”) Nick are you really going to sit there and claim that the words POSITION, and ANSWER are the same?
And again I call you Theists out on your focusing on irrelevant nonsense. Again, for like the THIRD TIME, substantiate why Logic/knowledge necessitates God’s existence. Give a logical account of this and stop using red herrings.
You do realize that regardless of “position” or “answer” setting an arbitrary time line for truth is neither, logical, nor empirical, nor scientific. the emphasis was on your arbitrary timeline for when truth is still truth.
And I told you more to follow, but it is memorial day, so if my response doesn’t come today I sincerely hope I wont run afoul of your “magical timeline of doom”, where no truth can escape from.
Maybe you can also explain how you can even use some of the language you do based on a world-view which only acknowledges “atoms in motion” and doesn’t have an answer to the problem of induction.
I have never met a “strong atheist” they always insist on borrowing form other world views in order to live out life. They are only “strong atheists” (an illogical position by the way unless you think you can affirm a negative concerning the metaphysical in the absolute) when they are debating on blog sites. Then they march right back into the real world where they all of a sudden believe in objective morale values, etc.
“an illogical position by the way, unless you think you can affirm a negative concerning the metaphysical in the absolute”
Both of us deny the existence of square circles and there is nothing illogical in it. Unless you can come up with a definition of God that is coherent, we can feel free to affirm with all letters that such a contradiction doesn’t exist. As a being that “creates” reality and give objects their identities, his inexistence is 100 % garanteed. Your definiton of God is all proof of his inexistence one can possibly need.
@Nick
Oh this is just hilarious. You supposedly can’t say much because it’s Memorial day; but you somehow still managed to make a comment, and what does that comment contain? Does it contain a worthy and logical articulation of why logic/knowledge necessitates God? Of course not. It just contains more obsessing over irrelevancy. Pathetic.
And I didn’t set an arbitrary timeline for truth. I said I CAN CONCLUDE…(I) can conclude. This is reasonable. If you ask a female for a date, and she takes minutes to answer, YOU can conclude, that she either doesn’t want to go, or at the very least, can’t answer right now because she’s not sure. There’s a reasonable time for any response. This is like a debate but in written format. If you asked someone in a face to face debate to give a logical account of something, and they are silent for 10 minutes, one can conclude the question has revealed that their position is false or illogical. If their position was correct, they would not be silent for no 10 MINUTES. That’s common sense. What are you supposed to do? Sit there and left them think about it for 2 hours? No; There’s a reasonable timeline. In this format, a few days is the most because you have to know people have social lives /obligations, and are not on the computer all day. What are you supposed to do, check in regularly for 2 weeks until they MAY respond. That dog don’t hunt.
@Maxwell Hollack: Christian apologists, particularly of the presuppositional bent, claim that the Christian worldview is the basis of rationality, that the existence of the Christian god is the necessary precondition for intelligibility, etc. If I have any burden to meet, I’ve more than met it. To see more, please visit my blog sometime: http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/
@Nick F: Memorial Day is over, and we’re still waiting. Bolt & co. seem to have abandoned the discussion, so it may be up to you to defend the view that knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god.
Regards,
Dawson
Thank you all for your comments. Unfortunately, they have drifted well off topic.
Agreus responded, “Chris, I just sifted through the past week or so of comments after having returned from a trip and all I can say is that the versions of TAG you have presented so far really are nothing more than bare assertions. It is what I earlier referred to as TAG v1 (or the Transcendental Assumption of God). Is this your idea of a good argument?”
Agreus attempted to reconcile the two objections in the initial post. He has been presenting contradictory reasons for considering TAG to be a circular argument. Again, even if circularity is established, it is difficult to see how TAG can be both unstated and circular. Please see the original post – https://choosinghats.org/?p=1207
In this comment – https://choosinghats.org/?p=1207&cpage=1#comment-1712 – I wrote the following to Agreus:
“When this conversation is complete I will be posting it as its own entry. If you do not demonstrate circularity within TAG in your next post the thread is over and the conversation is posted as is. It’s going to look bad at this point, so I do hope you produce some actual argument or evidence or whatever it is you have that demonstrates that TAG is circular!”
As promised, the thread is now closed. I hope to post the conversation with Agreus and also interact some more with what Dawson Bethrick has written concerning circularity in a separate post. No promises on how soon that will be.