circular

It’s Circular Because It’s Circular

November 13, 2012 / C. L. Bolt

The charge that presuppositionalism is “circular” must be one of the dumbest objections I have ever heard.

No really. Think about it for just a moment.

You hear the accusation again and again that presuppositional apologetics are “circular.” The implication is that the charge of circularity in view here constitutes an objection against presuppositional apologetics. A fatal objection, even. So a logical point is being made. A fallacy is in view.

Presuppositional Apologetics Can’t Be Circular

But it should be noted right away that “presuppositional apologetics” can never be circular. Neither the label “presuppositional apologetics” nor the discipline the label …

Three Very Different Philosophers: Necessity of Epistemic Circularity

December 13, 2011 / C. L. Bolt

“But don’t the doctrines of the imago dei (the image of God), and the purpose of human creation already presuppose that we can have substantive knowledge of God? They seem clearly to do this, and if so, then they cannot be appealed to in a noncircular argument for this theological optimism as a conclusion.

First, it must be pointed out that the possibility of any kind of basic knowledge cannot be demonstrated by means of noncircular, nonquestion-begging arguments, by arguments that do not in any way already presume to some extent that to which they intend to lend some support.