**Stroud’s Objection Restated**

Bálint Békefi **proposes** the following transcendental argument (Békefi, B. Van Til versus Stroud: “Is the Transcendental Argument for Christian Theism Viable?” TheoLogica. Published Online First: September 26, 2017):

*(S1) If the negation of p is self-defeating, then p is true.
(S2) The negation of p is self-defeating.
(S3) Therefore, p is true.* (Békefi 9)

Békefi follows Adrian Bardon (Bardon, Adrian. “Performative Transcendental Arguments.” Philosophia 33: 2005, 69-95) in distinguishing between two types of self-defeating propositions:

*A proposition then is performatively self-falsifying if its affirmation implies its falsehood; it is self-stultifying if its truth implies that one can never be rationally justified in affirming it.* (Békefi 10)

Thus, Békefi restates his transcendental argument:

*(1) If the negation of p is either self-stultifying or performatively self-falsifying, then p is true.
(2) The negation of p is either self-stultifying or performatively self-falsifying.
(3) Therefore, p is true. *(10)

Having provided the aforementioned distinction between self-stultifying and performatively self-falsifying propositions and having applied said distinction to the transcendental argument in question, Békefi states what he believes is Barry Stroud’s objection to transcendental arguments:

*Stroud’s objection is that showing that we must believe something (probably because we can never be justified in believing its negation) does not establish its truth. We can plausibly take Stroud to be talking about self-stultification—and so the gist of his critique, the Stroudian thesis, can be formulated in the following way:
(ST): Self-stultification does not imply falsehood. *(10)

The question of a proper interpretation of Stroud’s objection aside, it can be demonstrated that Békefi’s ST is not nearly as strong as it can be since it is also the case that performative self-falsification does not entail falsehood. Thus ST needs to be restated:

(STʹ): Self-defeat does not imply falsehood.

For example, Bardon borrows from Davidson to state:

*Our belief-forming practices are not reliable.* (Bardon 73)

Bardon explains, “If not, then most of what we say is false, and so our utterances could not be part of a public language. But then none of our utterances, including any attempt to affirm this proposition, would be meaningful.” (73) Perhaps, but it does not follow that the proposition is false. The performative element contradicts the proposition, but implies nothing with respect to the truth or falsehood of the proposition. The proposition might still be true; it is not falsified by way of assertion. Propositions are true or false; performative inconsistencies are not. Performative inconsistencies do not establish anything with respect to the content of propositions.

Békefi reformulates TACT according to the modified self-defeat view:

*(C1’) If the negation of CT is performatively self-falsifying, then CT is true.
(C2’) The negation of CT is performatively self-falsifying.* (Békefi 11)

Since self-defeat, whether in terms of performative self-falsification or self-stultification, does not imply falsehood, the first premise is false.

**Modest Transcendental Arguments**

Here is a proposal for a Modest Transcendental Argument:

(T1) If the negation of p is self-defeating, then p is transcendentally necessary.*

(T2) The negation of p is self-defeating.

(T3) Therefore, p is transcendentally necessary.

The argument is ‘modified’ because it no longer claims anything with respect to the truth or falsehood of the proposition in question.

The argument is ‘transcendental’ because it pertains to necessary preconditions of intelligible experience, not to metaphysics.

The argument is in a deductively valid form; *modus ponens*.

The argument has true premises, since self-defeat just means performative inconsistency or irrationality, and the negation of p entails self-defeat.

The argument is sound.

**Van Tilian Transcendental Arguments**

The transcendental method set forth by Cornelius Van Til and Greg Bahnsen is useful whether it is interpreted transcendentally or metaphysically. By ‘useful,’ I simply mean that the transcendental method is a cogent apologetic argument. Not only is the argument sound, as demonstrated above, but persuasive. Why? The argument demonstrates (assuming all the other pieces are in order, which Stroud’s objection does not address) that if someone wishes to set forth any rational argumentation whatsoever, he or she must psychologically presuppose the Christian worldview (or more narrowly construed, God) to make sense of anything. The unbeliever must remain silent (because of performative inconsistency) or function irrationally (because of self-stultification). This is more than enough for the apologist. This result is also perfectly consistent with traditional Van Tilian claims. Although this modest expression is not the strongest form of the Van Tilian project, the argument still powerfully demonstrates that in order for unbelievers to be able to argue against Christianity, they must first assume they are wrong – and not just wrong, but *undoubtedly* wrong – and that does not sound like a very happy state of affairs (no pun intended) for the skeptic. In the end, the Stroudian objection tends to highlight the tenacity of the transcendental method.

*In the comments David Byron rightly observes:

Rather, (T1’) If the negation of p is self-defeating, then a transcendental equivalent of p is transcendentally necessary.

Maintaining a strict distinction between “metaphysical “ and “transcendental” (if that were meaningful) ensures that this rebuttal is insurmountable.

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