Mitch LeBlanc has posted the draft for his journal submission on The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God. In the Abstract for the article, he writes, “I present a couple of objections formulated by Sean Choi and Michael Martin and develop three of my own”. It has been pointed out already that whatever Mitch is arguing against, it is not Bahnsen’s TAG. Given that even I, though not very well read on TAG, had encountered the objections from Choi and Martin no later than 2007 and given the recent interaction found here and here with some of the material Mitch has already posted on this topic one should be thankful that Mitch has advanced three other arguments of his own in his article.
I propose firstly that a Euthyphro-like dilemma regarding the principles of logic reveals an insufficient, or at least, arbitrary justification. I then show that the symmetrical relationship between logical principles and the existence of God is a severe problem for Christian theism which must either reject the necessity for logical principles, or Christian theism altogether. I conclude that the existence logical principles cannot depend on the Christian God. Lastly, I show that the mere possibility that God justifies logical principles in any of the ways criticized by the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God requires further explanation from the Christian theist as to how divine justification differs from human justification.
There is certainly room to critique these arguments as well, but recall that Mitch has not provided an answer to the TA advanced in defense of the TAG. As already mentioned, Mitch is really dodging the brunt of the TAG. He has no place to stand whereupon he may raise his objections to the TAG. While elsewhere describing his position on logic as falling under the label of “conventionalism” and hence submitting himself to refutations of this view, he proposes another way of accounting for logic in his article.
It seems to me that some hybridization of any of the mentioned means of justification may bring about a new means of justification. For example, a hybridization of an a priori and conventionalist system may succeed in providing the justification of logic sought by Bahnsen, but in a manner wherein the new system may be thought of as unique to both previous a priori systems, and forms of conventionalism.
If the earlier position of “conventionalism” Mitch claimed to adhere to satisfies what the TAG proponent is looking for, then why is there a need for any discussion of hybrid systems? What exactly is the position Mitch adheres to? More importantly, why does he think that putting two leaky buckets together will give him somewhere to keep the water? If some feature of some kind of alleged justification is the same in various systems of alleged justifications then why should one expect that feature to hold in other systems where it has failed before given a similar context? Surely Mitch is not suggesting that there are an infinite, even an indefinite number of such features?
One more brief comment. Mitch presents Fristianity in his article in such a way as has already been seen to fail.
Fristianity is a worldview…which is identical to Christianity with the exception of the triune godhead…The distinguishing feature of Fristianity is that its godhead is a quadrinity rather than a trinity, it is essentially a “Christianity + 1”.
Unless Mitch shows that he is standing on something more than thin air in his utilization of logic to make his arguments, there is no real need for concern.